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Abstract
A foreign subsidiary’s performance depends on its ability to manage the
institutional context of its resource decisions. In response to the evolving institutional
contexts facilitated by economic liberalization, MNEs have dramatically increased their
ownership levels in their FDIs in some emerging economies. Nevertheless, the
international business field has yet to sufficiently understand the consequent performance
of those FDIs with increasingly higher MNE ownership levels. To address this gap, this
dissertation is guided by three research questions. First, how does economic liberalization
influence an MNE’s ownership choice in emerging economies? Second, how does
economic liberalization change the relationship between an MNE’s equity ownership and
its subsidiary’s profitability? Third, how does economic liberalization influence a foreign
subsidiary’s survival?
Utilizing a multi-theoretic lens, this dissertation investigates these questions by
comparing Japanese investments from 1990 to 2009 in China, the largest emerging
economy, and in the United States, the largest advanced economy.
Essay 1 investigates how economic liberalization and subsidiary experience
influence an MNE’s ownership choice. It posits that an MNE increases its ownership
level in China to accommodate the process of economic liberalization and that an MNE
tends to maintain equity-based relationships with local actors as subsidiary experience
increases. In contrast, in the United States an MNE only increases its ownership level
with the accumulation of subsidiary experience.
Essay 2 examines the evolving relationship between MNE ownership level and
subsidiary profitability (the O-P relationship). It suggests that China’s economic
liberalization has incurred institutional uncertainty that negatively influences an MNE’s
O-P relationship. Moreover, with declining institutional uncertainty, an MNE’s O-P
relationship positively evolves as China’s economic liberalization expands. Even so, or
most years during 1990-2009, an MNE’s O-P relationship remains negative in China,
indicating that high equity control does not lead to superior subsidiary profitability in
i

China. Empirical results show that the O-P relationship in the United States has evolved
as well.
Essay 3 examines the survival of a foreign subsidiary under the conditions of
economic liberalization, and the relationship between MNE ownership level and
subsidiary survival (the O-S relationship). It suggests that the profitability of a foreign
subsidiary is associated with its survival. Moreover, institutional uncertainty is positively
associated with subsidiary survival. While the survival rate of Japanese subsidiaries in the
United States does not change, it declines over time in China with decreasing institutional
uncertainty.
This dissertation provides a detailed picture of MNE ownership and subsidiary
performance under the condition of economic liberalization.
Keywords: emerging economy; institutional voids; economic liberalization; institutional
transition; subnational disparity; ownership strategy; subsidiary performance; profitability;
survival

ii

Dedication

To Heavenly Father –
Your word is a lamp to my feet, and a light to my path. (Psalm 119:105)

iii

Acknowledgement
Ten years ago, when I was still working as an engineer in Shanghai, I had no idea
that eventually I would pursue an academic career in international business. I still
remember the huge excitement when I received the PhD admission letter from Ivey
Business School in the spring of 2010. I still have the first course paper I wrote during my
doctorial studies. Today I still realize how lucky I am to have this priceless opportunity
in my life. It is not only a journey to grow to a junior scholar, but also a journey to
exercise my faith. With faith all things are possible.
A number of people have been highly influential on my development over the
course of my doctoral studies. First is my supervisor Dr. Paul Beamish who guided me
throughout my PhD journey with intellectual and emotional support with no reservation.
His passion for an academic career has strengthened my desire to be a useful scholar, and
his rigorous work style has shaped my good work habits. These influences will benefit
my whole scholarly life. Dr. Matt Thompson, the instructor in my first class at Ivey,
helped me in adapting to the western classroom quickly and establishing my initial
confidence for my doctoral studies. No words can express my gratitude to them.
I also sincerely appreciate my proposal and thesis committee members who
provided valuable assistance to me in completing this thesis, namely, Dr. Glenn Rowe, Dr.
Andreas Schotter, Dr. Brian Pinkham, Dr. Roy Eagleson, and Dr. Lance Brothers. Their
academic rigor has extensively honed my theoretical thinking.
I am grateful to other Ivey faculty members with whom I worked in courses or
other scholarly activities such as teaching, particularly Dr. Rod White, Dr. Chris Higgins,
Dr. Oana Branzei, Dr. Claus Rerup, Dr. Tima Bansal, Dr. Mark Zbaracki, Dr. Christopher
Williams, Dr. Jean-Louis Schaan, and Dr. Lynn Imai. I had the honor of learning from
them and working with each.
I am grateful to my fellow PhD colleagues from all over the world. They shared
with me their wonderful ideas and experiences, particularly Dr. Majid Eghbali-Zarch, Dr.
Michael Sartor, Dr. Bassam Farah, Yves Plourde, Nathaniel Lupton, Vanessa Hasse,
iv

Maya Kumar, Yamlaksira Getachew, and Max Stallkamp. I had the honor of working
with so many promising scholars who will influence the world.
I am grateful to PhD Program Office and all the staff at the Ivey Business School.
They greatly helped me in smoothing all procedures throughout my studies.
I am grateful to my best friends who always acted as cheerleaders during the
course of my doctoral studies. Paul Parker and Min Liu were always available when I
needed them. Wenbei Li always shared with me her philosophy about everything,
enriching me with ideas that are not available from elsewhere. Dr. Li Dai provided
constant inspiration and comfort during my progress. With their care, I never felt lonely
in Canada.
Specifically, I am grateful to Sisters and Brothers at the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints. They made me believe that all truth is one, no matter science or
religion.
Finally, I am grateful to Canada where my academic dream took off. Over the
course of my studies I enjoyed the clean air, water, and food, and peaceful life in this
beautiful country. This precious experience made me believe that there could be a better
world for the entire human race, calling for each one’s contribution including mine.

v

Table of Contents
Abstract .............................................................................................................................i
Dedication ...................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgement ...........................................................................................................iv
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................ix
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. x
Chapter 1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 1
Literature Review ............................................................................................................. 3
Emerging Economies ....................................................................................................... 5
Research Setting ............................................................................................................... 7
Data and Methods ............................................................................................................. 8
Dissertation Overview ...................................................................................................... 9
Essay 1 .......................................................................................................................... 9
Essay 2 ........................................................................................................................ 10
Essay 3 ........................................................................................................................ 11
Dissertation-Related Presentations ................................................................................. 11
Writing Style .................................................................................................................. 12
References ...................................................................................................................... 14
Chapter 2. Significance, Substance, and Dynamism of Institutional Response:
Japanese MNEs’ Ownership Choices in China and the United States ....................... 18
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 18
Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 21
Theories on Ownership Strategy ................................................................................ 21
Economic Liberalization............................................................................................. 24
Research Setting ......................................................................................................... 25
Hypotheses ..................................................................................................................... 27
The Influence of Economic Liberalization ................................................................. 28
Subsidiary Experience ................................................................................................ 32
Methodology .................................................................................................................. 34
Samples ....................................................................................................................... 36
Dependent and Independent Variables ....................................................................... 36
Control Variables ........................................................................................................ 37
Descriptive Statistics and Multi-Collinearity ............................................................. 39
Results ............................................................................................................................ 40
Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 45
Significance, Substance, and Dynamism of Institutional Response ........................... 45
vi

Control Variables ........................................................................................................ 46
Robustness Checks ..................................................................................................... 48
Contributions and Next Steps ..................................................................................... 49
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 52
References ...................................................................................................................... 53
Chapter 3. The Evolving Relationship between MNE Ownership (O) and
Subsidiary Profitability (P) ............................................................................................. 60
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 60
Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 63
Emerging Economies .................................................................................................. 65
Research Setting ......................................................................................................... 66
Hypotheses ..................................................................................................................... 68
Evolution of the O-P Relationship.............................................................................. 68
Methodology .................................................................................................................. 72
Samples ....................................................................................................................... 73
Variables ..................................................................................................................... 74
Descriptive Statistics and Multi-Collinearity ............................................................. 78
Results ............................................................................................................................ 81
Robustness Checks ......................................................................................................... 84
Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 87
Evolution of the O-P Relationship in China ............................................................... 87
Control Variables ........................................................................................................ 89
Contributions and Next Steps ..................................................................................... 90
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 94
References ...................................................................................................................... 95
Chapter 4. MNE Ownership (O), Subsidiary Survival (S), and Economic
Liberalization ................................................................................................................. 103
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 103
Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 105
Subsidiary Survival and Institutional Environment.................................................. 105
Subsidiary Survival and MNE Equity Ownership .................................................... 107
Emerging Economies ................................................................................................ 107
Research Setting ....................................................................................................... 109
Theory and Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 110
Subsidiary Survival and Profitability ....................................................................... 110
Subsidiary Survival and Its Evolution ...................................................................... 111
The O-S Relationship and Its Evolution ................................................................... 114
Methodology ................................................................................................................ 116
vii

Samples ..................................................................................................................... 116
Variables ................................................................................................................... 117
Descriptive Statistics and Multi-Collinearity ........................................................... 121
Empirical Tests ............................................................................................................. 124
Event History Analysis without Instrumental Variables .......................................... 124
Event History Analysis with Instrumental Variables ............................................... 125
Robustness Checks ................................................................................................... 130
Discussion .................................................................................................................... 131
Control Variables ...................................................................................................... 131
Contributions and Next Steps ................................................................................... 132
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 136
References .................................................................................................................... 137
Chapter 5. General Conclusions ................................................................................ 145
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 145
Contributions ................................................................................................................ 148
Limitations and Future Research .................................................................................. 150
References .................................................................................................................... 154
Curriculum Vitae ........................................................................................................... 157

viii

List of Tables
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations ................................................ 41
Table 2.2 Four-Level Latent Growth Modeling ................................................................ 43
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations ................................................ 79
Table 3.2 Three-Level Longitudinal Logistic Regression ................................................. 82
Table 3.3 Robustness Check with Instrumental Variables ................................................ 86
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations .............................................. 122
Table 4.2 Event History Analysis without Correcting for Endogeneity .......................... 126
Table 4.3 Event History Analysis after Correcting for Endogeneity ............................... 128

ix

List of Figures
Figure 1.1 Average Values of Japanese Ownership Levels ................................................. 2
Figure 1.2 Dissertation Overview ...................................................................................... 13
Figure 2.1 Theoretical Foundation ..................................................................................... 32
Figure 2.2 Theoretical Model............................................................................................. 34
Figure 2.3 Influence of Economic Liberalization on Japanese Ownership Level ............. 47
Figure 2.4 Influence of Subsidiary Experience on Japanese Ownership Level ................. 47
Figure 3.1 Performance Projections for Subsidiaries in China (1992, 2000, and 2009) ... 88
Figure 3.2 Performance Projections for Subsidiaries in China (1990 – 2009) .................. 89
Figure 4.1 Subsidiary Survival between 1990-2008 ........................................................ 132
Figure 5.1 Summary of Dissertation Findings ................................................................. 153

x

1

Chapter 1. Introduction
Cross-border ownership strategy, defined as the degree of ownership of a
multinational enterprise (MNE) investing abroad, can affect the overseas subsidiaries’
likelihood of success and the overall probability of survival (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004;
Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino, 1994). Prior studies, most of which substantiated their
conclusions with data prior to 2000, have investigated how an MNE’s ownership choice
influences its overseas performance, via subsidiary profitability and/or survival. It has
been suggested that the relationship between MNE ownership and subsidiary profitability
(the O-P relationship) in emerging economies might be different from those in advanced
economies. Wholly owned subsidiaries (WOSs) tend to have higher profitability than
international joint ventures (IJVs) established in North America or Europe because of
interest alignment, mutual trust, and security of firm specific assets (Nitsch, Beamish, and
Makino, 1996; Woodcock et al., 1994). In contrast, IJVs have better profitability than the
WOSs in emerging economies because governments often limit location-specific
resources that are critical to performance to IJVs so as to protect indigenous enterprises
from the threat of competition (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Makino and Beamish, 1998;
Oman, 1988). Moreover, prior studies also have suggested that the relationship between
MNE ownership level and subsidiary survival (the O-S relationship) is positive and
nonlinear (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Lu and Hébert, 2005). Therefore, it is of critical
importance for MNEs to adopt an appropriate ownership strategy overseas in order to
generate profits and survive in a foreign country.
The past two decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the global economy.
The time-varying institutional contexts and MNEs’ responses have been challenging
scholars’ prior understanding of an MNE’s ownership choice and corresponding
performance outcomes. One of the most fundamental institutional changes is the rapid
development of emerging economies that use economic liberalization as their primary
engine of growth (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright, 2000).
When regulatory liberalization of foreign direct investments (FDIs) is an important
dimension of economic liberalization in the host country, MNEs increasingly adopt WOS
entries and even convert existing IJVs to WOSs (Chang, Chung, and Moon, 2013;
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Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Puck, Holtbrügge, Mohr, Lee, and Makhija, 2009). Based on data
compiled in this dissertation, Japanese MNEs have dramatically increased their average
ownership level in FDIs in China during the period of China’s economic liberalization. In
contrast, over the same period, they have only slightly increased their average ownership
level in FDIs in the United States. Figure 1.1 delineates this emerging phenomenon.
Figure 1.1 Average Values of Japanese Ownership Levels

In spite of a preference by many MNEs for majority or sole ownership, rapid
changes in the institutional environment require MNEs to cope with various uncertainties
which they had never encountered before (Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan, 2010;
Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Therefore, it is necessary to revisit an MNE’s ownership
choice and the O-P/O-S relationship. Otherwise, scholars are unable to prescribe how
MNEs can utilize their cross-border ownership strategies to secure the success of their
overseas investments.
This dissertation is guided by three research questions. First, how does economic
liberalization influence an MNE’s ownership choice in emerging economies? Second,
how does economic liberalization influence the relationship between an MNE’s equity
ownership and its subsidiary’s profitability? Third, how does economic liberalization
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change the survival prospect of a foreign subsidiary and the relationship between an
MNE’s equity ownership and its subsidiary’s survival? By exploring these three questions,
this dissertation bolsters MNEs’ comprehension of possible strategies to develop and
secure competitive advantages in foreign countries.
This chapter proceeds with a brief review of the existing literature pertaining to
the research questions. The chapter also identifies research gaps which can be addressed
to further the understanding of MNEs’ ownership strategies and the O-P/O-S relationship.
It then discusses the core theoretical foundations that inform this dissertation research. It
briefly concludes with an outline of each essay as an overview of the research that
constitutes the dissertation.

Literature Review
Historically, IB scholars have studied MNEs’ ownership choice and the O-P/O-S
relationship by considering transactional, institutional and experience influences (Chang
et al., 2013; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Demirbag, Glaister, and Tatoglu, 2007; Dhanaraj
and Beamish, 2004). To address the research questions, this dissertation primarily focuses
on institutional influences, but incorporates other types of influences such as asset
specificity into the analysis.
Prior studies of MNEs’ ownership strategy and the O-P/O-S relationship consider
different types of institutional influences. In general, the sources of institutional
influences can be categorized into institutional pressure and institutional uncertainty.
Studies focusing on the influence of institutional pressure mainly examine how an MNE
responds to relevant institutions in its ownership strategy so that its actions can be
perceived as legitimate (i.e., desirable, proper or appropriate) by the host/home country,
peers and the MNE itself (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Suchman, 1995; Xia, Tan, and Tan,
2008). This stream implicitly assumes that (i) the MNE has clear knowledge of
institutions that are fixed for some meaningful period, and (ii) lack of legitimacy may
result in poor local performance. Based on these assumptions, this stream advocates that
institutions (as a set of norms, cultural beliefs, and regulations) shape an MNE’s practices
and structures through institutional pressures for isomorphism (Kostova, Roth, and Dacin,
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2008; Scott, 1995). Moreover, this stream posits that institutional pressure influences an
MNE’s ownership choice by mechanisms that are distinct from transactional or
experience factors. While transactional and experience factors address the question about
what ownership structure the MNE wants in order to achieve better local performance, the
influence of institutional pressure addresses the question about what ownership structure
the MNE should have, irrespective of the optimal performance (Gomes-Casseres, 1990).
In addition, assuming that the MNE has clear knowledge of institutions, this stream does
not consider the influence of experience.
Regulatory restriction/liberalization and peer pressure are two types of
institutional pressure that an MNE must cope with in its ownership choice (Child, 1997;
Peng, 2003). The pressure from regulatory restriction on FDI may bring about a “forced”
local ownership for an MNE, even where transaction cost economics (TCE) does not
predict the existence of the IJV (Contractor, 1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). In contrast, an
MNE encounters less pressure when the host country liberalizes this restriction. An MNE
may respond to the institutional pressure stemming from reference groups or peers that it
is associated with, and increase its ownership level irrespective of efficiency
considerations (Chang et al., 2013; Xia et al., 2008).
Institutional pressure influences an MNE’s overseas performance by constraining
resource allocation. For example, with regulatory restriction, an MNE seldom obtains the
necessary subsidies and/or incentives from the host government to ensure profit in WOS
operation (Makino and Beamish, 1998; Oman, 1988). As a result, IJVs tend to have a
better performance than WOSs (Makino and Beamish, 1998; Oman, 1988). In contrast,
WOSs may have a better performance than IJVs in developed countries where MNEs can
arrange their ownership structures based on firm factors such as asset specificity (Nitsch
et al., 1996; Woodcock et al., 1994). This stream implies that an MNE’s ownership
strategy interacts with the institutional pressure inherent in the host country to influence
the subsidiary performance.
Studies focusing on the influence of institutional uncertainty examine how an
MNE arranges its subsidiaries’ ownership structures based on the extent to which it can
understand and cope with local institutions (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Kostova and
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Zaheer, 1999; Xu, Pan, and Beamish, 2004). Assuming that it takes time for the MNE to
accumulate experience about the local institutions and corresponding practices, this
stream explicitly or implicitly draws on TCE logics such as the resource complementarity
of potential partners (Hennart, 2009). It has been suggested that an MNE’s local
performance is threatened by the deficiency in the knowledge/capabilities of coping with
a broad array of host country characteristics that constitute the host country’s institutional
environment, including political and legal rules, and the social norms. This produces
significant uncertainty or competitive disadvantage for an MNE (Kostova and Zaheer,
1999; North, 1990). It can be inferred that with adequate local institutional knowledge the
MNE may consider a higher ownership level to secure its specific assets unless it is
prevented by local regulation. In contrast, if an MNE has not acquired the institutional
advantages that are critical to its overseas performance, it may access them by sharing
ownership with indigenous partners (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Delios and Beamish,
1999; Hennart, 2009). Moreover, experience can improve the MNE’s institutional
knowledge and reduce institutional uncertainty over time, leading to positive ownership
adjustment (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Hennart, 1991; Makino and Delios, 1996). This
stream implies that an MNE’s ownership choice interacts with the institutional
uncertainty to influence the subsidiary performance.
Prior studies have contributed to our understanding of an MNE’s cross-border
ownership strategy and the consequent performance within relatively static institutional
environments. Nevertheless, previous research has yet to consider a more dynamic
context that simultaneously reshapes institutional pressure and institutional uncertainty
that an MNE confronts. Studying such a dynamic and complex context is necessary and
important in order to comprehensively understand an MNE’s ownership choice and
subsidiary performance in an emerging economy.

Emerging Economies
The institutional context in an emerging economy is complicated by the
coexistence of institutional voids and economic liberalization (Arnold and Quelch, 1998;
Hoskisson et al., 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). On one hand, institutional voids
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represent underdeveloped capital markets, infrastructure, intermediary markets,
regulatory systems,

contract-enforcing mechanisms

or other market-supporting

institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). On the other hand, economic liberalization may
fill institutional voids by establishing formal market-oriented mechanisms and structures
that facilitate market exchange (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Taking China as an example,
economic liberalization (i) facilitates regulatory liberalization, (ii) decentralizes decisionmaking power from the central government to provincial and/or city governments and
local enterprises, (iii) privatizes property rights, (iv) establishes relevant legal systems to
improve incentive structures and enforcement mechanisms, and (v) formulates favorable
industrial policies that influence resource allocations (Child and Tse, 2001; Davis, Desai,
and Francis, 2000). Therefore, economic liberalization facilitates institutional changes in
terms of both depth and breadth regarding their influences on economic activities.
These institutional changes reshape institutional pressure and uncertainty that an
MNE must cope with in its ownership choice. They also complicate the O-P/O-S
relationship. On one hand, economic liberalization facilitates institutional transition that
replaces institutional voids with market-supporting institutions over time (Peng, 2003).
On the other hand, institutional transition proceeds unevenly across political hierarchies
and geographies, and an MNE increasingly confronts political, social and economic
institutions at the subnational level rather than at the country level (Chan, Makino, and
Isobe, 2010; Shi, Markóczy, and Stan, 2014). Thus the combination of institutional voids
and market-based rules varies in time and space, resulting in subnational disparity in
institutional pressure and uncertainty (Chan et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2014). Institutional
transition and subnational disparity cause the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of
institutional conditions varying across the geographic scope and over time (Dess and
Beard, 1984; Tan and Tan, 2005). These factors complicate an MNE’s understandings of
the states of institutions and their cause-effect on subsidiary performance, constituting the
main sources of uncertainty that a foreign MNE must cope with in an emerging economy.
Nevertheless, prior literature has yet to synthesize the institutional uncertainty stemming
from institutional transition and subnational disparity into the research on MNE
ownership choice and subsidiary performance.
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This dissertation systematically synthesizes time- and space-varying institutional
influences stemming from the process of economic liberalization to further scholarly
understanding of an MNE’s ownership choice and the O-P/O-S relationship in an
emerging economy. Accordingly, this dissertation adopts an institution-based view, in
conjunction with TCE, learning perspective, the resource-based view (RBV), and real
options perspective (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Kogut, 1991; Meyer, 2001; Wright,
Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005). The performance of a subsidiary is determined
by its sustained competitive advantages (Barney, 1991). A subsidiary’s sustained
competitive advantages depends on its ability to manage the institutional context of its
resource decisions (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008b; Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang,
and Jiang, 2008). These decisions are usually concerned with securing firm-specific
assets and acquiring/accessing complementary local assets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008;
Hennart, 2009). Moreover, institutional uncertainty increases the importance of keeping
options available (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008a; Cuypers and Martin, 2007;
Vassolo, Anand, and Folta, 2004), thus influencing an MNE’s decision on subsidiary
termination as well. When the institutional context varies over time and across
geographies, its variation should be included in theoretical analysis and empirical testing
in performance research.

Research Setting
This dissertation compares Japanese FDIs in China and the United States. There
are several advantages for such a research setting. First, examining MNEs from one
country such as Japan can control for the endogeneity issue caused by country origin that
influences an MNE’s ownership choice (Erramilli, 1996; Shaver, 1998). Moreover, a
number of prior studies have empirically examined Japanese FDIs (Makino and Beamish,
1998; Woodcock et al., 1994), providing a basis for comparison with this dissertation.
Second, this research setting allows for comparison of Japanese FDIs in China, the
largest emerging economy undergoing an institutional transition, with those in the United
States, the largest advanced economy sustaining a relatively mature free-market
institutional environment (Chan et al., 2010). This provides a larger sample size for
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empirical tests. This setting also controls for the confounding effects of multiple host
countries (Makino, Isobe, and Chan, 2004; Pattnaik, Choe, and Singh, 2015). Although
advanced economies advocate free market institutions, they still differ in other
dimensions of their institutional environments (e.g., country culture) that influence a
foreign MNE’s ownership choice (Xu et al., 2004). In addition, emerging economies
employ heterogeneous approaches to economic liberalization (Lau, Qian, and Roland,
2000). These different approaches may facilitate distinct institutional changes in scope,
intensity, and duration (Brouthers and Lamb Jr, 1995; Roland, 2002), potentially
complicating theoretical analysis and empirical testing when involving more than one
emerging economy.
Third, China advocates a gradualist, dual-track strategy for economic
liberalization, a process by which a market track is introduced and gradually strengthened
while the central planning track is maintained and progressively diminished (Lau et al.,
2000; Park, Li, and Tse, 2006). This dual-track nature results in incremental economic
liberalization lasting for a lengthy period of time, making it possible to identify the
overall trends of China’s institutional conditions by accessing well-documented
governmental policies and relevant academic studies.

Data and Methods
Data used in this dissertation is from the Merged Toyo Keizai and Needs Datasets
(2012 Edition). Many prior studies referred to in this dissertation used earlier editions of
the Toyo Keizai datasets (Makino and Beamish, 1998; Nitsch et al., 1996; Woodcock et
al., 1994). Using the data from the same organization improves the reliability of this
dissertation. The dissertation adopts longitudinal and multilevel methodologies so that the
evolutionary nature of an MNE’s ownership choice and its subsidiary performance can be
empirically identified (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, and Mathieu, 2007; Hoskisson et al.,
2000). Moreover, this dissertation also addresses endogeneity issues caused by an MNE’s
ownership choice with panel data and instrumental variables (Hamilton and Nickerson,
2003; Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood, 2012; Shaver, 1998).
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Dissertation Overview
This dissertation is organized as a collection of three integrated essays. Figure 1.1
delineates the structure of the dissertation, detailing the focal phenomena, the theoretical
foundations underpinning this dissertation, and the contributions that link the essays
together. Essay 1 integrates regulatory liberalization, institutional uncertainty and peer
pressure into the analysis of MNE ownership choice. Essay 2 and Essay 3 jointly
investigate the evolution of subsidiary performance, and the O-P/O-S relationships under
the conditions of economic liberalization. In particular, Essay 3 identifies the association
and differentiation between subsidiary profitability and survival.
Essay 1
The first essay (Chapter 2), entitled “Significance, Substance, and Dynamism of
Institutional Response”, investigates how Japanese MNEs are adapting their ownership
choices to accommodate China’s gradual economic liberalization process and the
relatively mature free-market system in the United States. Prior studies focus on China’s
regulatory condition on foreign equity ownership. They suggest that regulatory
liberalization allows decisions about partner choice to be increasingly based on rational
considerations of strategic intention, risk and transaction costs. In contrast to existing
research, Essay 1 involves broader aspects of economic liberalization such as political
decentralization and corresponding subnational disparity in institutions. Moreover,
existing literature suggests that subsidiary experience reduces an MNE’s reliance on local
partner(s) and leads to higher MNE ownership level. While this statement remains true in
an advanced economy where rule-based exchanges dominate, Essay 1 argues that it
should be re-examined within China’s institutional context. The institutional uncertainty
stemming from economic liberalization increases the importance of relationship-based
exchanges. In this vein, subsidiary experience in China is associated with relationshipbased operation rather than rule-based operation. As such, Essay 1 posits that a Japanese
MNE increases its ownership levels in China to accommodate the process of economic
liberalization. However, a Japanese MNE also tends to maintain equity-based
relationships with Chinese partners with the increase of subsidiary experience. In contrast,
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a Japanese MNE only increases its ownership levels in the United States with the
accumulation of subsidiary experience.
Empirical tests based on growth-curve models support the theory developed in
Essay 1, showing the significance, substance, and dynamism of an MNE’s institutional
response in terms of overseas ownership choice.
Essay 2
The second essay (Chapter 3), entitled “The Evolving Relationship between MNE
Ownership and Subsidiary Profitability”, examines the O-P relationship under the
condition of economic liberalization. Existing literature suggests that a Japanese MNE’s
ownership level is positively associated with the subsidiary profitability in developed
countries and negatively associated with those in developing countries. Essay 2
investigates an underexplored topic: the evolution of the O-P relationship during China’s
economic liberalization. Consistent with Essay 1, Essay 2 argues that China’s economic
liberalization not only has improved institutional openness towards foreign investments,
but also has incurred institutional uncertainty that an MNE must cope with. While
institutional openness positively adjusts an MNE’s O-P relationship, institutional
uncertainty negatively alters it. Moreover, along with the economic liberalization, China’s
institutional openness is increasing, reducing an MNE’s reliance on local partners to enter
the market. Meanwhile, China’s institutional uncertainty is declining, reducing an MNE’s
reliance on local partners to understand the state of local institutions and their causeeffect on subsidiary performance. Therefore, a Japanese MNE’s O-P relationship
positively evolves with China’s economic liberalization. Empirical tests based on
multilevel longitudinal models support this proposition. Even so, for most years during
1990-2009, a Japanese MNE’s O-P relationship remains negative in China. A negative OP relationship indicates that high equity control does not lead to superior subsidiary
profitability in China. Even after addressing the endogeneity issue caused by ownership
choices, this conclusion remains true.
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Essay 3
The third essay (Chapter 4), entitled “MNE Ownership, Subsidiary Survival and
Economic Liberalization”, examines the survival prospect of a foreign subsidiary and the
O-S relationship under the condition of economic liberalization. Prior studies suggest that
an MNE’s ownership level is positively associated with subsidiary survival (Dhanaraj and
Beamish, 2004; Lu and Hébert, 2005), and leave two research gaps. First, an MNE
chooses it overseas ownership level according to the institutional context within which it
operates. This highlights the necessity of addressing the endogeneity issue caused by
organizational choices when investigating an MNE’s O-S relationship (Reeb et al., 2012;
Shaver, 1998). Second, the survival of a foreign subsidiary is associated with its shortterm profitability and future opportunities. Although Essay 2 addressed subsidiary
profitability and the O-P relationship, it is necessary to investigate how the real options of
future opportunities influence subsidiary survival and the O-S relationship. Accordingly,
Essay 3 suggests that institutional uncertainty positively relates to the survival of a
foreign subsidiary because of the importance of keeping options available. With declining
institutional uncertainty in China, there is a decreasing need for an MNE to seize future
opportunities by maintaining non-performing subsidiaries. This results in a declining
survival rate of foreign subsidiaries in China. Essay 3 also identifies the association and
differentiation between subsidiary profitability and survival. After controlling for
endogeneity issues caused by ownership choices and subsidiary profitability, an MNE’s
O-S relationship is constantly insignificant in China and the United States.

Dissertation-Related Presentations
Prior to the submission of the dissertation for final examination, the theoretical
and empirical analyses presented in the following three essays have evolved through
extensive developmental feedback received from my supervisor and proposal committee
members as well as multiple public forums including doctorial consortiums, academic
conferences and invited scholarly presentations. With respect to Essay 1 (Chapter 2), the
author presented an early version at the Academy of International Business Annual
Meeting in June 2014 in a competitive session convened by the Institutional and Political
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Environment of IB interest track. It was nominated for the 2014 Temple/AIB Best Paper
Award. With respect to Essay 2 (Chapter 3), the author presented an early version at the
2014 Association of Japanese Business Studies Annual Conference. It was nominated for
the Palgrave Macmillan/AJBS Best Paper Award.

Writing Style
The three essays adopt the same research setting and a comparative methodology.
Therefore, they use the same procedure to select samples, and involve similar arguments
about institutional conditions in China and the United States. Inevitably, there is some
repetition regarding methodology and institutional contexts. The author retains them for
the completeness of each essay. Any repetition within essays will be eliminated at the
journal submission stage.
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Figure 1.2 Dissertation Overview
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Chapter 2. Significance, Substance, and Dynamism of
Institutional Response: Japanese MNEs’ Ownership
Choices in China and the United States
Introduction
The OLI paradigm describes that a multinational enterprise (MNE) always has a
configuration of firm specific ownership advantages (O), location specific advantages (L),
internalization advantages (I), and strategic objectives as well (Dunning, 1977; Dunning
and Lundan, 2008). As one means of realizing internalization advantages (Dunning,
1977), ownership strategy is critical for multinational enterprises (MNEs) as it affects the
overseas subsidiaries’ likelihood of success as well as the probability of survival
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Stopford and Wells, 1972; Woodcock,
Beamish, and Makino, 1994). International business (IB) research has investigated the
predictors of MNEs’ ownership patterns in foreign countries by considering various
transactional, institutional, and experience influences (Delios and Beamish, 1999;
Demirbag, Glaister, and Tatoglu, 2007).
The past two decades have witnessed dramatic institutional changes in emerging
economies facilitated by their economic liberalization. To cope with these evolving
institutional contexts, MNEs have increasingly adopted WOS entries and sometimes even
converted existing IJVs to WOSs (Chang, Chung, and Moon, 2013; Gomes-Casseres,
1990; Puck, Holtbrügge, Mohr, Lee, and Makhija, 2009). Based on data compiled in this
dissertation, Japanese MNEs have dramatically increased their average ownership level in
FDIs in China during the period of China’s economic liberalization. In contrast, over the
same period, they have only slightly increased their ownership levels in FDIs in the
United States. This emerging phenomenon delineated by Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, requires
scholars to understand the influence of economic liberalization on MNEs ownership
choice.
Prior studies have particularly been concerned with two competing institutional
influences in an emerging market: institutional voids and economic liberalization. On one
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hand, emerging economies are frequently characterized by “institutional voids”. The term
refers to the absence of market-oriented regulatory systems or contract enforcing
mechanisms which facilitate the efficient functioning of free markets (Khanna and Palepu,
1997). Thus, MNEs must develop relevant cross-border strategies to manage
underdeveloped institutions that either prevent market transactions or increase their costs
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). IB theorists have suggested that MNEs may respond
to institutional voids, such as foreign ownership restriction, through partnerships with
local firms (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Delios & Beamish, 1999). On the other hand,
emerging economies are recognized as rapid-growth countries using economic
liberalization as their primary engine (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau,
and Wright, 2000). Since economic liberalization will fill institutional voids with marketbased rules, foreign MNEs must respond to the liberalization process to continuously
reconfigure and secure their competitive advantages in emerging economies. Several
studies have posited that regulatory liberalization as an important aspect of economic
liberalization, may reduce the number of minority affiliates and even facilitate the
conversion of existing international joint ventures (IJVs) into wholly owned subsidiaries
(WOSs) (Contractor, 1990; Puck et al., 2009).
Nevertheless, most studies assume that economic liberalization is a singular event
or a steadily proceeding reform over time and across geographic space. These studies
have not sufficiently incorporated the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of the
institutional environment of an emerging economy into the research on MNEs’ ownership
strategies. For a variety of reasons, this issue deserves more attention. First, when
regulatory liberalization proceeds incrementally, it creates a changing threshold for levels
of foreign ownership and influences the extent to which an MNE can secure its firmspecific advantages and acquire/access local complementary resources. Whether and how
the MNE responds to the dynamics of regulatory liberalization reflects the MNE’s ability
to simultaneously reconfigure and secure its competitive advantages in a context with
rapid dynamics (Teece, 2007).
Second, regulatory liberalization influences the extent to which other factors play
roles in predicting the foreign ownership level. For example, ownership regulations may
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bring about a “forced” local ownership even where transaction cost economics (TCE)
does not predict the existence of the IJV (Contractor, 1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1990).
Incremental regulatory liberalization relaxes the threshold over time, allowing MNEs to
increasingly decide their ownership levels based on firm-specific factors. If this threshold
effect is not considered in the theoretical model, particularly when investigating the
MNE’s ownership strategies with longitudinal data, a study may under- or over-estimate
the influence of other factors.
Third, the process of economic liberalization usually unevenly proceeds within the
political hierarchy and across the breadth of geographic scope (Boisot and Child, 1996;
Park, Li, and Tse, 2006). It results in prominent institutional transition and subnational
variation for a long time period (Chan, Makino, and Isobe, 2010; Peng, 2003). These
important characteristics of task environments may influence the cross-border ownership
strategy of MNEs in a more complicated way than has been incorporated into existing
studies.
Fourth, prior studies suggest that the experience in the host country may be
associated with higher foreign ownership levels (Contractor, 1990; Delios and Beamish,
1999; Puck et al., 2009). Nevertheless, frequent institutional changes in an emerging
economy may invalidate an MNE’s prior experience with local conditions. In addition,
the influences of both economic liberalization and subsidiary experience can be perceived
as functions of time. Without simultaneously including them in theoretical analysis and
empirical testing, it is unclear whether they are still respectively associated with a higher
foreign ownership level when they coexist.
This study purports to shed light on these underexplored and important research
gaps by examining the growth trajectories of ownership levels of Japanese MNEs in the
past two decades. To address such a challenge, this study adopts an institution-based view,
which draws upon TCE and the learning perspective (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Meyer,
2001; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005). A subsidiary’s sustained
competitive advantage depends on its ability to manage the institutional context of its
resource decisions (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008; Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang,
and Jiang, 2008). These decisions are usually concerned with how to secure firm-specific
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assets and acquire/access complementary local assets (Dunning and Lundan, 2008;
Hennart, 2009). When institutional context varies over time, its evolution should be
included in theoretical analysis and empirical testing. In addition, this study focuses on
the influences of economic liberalization and subsidiary experience, and examines
whether and how they are empirically distinguished from each other. The present study
also includes other influences identified in existing literature as control variables.
This paper proceeds with a literature review and a description of the research
setting that was used. Then it develops a set of hypotheses to delineate the distinct
influences of the economic liberalization process and subsidiary experience on MNE
ownership choice. It proceeds to examine hypotheses using a latent growth-curve model
and data spanning a wider period of time. Finally, it discusses empirical results that
confirm or diverge from existing work and presents implications to IB research and
practitioners.

Literature Review
Theories on Ownership Strategy
The IB field has extensively investigated the predictors of MNEs’ ownership
strategies by considering transactional, institutional, and experience influences (Anderson
and Gatignon, 1986; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Demirbag et al., 2007; Jung, Beamish,
and Goerzen, 2010).
TCE discusses the most efficient governance structures – markets, hierarchies, or
a hybrid of the two – to govern a specific set of transactions (Williamson, 1975, 1985). It
has been particularly useful in understanding the establishment of an MNE’s ownership
levels in its overseas subsidiaries by answering two questions: (1) what specific assets
does the MNE possess to exploit in the host country; and (2) what complementary assets
does the MNE purport to acquire or access in the host country (Hennart, 2009). For the
first question, TCE posits that the degree of ownership assumed in the foreign operation
confers a proportional degree of control over the uses to which the firm-specific assets
can be put (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). The higher the specificity of firm assets is, the
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higher the considered level of the ownership when the MNE invests in a foreign country
(Chen and Hennart, 2002; Delios and Beamish, 1999; Demirbag et al., 2007). With
greater control comes increased resource commitments and risk. This means that the
ownership decision involves a trade-off between control and resource commitments
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). Regarding the second question, TCE suggests that when
complementary resources are subject to market inefficiency or asymmetric information,
an MNE may adopt a relatively lower level of ownership in order to access the local
based assets and/or to keep the real options open (Hennart, 2009). To secure firm-specific
advantages and access complementary resources, an MNE should be able to manage the
institutional context of its resource decisions in the host country (Brouthers et al., 2008;
Oliver, 1997; Peng et al., 2008).
Although institutional influences are usually analysed based on institutional
theory, they are closely associated with TCE because one critical locally based resource is
institutional knowledge, and a lack thereof constitutes a significant competitive
disadvantage for the MNE (Hymer, 1976). Institutions encompass a broad array of
political and legal rules, and the social norms that constitute the home/host country’s
institutional environment for business operation (Delios and Beamish, 1999; North, 1990).
To formulate appropriate organizational choices, an MNE needs to have knowledge of the
state of institutions and their cause-effect on firm performance (Dunning and Lundan,
2008; Milliken, 1987). In this vein, institutional influences are associated with two
aspects of MNE operations: (1) the establishment of legitimacy in the host country, i.e.,
the local responsiveness; and (2) the transfer of strategic orientations and organizational
practices shaped in the home country to the foreign subsidiary, i.e., the internal
consistency (Kostova, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). While the former is associated
with acquiring or accessing complementary resources in the host country, the latter is
concerned with the security of firm-specific advantages developed in the home country.
The IB field investigates the local responsiveness and internal consistency with
two streams of literature. One stream explores how the unilateral national characteristics
(either of the home country or of the host country) influence the MNE’s ownership
strategies. For example, the home country’s levels of power distance and uncertainty
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avoidance may be positively related to the MNE’s ownership levels in a foreign country
(Erramilli, 1996; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Hofstede, 1980). Another example is that
underdeveloped property rights in the host country may be associated with a higher level
of MNE control in order to secure firm-specific assets (Delios and Beamish, 1999). The
other stream focused on institutional distance explores the influence of the similarities or
dissimilarities between the host and home institutional environments. Institutional
distance raises the uncertainty, risk, and hence the cost of operating in the foreign country
(Hennart and Larimo, 1998). Some studies posit that greater institutional (or cultural)
distance predicts higher ownership control levels in order to enhance internal consistency
and minimize transaction costs (Hennart and Larimo, 1998). Other research proposes that
greater institutional distance is associated with lower equity ownership so as to maintain
local responsiveness (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Xu, Pan, and Beamish, 2004). A
trade-off between internal consistency and local responsiveness is thus important.
Nevertheless, the institutional uncertainty that an MNE confronts ultimately stems from
the complexity, dynamism and hostility of institutional environments in the host country
(Dess and Beard, 1984; Tan and Litschert, 1994), as these factors retard the MNE in
understanding the state of institutions and their cause-effects on the firm performance
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Milliken, 1987). Neither unilateral national characteristics
nor institutional distance can sufficiently capture these three dimensions.
As argued by IB theorists, firms with experience in the host country may learn
about local institutions and develop organizational capabilities adapted to the
environment. They therefore face fewer institutional disadvantages (Johanson and Vahlne,
1977). Multiple studies have suggested a positive relationship between an MNE’s
ownership level and its experience in the host country (Delios and Beamish, 1999;
Hennart, 1991; Makino and Delios, 1996; Wilkinson, Peng, Brouthers, and Beamish,
2008). Nevertheless, an experienced MNE may also develop capabilities in managing
local partners to access institutional advantages that are difficult to acquire (Cantwell,
Dunning, and Lundan, 2010; Hennart, 2009). In particular, an MNE would have a weaker
need to rely on a high equity ownership to deal with unexpected contingencies in a
rapidly changing environment (Jung et al., 2010). The experience in the host country
therefore leads to an appropriate choice of ownership level contingent on the state of
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institutions and their cause-effect on firm performance, and it does not always result in
higher equity control.
Prior literature has contributed to our understanding of cross-border ownership
strategy by analyzing transactional, institutional and experience influences. As
institutional conditions determine the cause-effect of transactional and experience factors
on firm performance, these three types of influences are not independent from each other.
The literature has not sufficiently investigated their interdependence. To address such a
challenge requires an institutional setting with remarkable dynamism so that their
interdependence can be theoretically and empirically identified. An emerging economy
employing economic liberalization can satisfy such a requirement.
Economic Liberalization
When studying an MNE’s ownership strategy in an emerging economy, prior
studies mainly focus on influences of the regulation and/or deregulation of foreign
ownership. Regulatory restriction on foreign equity participation may bring about a
“forced” local ownership even where TCE does not predict the existence of the IJV,
resulting in a lower MNE ownership level (Contractor, 1990; Delios and Beamish, 1999;
Delios and Henisz, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). In contrast, with regulatory
liberalization, an MNE may reduce the number of 50-50 and minority affiliates and
convert existing IJVs to WOSs in order to secure firm-specific advantages or to be
isomorphic to successful peers (Chang et al., 2013; Puck et al., 2009; Xia, Tan, and Tan,
2008). Nevertheless, most studies assume either regulatory restriction or liberalization as
the basis for their arguments (Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Puck et al., 2009). This assumption
leaves the influence of regulatory transition on MNE ownership level unexplored.
Moreover, economic liberalization involves other components in addition to
regulatory liberalization. It may also involve the decentralization of political power,
privatization of property rights, establishment of legal systems, and formulation of
industrial policies (Child and Tse, 2001; Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000; Park et al.,
2006). Along with economic liberalization, the interaction of existing institutional voids
and establishing market-based mechanisms may facilitate institutional changes within the
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political hierarchy and across geographies over time (Boisot and Child, 1996; Hoskisson
et al., 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Park et al., 2006). This can result in institutional
transition and subnational variation for a long period of time (Chan et al., 2010; Peng,
2003). Therefore, although regulatory liberalization increasingly relaxes the threshold of
foreign ownership, the changing complexity, dynamism, and hostility of institutional
environments incur fluctuating institutional uncertainty (Dess and Beard, 1984). These
factors complicate an MNE’s ownership choice.
In brief, studying the foreign investments in an emerging economy can further
scholarly understanding about how transactional, institutional and experience influences
will interdependently affect an MNE’s ownership choice.
Research Setting
This study compares Japanese FDIs in China and the United States from 1990 to
2009 for multiple reasons. First, the country of origin may influence an MNE’s overseas
ownership choice (Erramilli, 1996; Makino and Neupert, 2000; Zhao, Luo, and Suh,
2004). Focusing on MNEs from a single country such as Japan can reduce the
endogeneity issue caused by organizational choices. Moreover, a number of prior studies
have empirically examined Japanese MNEs’ ownership choices in their FDIs (Delios and
Beamish, 1999; Jung, Beamish, and Goerzen, 2008; Jung et al., 2010), providing a basis
for comparison with the present work.
Second, such a research setting allows for comparison of Japanese ownership
choices in China, the largest emerging economy undergoing an institutional transition,
with those in the United States, the largest advanced economy sustaining a relatively
mature free-market institutional environment (Chan et al., 2010). This provides a large
sample size for empirical tests. Moreover, this research setting controls for the
confounding effects of multiple host countries as well (Makino, Isobe, and Chan, 2004;
Pattnaik, Choe, and Singh, 2015). Although advanced economies advocate free market
institutions, they still differ in other dimensions of their institutional environments (e.g.,
country culture) that influence a foreign MNE’s ownership choice (Xu et al., 2004). In
addition, emerging economies employ heterogeneous approaches to economic
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liberalization (Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000; Roland, 2002). Different approaches may
facilitate distinct institutional changes in scope, intensity, and duration (Brouthers and
Lamb Jr, 1995; Roland, 2002), influencing a foreign MNE’s ownership choice diversely.
Therefore, involving multiple advanced or emerging economies will complicate
theoretical analysis and empirical testing.
Third, since there are still no exact measurements for a country’s institutional
transition, this study needs an emerging economy within which the general trends of
institutional conditions can be estimated. While some countries adopted a “big bang”
approach for a fast and comprehensive implementation of all major reforms (Newman,
2000; Roland, 2002), China advocates a dual-track strategy for economic liberalization.
This is a process by which a market track is introduced and gradually strengthened while
the central planning track is maintained and progressively diminished (Boisot and Child,
1996; Lau et al., 2000; Park et al., 2006). This dual-track nature results in incremental
economic liberalization lasting for a lengthy period of time, allowing for the identification
of the overall trends of China’s institutional environments by accessing well-documented
governmental policies and relevant academic studies.
China’s incremental economic liberalization process is reflected in the regulatory
liberalization of inward foreign investments. Ownership regulations on FDIs in China
began to change with the Open Door Policy. The Joint Venture Law of 1979 allowed IJVs
between foreign MNEs and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for the first time (Ye, 2012).
In 1986 the Chinese government launched the Law of Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises
which permitted MNEs to establish WOSs for the first time (Ye, 2012). At that time
however, WOSs were only allowed in a few industries with limited product scope and
scales of operation. In 1995 the government issued the most prominent set of ownership
laws, “Regulations for Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment,” and its appendix,
“Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industries”. The former introduced the
general types, rules, and procedures of foreign investments in China, and was revised in
2002. The latter (known as the Catalogues) listed industries in detail in terms of
encouraged, permitted, restricted, or prohibited categories. The industries or relevant
products in the “encouraged” category usually enjoyed the right to establish WOSs with
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permitted products, processes and scales of operation. The industries or products in the
“restricted” category were usually limited to IJVs. The “prohibited” category refers to
industries in which foreign investment is completely restricted. The government revised
the Catalogues in 1997, 2002, 2004, 2007, and 2011 by upgrading more and more
“prohibited” or “restricted” categories and relevant products to “permitted” and
“encouraged”. 1 Based on this incremental regulatory liberalization, this study assumes
that the progress of China’s economic liberalization can be operationalized as a function
of time.

Hypotheses
Based on the institutional-based view, a Japanese MNE is likely to adopt high
equity control in overseas operations in order to achieve external legitimacy and/or
internal consistency. One stream of institutional theory, the national character theory,
posits that countries vary systematically in psychological characteristics and that MNEs’
subsidiary ownership strategies will reflect the home country’s characteristics (Hennart
and Larimo, 1998; Shetty, 1979). According to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, Japanese
culture is characterized as having moderate power distance and high uncertainty
avoidance 2 (Hofstede, 1980). These ratings indicate that Japanese MNEs are likely to
seek high ownership levels in their foreign subsidiaries, otherwise they may be perceived
illegitimate by their Japanese peers (Erramilli, 1996; Hennart and Larimo, 1998). In
addition, with high equity control an MNE can achieve internal consistency by
transferring strategic orientations and best practices to its foreign subsidiaries (Kostova,
Roth, and Dacin, 2008). Nevertheless, for Japanese FDIs in China, earlier studies suggest
that the regulatory restriction may suppress the preference for high ownership choice
(Beamish, 1993; Delios and Beamish, 1999). Moreover, economic liberalization in China
relaxes the regulatory restriction on foreign ownership and introduces emerging
institutional uncertainty, influencing foreign ownership in a complicated way.

1

The summary about China’s regulatory liberalization is synthesized from the website of the Ministry of
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (www.mofcom.gov.cn) and Ye (2012).
2
Japanese power distance value is 54, ranked 23rd out of 56 countries, and Japanese uncertainty avoidance
value is 92, ranked 50th out of 56 countries.
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The Influence of Economic Liberalization
Regulatory liberalization in China relaxes the threshold of foreign ownership,
making it possible for MNEs to operate with higher equity control. In the initial stage of
economic liberalization, regulative restriction in China exerted a coercive influence and
determined the ownership structure that MNEs could legitimately possess regardless of
their desired structure for efficiency and/or internal consistency (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Kostova, 1999; Scott, 1995). The result is that early IJVs in
China were usually created in place of WOSs due to government pressure, often with
government partners (Beamish, 1993). Gradually, regulatory liberalization offered a
broader choice of partnership arrangements to MNEs and allowed decisions about
ownership choice to be increasingly based on rational considerations of strategic intention,
risk and transaction costs (Child and Tse, 2001). With regulatory liberalization MNEs
increasingly established majority IJVs and WOSs in China, and even converted existing
IJVs to WOSs in order to secure their specific assets and/or mimic successful peers from
the same home country or industry, irrespective of the rationality of the efficiency (Davis
et al., 2000; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Guillén, 2003; Lu, 2002; Xia et al., 2008).
Although these theoretical conclusions are consistent with reality, they may be
incomplete in terms of the total effect of economic liberalization. As of 1990 the number
of majority IJVs and WOSs in China continued to rise along with the process of
regulatory liberalization. By 1997 the number of foreign WOSs exceeded the number of
IJVs in China for the first time (Xia et al., 2008; Xiong, 2009). This trend was
strengthened after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). In December,
2001 Panasonic declared that it would convert its 50 IJVs in China into WOSs. In
Motorola’s board meeting in 2001 directors asserted that sole proprietorships would be
the natural choice with China’s joining the WTO (Xiong, 2009). An underlying
assumption in these conclusions is that institutional uncertainty remains the same as
before. This may not be true. As previously discussed, the deficiency in institutional
knowledge raises the uncertainty and cost of operating in a foreign country. This creates
a significant competitive disadvantage for an MNE (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Hymer,
1976). An MNE may choose a lower ownership level in order to access complementary
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institutional advantages (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Li and Li, 2010; Xu et al.,
2004). It is thus necessary to examine the sources of institutional uncertainty and their
evolutionary trajectories along with China’s economic liberalization and evaluate whether
the level of institutional uncertainty would prevent an increase of foreign ownership level.
Prior studies have identified complexity, dynamism, and hostility as important
environmental attributes. In the present study, the attributes can be understood as
heterogeneity, instability, and inequality of institutional conditions where greater values
indicate higher institutional uncertainty towards FDIs (Dess and Beard, 1984; Tan and
Litschert, 1994). In addition, the hostility of the institutional environment towards FDIs is
closely associated with the institutional pressure because it indicates the extent to which
an MNE confronts institutional restriction/openness in the host country. The present study
argues that coexisting institutional transition and subnational disparity intensify the
complexity, dynamism, and hostility of China’s institutional environment, constituting the
main sources of institutional uncertainty for FDIs.
MNEs increasingly confront subnational institutions in China along with
economic liberalization. As mentioned, in the early stage of economic liberalization,
MNEs usually chose their investment locations and local partners from a limited scope
dictated by the central government and their subsidiaries were under the central
government’s monitoring (Beamish, 1993). Therefore, the influence of subnational
regional environments was mitigated by centralized decision-making mechanisms. With
deepening economic liberalization, China’s central government has gradually relaxed
country-level restriction on FDIs and decentralized decision-making power to local
governments and firms (Child and Tse, 2001; Davis et al., 2000; Park et al., 2006). This
allows MNEs to access different locations and partners with decreasing central
government control, interact with local stakeholders more directly, and spread their
investments across a broader geography.
With increasing embeddedness in subnational regions, MNEs investing in China
are influenced by subnational disparity in political institutions in a variety of ways (Chan
et al., 2010; Ma, Tong, and Fitza, 2013; Shi, Markóczy, and Stan, 2014a). First, the
central government exerts time-varying degrees of control (Huang and Sheng, 2009; Shi,
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Sun, and Peng, 2012), resulting in fuzzy boundaries between central and local controls
across geographic locations. Second, China’s central government delegates some
regulatory functions to the local level (Luo, 2005; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). Such
delegation is often ambiguously and equivocally stipulated, leaving opportunities for
subjective interpretation by local authorities (Gao, Murray, Kotabe, and Lu, 2010; Shi et
al., 2014a). Lacking sufficient institutions to support a free market, local authorities
continue to be influenced by the legacy of a socialist system and subnational culture when
formulating subnational regulations and policies (Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006; Peng,
2003).
Third, China’s dual-track approach purports to liberalize markets without
eliminating the pre-existing rents of economic agents (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lau et al.,
2000; Roland, 2002). The political decentralization usually gives rise to local
protectionism and regionalism, allowing local agents to maximize self-interest (Ma et al.,
2013). This agency problem creates “ad hoc rule bending” by local authorities and pushes
economic actors to rely on relationship-based exchanges more than on rule-based ones
(Lin, 2001; Park and Luo, 2001; Peng, 2003; Shi et al., 2014a). Subnational variation in
political institutions heightens the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of institutional
environments that MNEs confront. This constitutes the main source of uncertainty in
sensing the state of local rules, understanding their cause-effects on value-added activities,
and formulating organizational choices (Luo, 2003; Luo, 2007; Milliken, 1987;
Santangelo and Meyer, 2011).
Moreover, existing literature has thoroughly documented that China has
significant within-country variation in culture at the province or region level (Chan et al.,
2010; Ma et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2012). Subnational cultures as informal institutions are
usually used to bridge existing institutional voids (North, 1990; Peng, 2003; Puffer and
McCarthy, 2011). Cultural-based informal institutions are usually intangible and
sophisticated, and require time for MNEs to understand (North, 1990; Peng, 2003). It is
also difficult for an MNE to understand the fuzzy boundaries between formal institutions
and cultural-cognitive institutions. For example, guanxi, defined as ‘a relationship with
implications for continued exchange of favors,’ is an important cultural and social
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element that intensifies relationship-based exchanges in China (Standifird and Marshall,
2000). Its significance to the local business community varies at the subnational regional
level, complicating an MNE’s strategy at the country level (Park and Luo, 2001).
Subnational disparity in cultural/social institutions heightens the institutional uncertainty.
China also has significant within-country variation in economic development.
Economic institutions involve intermediaries and common infrastructure that support
economic transaction (Chan et al., 2010; Porter, 1990). They influence an MNE’s choices
of subnational locations and ownership structure (Goerzen, Asmussen, and Nielsen, 2013;
Ma and Delios, 2007). With central government’s macro-control and local governments’
political intervention, subnational economic institutions change over time (Pan and Chi,
1999). Subnational disparity in social and economic institutions heightens the institutional
uncertainty.
In conclusion, China’s economic liberalization not only results in a gradual
institutional transition from a central planning track to a market track, but also causes
subnational disparity in political, social, and economic institutions. The coexisting
institutional transition and subnational disparity give rise to the complexity, dynamism,
and hostility of China’s institutional environments, resulting in institutional pressure and
institutional uncertainty that MNEs confront. Figure 2.1 summarizes the theoretical
foundation for the present study. As mentioned, institutional pressure and institutional
uncertainty exert competing influences on an MNE’s ownership choice. While MNEs can
rapidly understand and respond to explicit institutional pressure, it is relatively more
difficult for them to identify and cope with institutional uncertainty.
Further, institutional uncertainty in China evolves following a certain trend. As
mentioned, China has adopted a dual-track approach in economic liberalization.
Strengthening the market track is embodied in institutionalizing formal market rules and
decreasing institutional voids. Literature suggests that the complexity, dynamism, and
hostility in China’s institutional environment decline over time (Tan and Tan, 2005),
reducing an MNE’s reliance on relationship-based exchanges in subnational regions
(Peng, 2003; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Decreasing institutional uncertainty allows an
MNE to more sufficiently respond to regulatory liberalization on FDIs. Therefore, along
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with China’s economic liberalization, Japanese MNEs will gradually increase their
ownership levels in China.
Figure 2.1 Theoretical Foundation

Compared to China’s situation, the United States has consistently had a mature
free-market economy. There has been no major recent regulatory change on FDIs in the
United States. Although political, economic, and social institutions vary across regions
within the United States as well, the extent to which they vary in the United States is
much less than in China (Chan et al., 2010). This study thus argues that a Japanese MNE
will not significantly change its ownership levels in the United States.
Hypothesis 1a: Japanese MNEs will increase their ownership levels in
China during the period of economic liberalization.
Hypothesis 1b: Japanese MNEs will not change their ownership levels in
the United States during the same period.
Subsidiary Experience
An MNE may increase its ownership levels in its foreign investments by two
means: (1) establishing new subsidiaries with higher ownership levels than before; and (2)
increasing the existing subsidiaries’ ownership levels. The second one can be influenced
by the subsidiary’s operating experience, which is usually measured by subsidiary age
(Hennart, 1991). In general, prior studies suggest that subsidiary experience may reduce
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the reliance on the local partners, leading to higher ownership level (Hennart, 1991;
Makino and Delios, 1996; Wilkinson et al., 2008).
Nevertheless, China’s economic liberalization may change the nature of the
subsidiary experience. First, because of the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of
subnational institutions, relationship-based exchanges would still outweigh the rule-based
ones for a period of time (Lin, 2001; Park and Luo, 2001; Peng, 2003; Shi et al., 2014a).
Although managerial ties with local agents can help a foreign subsidiary in relationshipbased exchanges, a WOS still has disadvantages in learning about local government
intentions and linking its managerial ties compared with local firms (Chen, Ding, and
Kim, 2010; Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2008; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Therefore, MNEs
usually establish equity partnerships with local governments or firms that have privileged
political ties (Henisz and Zelner, 2005). The complexity of the subnational culture and
changing subnational regulation intensify this trend. In this vein, subsidiary experience is
relevant to the ability to cooperate with local actors, rather than to the ability to operate
independently.
Second, it is costly to reduce or discontinue a relational contract when
relationship-based exchanges still prevail. Increasing equity share in an IJV or converting
the IJV to a WOS means that the MNE is trying to reduce and even discontinue a
relational contract with local actor(s) that are closer to the local power center. Reduction
or discontinuity of a relational commitment requires mutual agreement. The lack of
mutual agreement may damage trust in the relationship or more generally a firm’s
reputation in the local business community (Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). This would
increase the ex ante and/or ex post transaction cost. The longer the relational commitment,
the more difficult it is to reduce or discontinue it.
In contrast, Japanese MNEs can rely on relatively efficient market mechanisms to
increase their equity ownership in existing subsidiaries with the mature free-market
institutions in the United States.
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Hypothesis 2a: In China, the operating experience of a Japanese
subsidiary will be negatively related to its ownership level during the
period of China’s economic liberalization.
Hypothesis 2b: In the United States, the operating experience of a
Japanese subsidiary will be positively related to its ownership level during
the same period.
Figure 2.1 delineates the theoretical model.
Figure 2.2 Theoretical Model

Methodology
The empirical methodology used for this study should solve two problems. First,
Japanese ownership patterns in China and the United States may share a number of
explanatory factors to different degrees. Second, they also may be influenced by
systematic differences in the types of Japanese investments in China and United States
This study addresses the second problem in sample selection. To solve the first problem
this study follows the rationale in Gomes-Casseres (1990) and incorporates the country
dummy into the empirical model:
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𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =

𝑛

𝑛

α0 + (𝛼1 − 𝛼0 ) ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ∑ 𝛽0𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 + ∑(𝛽1𝑖 − 𝛽0𝑖 ) ∙ 𝑥𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝑖=1

(2.1)

𝑖=1

where
Country is a dummy variable (equal to 1 if the subsidiary operated in China),
xi is an independent variable that influences the MNE’s ownership strategies,
n is the number of independent variables,
α0, β0i are the intercept and slope for Japanese subsidiaries in the United States,
α1, β1i are the intercept and slope for Japanese subsidiaries in China.
As mentioned, the present study focuses on the influences of economic
liberalization and subsidiary experience and controls for other influences identified by
prior studies. It therefore employs latent growth-curve modelling because the relevant
techniques explicitly model the trajectories of individual subjects over time, delineating
how these trajectories vary both systematically and randomly (Singer and Willett, 2003).
A quadratic growth-curve model was chosen because it includes non-linear effects.
Moreover, since the influence of subsidiary experience measured by subsidiary age is also
an occasion-based variable, this study employs a double growth-curve model with two
occasional dimensions.
This study constructs the latent growth-curve model with occasion, subsidiary,
MNE, and subnational levels. Moreover, since MNE and subnational levels are crossed
but not nested, the model uses necessary techniques to address the random effect between
them. As such, the final empirical model consists of four levels and two occasional
dimensions. Finally, since the latent growth-curve model is a special case of randomcoefficient models (Singer and Willett, 2003), the model assumes that the coefficients of
occasions vary randomly at the subsidiary level.
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Samples
The initial sample included observations of Japanese subsidiaries during 19902009 from the merged Toyo Keizai and Needs dataset (2012 Edition). Many of the prior
studies to which this research refers used earlier editions of the Toyo Keizai datasets
(Delios and Beamish, 1999; Jung et al., 2010; Makino and Beamish, 1998a;
Padmanabhan and Cho, 1996). Using the data from the same organization improves the
reliability of this study.
To solve the second question (the systemic difference in selecting host countries)
mentioned by Gomes-Casseres (1990), this study discards the observations from Japanese
MNEs that only invested in either the United States or China during 1990-2009. To
highlight the effect of economic liberalization, this study drops subsidiaries invested in
agriculture, forestry, and mining industries within which there were distinct industryspecific regulations that were given priority over the Catalogues in China3. This study
also excludes Japanese subsidiaries that functioned as local headquarters as almost all of
them are WOSs. To focus on strategic investments, this study drops subsidiaries with less
than 5% Japanese ownership during their lifetimes since they were considered portfolio
investments (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). Finally, this study drops subsidiaries with
missing data. With this careful screening, the final dataset consists of 653 Japanese MNEs,
2,261 subsidiaries in China and the United States and a total of 19,737 observations
during 1990-20094.
Dependent and Independent Variables
The dependent variable for the present study is the Japanese ownership level,
measured as the percentage of total Japanese ownership in the subsidiary in China or the
United States.

3

The differences in regulatory rules between natural resource related industries and other industries are
synthesized from the website of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
(www.mofcom.gov.cn).
4
Compared to the number of Japanese subsidiaries (2,261), the number of observations (19,373) between
1990-2009 is relatively small. This is because (i) subsidiaries were established at different time, (ii) they
may have exited before 2009, or (iii) there are missing data in the dependent, independent, or control
variables.
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This study involves independent variables to examine hypotheses. Based on the
rationale of growth-curve modelling, the occasion variables that manifest the influence of
economic liberalization are simply the time (since 1990) and its square value (Time and
Time2). The occasion variables that manifest the subsidiary experience effect are the
subsidiary age (since its establishment) and its square value (Subsidiary age and
Subsidiary age2). Moreover, based on Equation (2.1) this study includes a country
dummy (Country, measured as 1 if the subsidiary was operated in China), and
interactions between it and the occasion variables (Time X Country, Time2 X Country,
Subsidiary age X Country, Subsidiary age2 X Country).
Control Variables
This study controls for other factors that may influence a Japanese MNE’s
overseas ownership choice. To control for the possible nonlinear influences from different
decades, due to the global economy or other country dynamics, the paper includes two
dummy variables to identify whether those subsidiaries were established before 1990,
during the 1990s (reference), or in the 2000s. For example, China joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in December, 2001. To fulfil a member country’s obligations in the
WTO, China accelerated the liberalization of regulation during the 2000s. This study also
considers the interactions of the country and decade dummy variables. Because of the
collinearity between the subsidiary age and the variable Established before 1990, finally
this study only includes the variable Established in the 2000s.
Second, this study considers an MNE’s experience in a subnational region. Prior
studies considered the influence of an MNE’s host country presence, computed as the log
of the sum of subsidiary-year units in the host country. This measure was used because
accumulated operation may provide a valuable local knowledge base to respond to
environmental contingencies (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).
Nevertheless, due to the subnational variation in political, social, and economic
institutions, regional experience more appropriately represents an MNE’s local
knowledge base than country presence does. This study deconstructs an MNE’s country
presence into subnational regional experience, regional diversity, and regional
concentration. Regional experience is measured by an MNE’s accumulated experience
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within a subnational region, i.e., a province, municipality, or state. Nevertheless, this
study drops the variable because it is highly correlated with the subsidiary experience.
Moreover, simultaneously operating in multiple subnational regions may intensify the
uncertainty that an MNE confronts (Boisot and Child, 1996; Qian, Li, Li, and Qian, 2008).
This study thus includes regional diversity measured by the number of subnational
regions where an MNE operates in China or the United States. Based on the sample
screening process previously described, the present study involves 25 subnational regions
in China and 39 in the United States. The study includes regional concentration measured
by the number of sibling subsidiaries in the focal region as it influences the focal
subsidiary’s strategic importance and embeddedness in the local networks (Andersson,
Forsgren, and Holm, 2002; Roth and Morrison, 1992). The study also considers the
interaction items of regional diversity and regional concentration with the country dummy.
Third, investment motives indicate a subsidiary’s strategic position in the parent
firm’s market expansion and global integration and they influence the subsidiary’s
operating mode (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Li, 1995). Following Goerzen et al.’s (2013)
approach, this study categorizes original investment purposes into nine types: Local
market seeking, Global production network, Global distribution network, Local
information collection, Local labor seeking, Follow global stakeholders, New product
development, Local resource seeking, and International risk hedging.
Fourth, this study includes industry and sector categories since they present the
various levels of marketization or concentration that influence an MNE’s overseas
ownership choice (Boisot and Child, 1996; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Zhao et al., 2004).
Following prior studies (e.g., Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004), the study includes eight
industry and two sector dummy variables for the subsidiary level in order to remove the
confounding industry and sector effects (the reference is the manufacturing of electronics).
Industry dummy variables for the MNE level are not used because of the collinearity
between the industrial categories of the subsidiary and its MNE parent. Nevertheless, the
MNE from one sector may invest in other sectors in the host country (e.g., a Japanese
manufacturer may invest in wholesale or retail sector in China), and therefore there is no
serious collinearity between the sectors of the subsidiary and its MNE parent. The study
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therefore includes two sector dummy variables for the MNE level (the reference is the
manufacturing sector). However, an MNE from the service sector usually still invests in
the same sector in foreign countries (correlation = 0.679). The study therefore drops the
variable Subsidiary in service to reduce multi-collinearity.
Fifth, the study controls for MNE-specific factors that positively relate to an
MNE’s cross-border ownership choice. The study includes the MNE’s asset specificity,
measured by advertising and R&D intensities (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Dhanaraj and
Beamish, 2004). The study includes the MNE size (measured by the ln function of the
number of employees in the MNE) since large MNEs may have more flexibility in
reallocating their subsidiary portfolio (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Dhanaraj and Beamish,
2004). The study also includes an MNE’s profitability, measured by its return on sales
(ROS). It may represent the MNE’s overall competitive advantages influencing the
ownership choice (Barney, 1991).
Finally, the study includes subsidiary-specific factors. The size (measured by the
ln function of the number of employees) represents the subsidiary resource commitment
that may negatively relate to the MNE ownership level (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986;
Delios and Beamish, 1999). The study includes the percentage of Japanese expatriates in
a subsidiary since it also represents the level of the MNE’s control (Gaur, Delios, and
Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; Makino, Beamish, and Zhao, 2004). A Japanese MNE may
invest in a subsidiary with other Japanese MNEs or multiple local partners. Since the
number of partners in a joint venture may alleviate the liability of foreignness and also
increase the ex ante or ex post costs stemming from the complexity of the transaction
(Gong, Shenkar, Luo, and Nyaw, 2007; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009; Makino and
Beamish, 1998b). The study therefore includes two dummy variables to indicate whether
the subsidiary had investment from more than one Japanese MNE or more than one local
firm.
Descriptive Statistics and Multi-Collinearity
This study centres all continuous independent variables in order to reduce multicollinearity of the whole model (Aiken and West, 1991). Table 2.1 provides all
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independent variables’ descriptive statistics and their Pearson correlation matrix.
According to Table 2.1, the correlation between time and subsidiary age is 0.150 (p-value
< 0.001). Therefore, there is no collinearity problem between the two occasional
dimensions. The greatest correlation value of this model is 0.587 (between MNE size and
The number of subnational regions). The study further evaluates the multi-collinearity of
the whole model based on variance inflation factor (VIF). The maximum VIF value is
less than 10, indicating that there is no serious multi-collinearity problem (Neter and
Michael, 1990).
Figure 1.1 delineates the mean values of Japanese ownership levels in the two
countries during 1990-2009. It indicates that Japanese MNEs prominently increased their
average ownership levels in China and slightly increased them in the United States.

Results
With the unconditional model (i.e., the regression on Japanese ownership using
only information about analysis levels but without any independent or control variable),
the intraclass correlations (ICC) for the constructed four-level model can be calculated.
The ICC between subsidiaries, MNEs and subnational regions are 0.899, 0.101 and 0.202
respectively. This indicates the necessity of four-level modeling (Singer and Willett,
2003).
Table 2.2 provides the hierarchical regression process for latent growth-curve
modeling with increasing Wald chi-square value. Model 1 only includes most control
variables. Model 2 adds the influences of subnational regional factors. Model 3 adds the
influences of subsidiary experience. Model 4 includes the influence of institutional
changes, providing the results for hypotheses tests. The regressions use centered
continuous variables. When the centered variable Time equals zero, the actual time is
2001 but not 1990 according to Table 2.1. Similarly, when centered Subsidiary age is
zero, the actual subsidiary age is 11.6 years.
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Japanese ownership
Time
Established in 2000s
Subsidiary age
The number of siblings in region
The number of subnational regions
Country
Local market seeking
Global production network
Global distribution network
Local information collection
Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical
Manufacturing transport
Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
Manufacturing non metal
Manufacturing other
Subsidiary Wholesale and retail
MNE wholesale or retail
MNE service
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Subsidiary size
Subsidiary expatriate rate
More than one Japanese partner
More than one local partner

Mean
83.619
11.070
0.152
11.551
0.294
0.705
0.442
0.725
0.397
0.307
0.261
0.153
0.085
0.080
0.083
0.052
0.031
0.032
0.081
0.112
0.066
0.047
0.037
0.018
0.300
0.122
0.103
0.453
1.167
8.463
0.036
4.124
0.152
0.232
0.052

S.D.
25.080
5.363
0.359
9.592
0.482
0.658
0.497
0.446
0.489
0.461
0.439
0.360
0.279
0.271
0.276
0.223
0.172
0.175
0.273
0.315
0.248
0.211
0.189
0.134
0.458
0.328
0.304
1.311
2.234
1.397
0.077
1.795
0.625
0.422
0.221

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1
0.018
0.043
0.186
-0.107
-0.230
-0.363
0.030
-0.209
0.009
0.177
-0.087
0.053
0.036
-0.065
0.003
-0.040
-0.034
-0.072
-0.150
-0.038
-0.103
-0.030
-0.018
0.292
-0.033
0.013
0.040
0.058
-0.160
0.038
-0.241
0.085
-0.273
-0.355

1
0.394
0.150
0.113
0.113
0.294
-0.046
0.159
0.073
-0.132
0.086
0.035
-0.041
-0.017
-0.120
-0.006
0.026
0.020
0.037
0.018
0.031
0.008
-0.007
-0.037
0.021
-0.003
0.107
0.206
-0.026
0.027
0.103
-0.041
-0.016
-0.020

1
-0.362
0.051
0.010
0.351
-0.044
0.100
0.001
-0.076
0.114
0.031
-0.010
0.015
-0.089
-0.022
-0.010
0.013
0.053
0.024
0.028
-0.005
-0.008
-0.027
-0.030
-0.020
-0.007
0.051
-0.121
0.024
-0.089
0.022
-0.024
-0.038

1
-0.019
-0.006
-0.476
0.096
-0.216
-0.031
0.162
-0.162
0.004
-0.027
-0.070
0.047
-0.020
-0.065
-0.076
-0.103
-0.050
-0.049
-0.042
-0.022
0.282
0.030
0.023
0.049
0.010
0.077
0.015
0.094
0.002
-0.153
-0.110

1
0.338
0.150
-0.129
0.077
-0.034
-0.107
0.052
-0.024
0.016
0.035
-0.037
-0.045
0.145
-0.002
-0.018
-0.008
0.001
-0.015
-0.013
-0.082
0.098
0.015
0.009
0.019
0.266
-0.024
0.119
-0.037
0.048
0.040

1
0.186
-0.083
0.108
-0.052
-0.147
0.026
-0.003
-0.042
0.023
0.012
0.004
0.083
0.039
0.045
-0.003
0.074
0.029
-0.028
-0.160
0.064
-0.037
-0.009
0.014
0.587
-0.044
0.280
-0.056
0.131
0.077

1
-0.118
0.322
0.111
-0.291
0.342
-0.043
-0.096
0.134
-0.173
0.036
0.146
0.098
-0.013
0.089
0.069
0.028
0.036
-0.308
0.064
0.000
0.037
0.035
0.069
-0.018
0.241
-0.104
0.246
0.246

1
-0.132
-0.015
0.106
-0.027
-0.005
-0.123
-0.004
0.019
-0.030
-0.113
-0.001
0.009
0.004
-0.006
0.058
-0.003
0.198
-0.046
-0.093
-0.017
0.014
-0.058
0.006
-0.027
0.003
-0.024
-0.057

1
0.011
-0.249
0.233
-0.018
-0.058
0.059
-0.065
0.037
0.137
0.228
0.190
0.180
0.141
0.127
0.108
-0.464
-0.069
-0.227
0.001
0.045
0.059
0.011
0.390
-0.107
0.156
0.105

1
0.061
0.081
0.020
-0.022
0.043
-0.028
-0.008
0.009
0.001
-0.093
-0.023
-0.013
-0.010
0.016
0.096
0.099
0.004
0.034
0.013
-0.125
-0.014
-0.036
-0.006
0.022
0.018

1
-0.134
0.019
0.118
-0.029
0.076
-0.024
-0.088
-0.066
-0.112
-0.097
-0.066
-0.055
-0.007
0.253
0.070
0.035
-0.064
-0.034
-0.141
-0.019
-0.299
0.110
-0.137
-0.061
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical
Manufacturing transport
Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
Manufacturing non metal
Manufacturing other
Subsidiary Wholesale and retail
MNE wholesale or retail
MNE service
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Subsidiary size
Subsidiary expatriate rate
More than one Japanese partner
More than one local partner

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

MNE wholesale or retail
MNE service
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Subsidiary size
Subsidiary expatriate rate
More than one Japanese partner
More than one local partner

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1
-0.045
-0.037
0.261
-0.042
0.039
0.149
0.015
0.002
0.053
0.009
0.059
0.032
-0.214
-0.004
-0.059
-0.007
0.027
-0.013
0.003
0.220
-0.068
0.047
0.046

1
-0.007
-0.070
0.044
-0.045
-0.041
-0.017
0.095
-0.018
-0.007
0.020
-0.014
-0.018
-0.005
0.053
-0.059
-0.064
-0.039
-0.001
-0.007
0.009
0.013
-0.014

1
-0.039
-0.026
-0.003
-0.038
-0.008
-0.075
-0.057
-0.049
-0.019
0.030
-0.074
-0.008
0.094
0.015
0.057
-0.028
0.008
-0.101
0.018
-0.067
-0.028

1
-0.049
0.181
0.033
0.029
-0.023
-0.031
0.007
0.059
0.000
-0.075
0.028
-0.038
0.003
-0.021
-0.012
0.014
0.066
-0.018
0.027
0.039

1
-0.042
-0.023
-0.035
0.119
0.019
-0.005
0.046
-0.027
-0.053
-0.043
-0.045
-0.011
-0.046
0.046
-0.025
0.062
-0.007
-0.004
-0.032

1
-0.032
-0.053
-0.063
-0.047
-0.039
-0.035
-0.024
-0.116
-0.035
-0.060
0.147
-0.042
-0.012
0.015
0.058
-0.022
0.065
0.022

1
-0.054
-0.064
-0.048
-0.040
-0.035
-0.025
-0.118
0.182
-0.044
0.053
-0.051
-0.013
-0.026
0.113
-0.031
0.075
0.048

1
-0.105
-0.079
-0.066
-0.058
-0.040
-0.194
-0.046
-0.101
0.040
0.161
-0.072
0.063
0.025
-0.032
0.083
0.002

1
-0.094
-0.079
-0.070
-0.048
-0.232
-0.114
-0.120
-0.069
-0.079
0.099
-0.020
0.239
-0.057
0.110
0.068

1
-0.059
-0.052
-0.036
-0.174
-0.093
-0.090
-0.036
0.016
-0.014
0.004
0.091
-0.036
0.024
-0.022

1
-0.044
-0.030
-0.145
0.039
-0.075
-0.051
-0.054
0.026
-0.032
0.092
0.010
0.140
0.070

1
-0.027
-0.128
-0.029
-0.066
-0.032
0.005
0.013
-0.002
0.091
-0.032
0.045
0.020

1
-0.089
-0.015
-0.039
0.091
-0.025
0.021
-0.010
0.051
-0.020
-0.032
0.011

1
0.216
-0.191
0.032
0.014
-0.152
-0.006
-0.394
0.111
-0.198
-0.133

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

1
-0.127
-0.055
-0.177
-0.198
-0.095
-0.123
0.013
0.017
0.034

1
0.004
-0.140
-0.005
-0.009
-0.109
0.016
-0.042
0.020

1
0.084
0.040
0.032
0.063
-0.026
-0.016
-0.013

1
-0.038
-0.008
-0.009
0.000
-0.070
-0.035

1
-0.037
0.409
-0.072
0.139
0.076

1
0.002
-0.001
-0.041
-0.027

1
-0.258
0.185
0.101

1
-0.076
-0.003

1
0.161

1
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Table 2.2 Four-Level Latent Growth Modeling
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Time Effect
Time
Time2
Time X Country
Time2 X Country
Establish in 2000s

Model 4
-0.066(0.076)
0.002(0.003)
1.513(0.201)***
-0.032(0.007)***
2.924(1.953)

Subsidiary Experience
Subsidiary age
Subsidiary age2
Subsidiary age X Country
Subsidiary age2 X Country
Subnational Experience
The number of siblings in region
The number of siblings in region X Country
The number of subnational regions
The number of subnational regions X Country

0.163(0.049)**
-0.003(0.002)†
-0.079(0.085)
0.002(0.004)

0.219(0.072)**
-0.005(0.003)†
-1.062(0.206)***
0.027(0.007)***

-0.382(0.320)
0.360(0.486)
-1.003(0.312)**
1.622(0.444)***

-0.380(0.320)
0.298(0.488)
-1.040(0.313)**
1.578(0.450)***

-0.416(0.319)
0.198(0.487)
-1.113(0.312)***
1.330(0.450)**

Country Dummy
Country (China =1; U.S. = 0)

-17.682(1.594)***

-17.773(1.600)***

-17.115(1.651)***

-26.773(1.943)***

Investment Purpose
Local market seeking
Global production network
Global distribution network
Local information collection
Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging

-0.495(0.247)*
-0.203(0.274)
0.447(0.221)*
0.665(0.267)*
0.847(0.312)**
1.065(0.338)**
-0.268(0.405)
0.354(0.429)
-1.032(0.502)*

-0.497(0.247)*
-0.209(0.274)
0.457(0.221)*
0.663(0.267)*
0.850(0.312)**
1.078(0.338)**
-0.270(0.405)
0.344(0.429)
-1.046(0.502)*

-0.515(0.248)*
-0.227(0.274)
0.438(0.221)*
0.631(0.267)*
0.841(0.312)**
1.093(0.338)**
-0.269(0.405)
0.361(0.429)
-1.056(0.503)*

-0.551(0.247)*
-0.273(0.274)
0.474(0.221)*
0.630(0.267)*
0.902(0.311)**
1.019(0.338)**
-0.267(0.404)
0.430(0.428)
-1.075(0.502)*

Subsidiary Industry and Sector
(reference: manufacturing electronics)
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical

-4.461(1.941)*
1.074(1.692)
-1.037(0.787)

-4.414(1.940)*
1.052(1.692)
-0.993(0.787)

-4.426(1.939)*
1.020(1.692)
-1.008(0.787)

-3.829(1.907)*
1.919(1.676)
-0.917(0.782)
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Manufacturing transport
Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
Manufacturing non metal
Manufacturing other
Wholesale or retail

-0.901(0.719)
-1.004(0.723)
0.286(0.844)
-0.153(0.844)
-0.931(1.136)
0.922(0.492)†

-0.788(0.720)
-0.965(0.723)
0.363(0.844)
-0.088(0.844)
-0.935(1.136)
0.928(0.492)†

-0.722(0.720)
-0.946(0.723)
0.379(0.844)
-0.099(0.844)
-0.878(1.136)
0.845(0.492)†

-0.978(0.716)
-0.979(0.720)
0.268(0.840)
-0.019(0.840)
-0.732(1.132)
0.703(0.491)

MNE Industry and Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service

-0.067(0.758)
-0.258(1.288)

-0.103(0.757)
-0.212(1.287)

-0.129(0.757)
-0.262(1.286)

-0.054(0.750)
-0.064(1.259)

MNE Specific Factors
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS

0.255(0.087)**
0.119(0.045)**
0.211(0.247)
0.598(0.678)

0.253(0.087)**
0.126(0.045)**
0.245(0.250)
0.578(0.677)

0.231(0.087)**
0.110(0.045)*
0.102(0.254)
0.576(0.678)

0.206(0.088)*
0.094(0.045)*
0.257(0.250)
0.423(0.679)

Subsidiary Specific Factors
Subsidiary size
Expatriate rate
More than one Japanese partner
More than one local partner

-0.330(0.096)**
-0.353(0.318)
2.004(0.332)***
-11.737(0.541)***

-0.348(0.096)***
-0.362(0.318)
1.967(0.332)***
-11.756(0.541)***

-0.417(0.100)***
-0.353(0.319)
2.010(0.333)***
-11.735(0.541)***

-0.399(0.099)***
-0.529(0.313)†
2.137(0.333)***
-11.447(0.541)***

89.726(1.108)***

89.604(1.110)***

89.496(1.121)***

89.136(1.084)***

-67541.344
757.57***
15.77**

-67534.308
771.81***
14.07**

-67453.581
985.72***
161.45***

Cons.
Log likelihood
Wald Chi2
ΔLR Chi2
***
p-value < 0.001; ** p-value < 0.01; * p-value < 0.05;

-67549.227
741.56***
/
†
p-value < 0.1
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Model 4 indicates that Japanese ownership in subsidiaries in China was lower than
in the United States in 2001 and the difference is 26.77%. While Japanese ownership does
not change over time in the United States, it increases in China following a growth curve
(coefficients are 1.513 and -0.032)5. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a and 1b are supported. In
addition, subsidiary experience is positively associated with Japanese ownership in the
United States (coefficients are 0.219 and -0.005), supporting Hypothesis 2a. In contrast, it
negatively relates to Japanese ownership in China (the coefficients are -0.843 and 0.022)6,
supporting Hypothesis 2b.

Discussion
This study investigates an underexplored question: how does an MNE respond to
the economic liberalization of an emerging economy given transactional, institutional,
and experience influences? With latent growth-curve modelling, the empirical tests herein
support the four hypotheses delineated in Figure 2.1, and distinguish an MNE’s
institutional response from other influences. This provides a detailed understanding of the
MNE’s ownership choices.
Significance, Substance, and Dynamism of Institutional Response
Based on the empirical results, Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 provide a visual
illustration of the influences of economic liberalization and subsidiary experience on
Japanese ownership levels in China and the United States. Figure 2.3 indicates that
Japanese MNEs increased their ownership levels in China substantively in the past two
decades. In contrast, Japanese ownership levels in the United States remained relatively
stable during this period. Figure 2.4 indicates that the Japanese ownership level decreased
along with accumulated subsidiary experience in China. By the same measurement,
Japanese ownership in the United States increased slightly.
5

Regarding variables Time and Time2, coefficients for subsidiaries in the United States are insignificant (0.066 and 0.002). When calculating coefficients for subsidiaries in China (Country = 1), there is no need to
subtract coefficients for subsidiaries in the United States (1.513 and -0.032).
6
Regarding variables Subsidiary age and Age2, coefficients for subsidiaries in the United States are
significant (0.219 and -0.005), and they should be considered when calculating coefficients for subsidiaries
in China (Country =1). Coefficients for subsidiaries in China are calculated as -0.843 (i.e., -1.062 + 0.219)
and 0.022 (i.e., 0.027 – 0.005).
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The aforementioned two figures show the significance and dynamism of Japanese
institutional response. By sensing economic liberalization and learning from local
operations, Japanese MNEs adopt cross-border ownership choices that continuously
evolved by interacting with updating institutional conditions of the host country (Meyer
and Nguyen, 2005). They not only adapt to the host country’s extant institutional voids
(Kwok and Solomon, 2006), but also adapt to the host country’s progress of economic
liberalization.
MNEs’ institutional response is also substantive. According to Figure 2.3,
Japanese MNEs increased their ownership levels in subsidiaries in China by about 30% in
the past two decades (from 42% to 72%). Comparatively, asset specificity that prior
studies usually emphasize affected Japanese ownership levels less than economic
liberalization did. In the present study, advertising intensity and R&D intensity positively
influence an MNE’s ownership choice (coefficients are 0.206 and 0.094), and this
conclusion is consistent with prior research. According to the maximum values of two
variables in this study (19% and 34% of total sales respectively), the maximum influence
of asset specificity on ownership level can be calculated as 7.11%. This suggests that
neglecting institutional response will lead to an incomplete understanding of MNEs’
ownership choices.
Control Variables
The empirical tests also generate interesting results for some control variables.
First, regional diversity influences an MNE’s ownership choice differently in the United
States and China. According to Model 4 in Table 2.2, regional diversity is negatively
associated with Japanese ownership level in the United States, but not in China. With
mature free-market institutions and relatively mild subnational disparity in the United
States, an MNE may integrate operations across different regions and manage the overall
resource commitment in the country. This negatively influences the ownership level in
individual subsidiaries (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). By comparison, underdeveloped
market institutions and prominent subnational disparity in China force an MNE to decide
its ownership choices at the subnational regional level rather than at the country level,
making it difficult to integrate all operations across regions.
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Figure 2.3 Influence of Economic Liberalization on Japanese Ownership Level

Figure 2.4 Influence of Subsidiary Experience on Japanese Ownership Level
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Second, investment purposes vary according to the extent to which a foreign
subsidiary needs to access the local complementary resources. Local market seeking and
international risk hedging negatively relate to MNE ownership level because of the need
for local responsiveness. In contrast, participating in global distribution networks, local
labor seeking, or following global stakeholders requires a subsidiary to have a greater
internal consistency, resulting in a higher MNE ownership level.
Finally, if a Japanese MNE establishes an IJV with more than one local partner, its
ownership level would be much lower than it would be in a situation involving only one
local partner (coefficient = -11.447). In 1990s, on average 18% of Japanese subsidiaries
in China were established with more than one local partner and this percentage decreased
to 10% in the 2000s. By comparison, those percentages in the United States were 1% in
1990s and 0% in 2000s. “Forced” joint ventures with multiple partners in 1990s were
another specific institutional phenomenon in China that arose from strong regulation and
government bargaining power. Thus, the decreasing number of joint ventures with more
than one local partner may provide additional evidence on how Japanese MNEs
responded to China’s economic liberalization.
Robustness Checks
The present study involves a robustness check using a subset of samples. The
check excludes subsidiaries with 20 or fewer employees in order to avoid mixing regular
subsidiaries with representative offices (Beamish and Inkpen, 1998). The robustness
check also does not include subsidiaries with Japanese ownership levels lower than 20%
as a very low foreign MNE ownership level implies very high mortality rate of the
subsidiary (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). All four hypotheses continue to be supported.
The study also test conclusions drawn by involving Japanese subsidiaries in other
emerging (India, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, etc.) and advanced (U.K., Germany,
Australia, France, etc.) economies. All hypotheses are strongly supported. The results
imply that although emerging economies employ heterogeneous approaches to liberalize
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their markets, the incremental nature of institutional transition and MNEs’ institutional
response may be generalizable (Peng, 2003).
Contributions and Next Steps
The dynamic context in an emerging economy is complicated by the coexistence
of inadequate market-oriented systems and ongoing economic liberalization. The present
study is one of the first papers to examine how MNEs respond to this complexity, thus
contributing to the IB field. This study suggests that institutional conditions may vary
across geographic space and over time, and this variation should be included in
theoretical analysis and empirical testing when investigating MNEs’ organizational
choices. In particular, integrating three institutional influences (regulatory openness,
institutional uncertainty, and peer pressure) stemming from different levels into analysis,
this study identifies that regulatory liberalization is not the only institutional condition
that influences an MNE’s ownership choice in an emerging economy. Second, this study
delineates how Japanese MNEs adopt cross-border ownership choices that continuously
evolve along with the local institutions. The theoretical and empirical findings enrich the
OLI paradigm by depicting an evolutionary relationship between institutional
environment (L factor) and MNEs’ responses in terms of cross-border ownership
strategies (I factor) (Cantwell et al., 2010; Dunning, 1977; Dunning and Lundan, 2008).
Third, this study indicates that the application of existing theories should be contingent on
institutional contexts. When institutional context changes, the inherent causality of
existing theories may be altered as well. For example, the influence of subsidiary
experience on MNEs’ ownership choices may be different for subsidiaries in an emerging
economy from those in an advanced economy, as the former emphasizes relationshipbased experience and the latter emphasizes rule-based experience.
These theoretical conclusions have implications for managers. Constantly
scanning institutional conditions is a precondition for an MNE to appropriately reorganize
critical assets including complementary resources and seize volatile opportunities in an
emerging economy (Teece, 2007). In particular, local experience as an acquired critical
resource for foreign subsidiaries may exert different influences in distinct institutional
conditions. Therefore, managers should not always relate local experience to the
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independence of local operation. Rather, they should analyse the nature of experience that
they accumulate during local operations. Moreover, as mentioned, the empirical results
indicate that the number of subnational regions in which an MNE operates exerts
difference influences on its ownership choice in the United States and China (Table 2.2).
This distinction implies that due to the subnational disparity in China’s institutions, it may
be challenging for an MNE to integrate all subsidiaries within the focal country in order
to achieve the desired scale economy. Therefore, managers should formulate an
integration strategy contingent on institutional conditions as well. For example, MNEs
may widely spread their subsidiaries in the United States in order to be close to local
markets because of relatively weak subnational disparity. In contrast, MNEs may want to
allocate their subsidiaries in subnational regions in China with similar institutional
environments in order to efficiently integrate their operations.
This study leaves several issues for future research. First, although the present
study delineates the evolution of Japanese ownership along with economic liberalization,
it has not explained whether MNEs overreact or underreact to institutional changes. It is
thus unclear whether the changes of ownership levels lead to better subsidiary
performance. Economic liberalization may improve the overall business climate of a
country, resulting in better operating efficiency not directly associated with ownership
choices. In addition, advances in the OLI paradigm have suggested that a firm’s
capability and flexibility of coordinating the various critical assets that it creates or
accesses, rather than ownership control, is becoming more critical to its performance
(Cantwell et al., 2010; Li and Li, 2010). Therefore, within complicated contemporary
contexts, the relationship between an MNE’s ownership choice and its subsidiaries’
performance deserves more academic attention.
Second, literature has suggested that foreign MNEs are diverse in local partner
selection (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza, 2000; Shi et al., 2012). In addition,
domestic firms in China are heterogeneous in terms of their embeddedness in central
planning or market tracks, positions in domestic network alliance, strategic orientation,
and operational capabilities (Luo, 1998; Peng and Heath, 1996; Shi, Sun, Pinkham, and
Peng, 2014b). The heterogeneity of local partners results in variability in coordinating and
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aligning operations (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Wilkinson, 1995; Park and Ungson, 2001).
Lacking relevant data, the present study is unable to address their influences on an
MNE’s ownership choice. These factors call for further research.
Third, other mechanisms in addition to equity ownership and expatriate staffing
may relate to the level of control to a subsidiary (Luo, 2003; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997),
and managerial ties in addition to equity-based relationship may benefit a subsidiary in
relationship-based exchanges (Acquaah, 2007; Li, Zhou, and Shao, 2009; Peng and Luo,
2000). Future research may consider whether these factors influence an MNE’s crossborder ownership choice.
Fourth, this research uses a subsidiary’s investment purpose and the number of its
sibling subsidiaries in the same subnational region as rough proxies in addressing the
influence of its strategic position on the parent MNE’s ownership choice. These proxies
cannot fully explain the degree to which a foreign subsidiary is integrated in global
subsidiary networks, which in turn influences the requirement for internal consistency.
Since an MNE’s ownership choice may be leveraged by network characteristics
(Johanson and Vahlne, 2009), future research may incorporate them into subsequent
analyses.
Fifth, the Keiretsu membership of a Japanese MNE may influence its overseas
operation mode (Banerji and Sambharya, 1996). Keiretsu membership is defined in terms
of the origin of the owner of the firm, the affiliated main-banks, and the conventional
buyer-supplier links (Makino and Beamish, 1998b). Lacking relevant data, the present
study does not address the influence of affiliated Japanese partners. Future research may
control for the influence of Keiretsu membership of Japanese MNEs.
Sixth, the present study has neither separated formal institutions from informal
institutions, nor considered their differences in complexity, dynamism, and hostility
towards FDIs over the focal period. The literature usually categorizes regulatory rules as
formal institutions, and normative and cognitive rules as informal institutions (Peng and
Khoury, 2010; Scott, 1995). Uncertainties from formal and informal institutions differ in
that the former relates to local government while the latter relates to the local market (Li
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et al., 2008). Without measuring institutions in different categories, the present study has
only utilized the general trends of China’s institutional environment between 1990-2009
in theoretical and empirical analyses. Future study could divide the institutional
uncertainty further based on the differences between formal and informal institutions, and
refine the analysis of their influences on MNEs’ ownership choices in overseas markets.
Seventh, the present study attributes subnational disparity in institutions to
institutional uncertainty at the country level. Nevertheless, some studies have started to
investigate subnational legitimacy such as relative openness at the subnational level
(Meyer and Nguyen, 2005; Schotter and Beamish, 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2008).
Subnational level analysis can transfer partial country-level uncertainty into subnational
certainty, leading to finer-grained conclusions about the influences of institutions on
MNEs’ ownership choices. Future research could anchor the analysis at the subnational
level but simultaneously consider the homogeneity of subnational institutions at the
country level. For example, since some subnational regions in China such as Shanghai
and Shenzhen have emerged, it is feasible for future research to categorize China’s
subnational regions into emerging areas and emerged areas, so that the heterogeneity of
MNEs’ ownership choices within China can be explicitly identified.
Last but not least, it would be useful to examine the generalizability of our
conclusions with subsidiaries of MNEs from other countries.

Conclusion
By incorporating multiple theoretical lenses, as well as longitudinal and
multilevel methods, this study investigates how an emerging economy’s economic
liberalization influences a Japanese MNE’s ownership choice. The empirical results
suggest that a Japanese MNE increases its ownership levels in China to accommodate the
process of economic liberalization. However, a Japanese MNE also tends to maintain
equity-based relationships with local actors with subsidiary experience. In contrast, a
Japanese MNE only increases its ownership levels in the United States with the
accumulation of subsidiary experience. This study reveals a more fine-grained image of
how MNEs respond to institutional transition by adjusting their ownership strategies.
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Chapter 3. The Evolving Relationship between MNE
Ownership (O) and Subsidiary Profitability (P)
Introduction
Cross-border ownership strategy, defined as the degree of ownership of a
multinational enterprise (MNE) investing abroad, can affect the overseas subsidiaries’
likelihood of success and the overall probability of survival (Delios and Beamish, 1999;
Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Stopford and Wells, 1972). Prior studies, most of which
substantiated their conclusions with data from before 1995, have suggested that the
relationship between MNE ownership and subsidiary financial performance (O-P
relationship) in developing countries is different from that in developed countries. Wholly
owned subsidiaries (WOSs) tend to have a better financial performance than international
joint ventures (IJVs) established in North America or Europe because of interest
alignment and security of firm-specific assets (Nitsch, Beamish, and Makino, 1996). In
contrast, IJVs are more frequently used and are more profitable than WOSs in developing
countries because governments often limit location-specific resources critical to
performance to IJVs. This limitation protects indigenous enterprises from the threat of
competition (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Pan and Chi, 1999). Therefore, it is critical for
MNEs to adopt an appropriate ownership strategy overseas in order to generate profits.
The past two decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the global economy.
These evolving contexts have challenged scholars’ prior understanding of MNEs’ O-P
relationship. One of the fundamental changes is the rapid development in some
developing countries (emerging economies) where economic liberalization has been a
primary engine of growth (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright,
2000). When regulatory liberalization of foreign direct investments (FDIs) is one of the
most important aspects of economic liberalization in the host country, MNEs increasingly
adopt WOS entries and even convert existing IJVs to WOSs (Chang, Chung, and Moon,
2013; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Puck, Holtbrügge, Mohr, Lee, and Makhija, 2009). This
phenomenon is particularly remarkable in China, which is one of the world’s largest
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markets exerting an increasing impact on the global economy. Before 1990, minority IJVs
in China were usually created in place of WOSs due to government pressure (Beamish,
1993; Xiong, 2009). After 1990, the number of majority IJVs and WOSs continued to rise
along with the process of regulatory liberalization. By 1997, the number of foreign WOSs
exceeded that of IJVs in China for the first time (Xia, Tan, and Tan, 2008; Xiong, 2009).
In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), accelerating this trend
further. In that same year, Panasonic declared that it would convert its 50 IJVs established
in China into WOSs. Meanwhile, Motorola’s directors asserted that being a sole
proprietorship in China would be a natural choice with China’s joining the WTO (Xiong,
2009). Based on data developed in this dissertation, Japanese MNEs have dramatically
increased their average ownership level in FDIs in China during the period of China’s
economic liberalization. In contrast, over the same period, they have only slightly
increased their average ownership level in FDIs in the United States. This emerging
phenomenon delineated by Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, requires scholars to understand
whether existing conclusions about MNEs’ O-P relationship still hold true under the
condition of economic liberalization.
The trend of majority or sole ownership of foreign investments in China has
received attention in regards to its consequences. China’s governments have been
concerned with how this trend influences indigenous enterprises and the economy. They
have reacted by drafting new legislation to safeguard its growing economy and domestic
players (Sun, 2012; Xiong, 2009). An example is China’s Anti-Monopoly Law which took
effect in August 2008 (Wei, 2011). In addition, scholars have noticed that MNEs
sometimes mimic the dominant strategy of successful peers when deciding their operating
modes in foreign countries. Therefore, a high ownership level does not necessarily benefit
the subsidiary performance (Chang et al., 2013; Child and Tsai, 2005; Xia et al., 2008).
Although several studies have investigated foreign MNE’s O-P relationship using
a context of emerging economies (Chang et al., 2013; Douma, George, and Kabir, 2006),
there is still no study that has directly examined whether economic liberalization has
changed MNEs’ O-P relationship in emerging economies. Moreover, the institutional
transition, subnational variation and emerging uncertainty during economic liberalization
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have been well documented (Boisot and Child, 1996; Peng, 2003; Shi, Markóczy, and
Stan, 2014a). However, these important phenomena of task environments have not been
systematically incorporated into scholarly understanding of the O-P relationship. The
present study purports to shed light on this underexplored and important area by
examining whether the O-P relationship has evolved along with institutional transition.
To address such a challenge, the present study adopts an institution-based view,
which draws upon the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective and the resourcebased view (RBV) (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2003; Delios and Henisz, 2000;
Meyer, 2001; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005). The performance of a
subsidiary is determined by its sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). A
subsidiary’s sustained competitive advantage depends on its ability to manage the
institutional context of its resource decisions (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008;
Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008), which are usually concerned with how to
secure firm-specific assets and acquire/access complementary local assets (Dunning and
Lundan, 2008; Hennart, 2009). When institutional context varies over time, its evolution
should be included in theoretical analysis and empirical testing in performance research.
Such an approach is advocated because the conclusions that are drawn from institutional
context at one point of time may not be generalizable to its next state.
Moreover, economic liberalization has substantively influenced organizational
choice in subsidiary operating mode, resulting in possible endogeneity that needs to be
addressed in firm performance research (Brouthers et al., 2003; Reeb, Sakakibara, and
Mahmood, 2012; Semadeni, Withers, and Trevis Certo, 2014; Shaver, 1998). The present
study addresses the endogeneity issue by simplifying the research setting, using panel
data, including necessary control variables, and conducting a robustness check with
instrumental variables (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Reeb et al., 2012; Shaver, 1998).
This study proceeds with a literature review and a description of the research
setting used. Then it formulates a set of hypotheses that delineates the evolution of the OP relationship. Afterwards, it examines hypotheses using longitudinal methods and data
spanning a wider period of time. This study concludes with a discussion of empirical
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results that confirm or diverge from existing work and presents implications to IB
research and practitioners.

Literature Review
Scholars have been concerned with the importance of an institution-based view to
IB strategy (Peng et al., 2008). Literature suggests that a financially successful firm
would not only possess advantages in specific assets and organizing mechanism, but also
have institutional advantages (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Institutional advantages can
be defined as the formal and informal institutions that govern the value-added processes
within the firm and between the firm and its stakeholders (Cantwell, Dunning, and
Lundan, 2010). To obtain and utilize institutional advantages in a foreign country, an
MNE needs to understand the state of local institutions and their effects on firm
performance, and then formulate appropriate organizational choices (Milliken, 1987).
When studying MNEs’ O-P relationship from an institutional point of view, IB
scholars focus on the host country’s institutional openness, i.e., the extent to which the
host country allows MNEs to choose their operating modes freely (Nitsch et al., 1996;
Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino, 1994). Due to restrictive institutions in developing
countries, an foreign MNE has fewer choices regarding the scale of operations and the
scope of products than a local player (Makino and Beamish, 1998a). It also seldom
obtains the necessary subsidies or incentives from the host government to ensure profits
in the WOS operation (Guisinger, 1985; Pan and Chi, 1999). As a result, foreign MNEs
engage more often with local partners because an IJV tends to have institutional
advantages such as faster approval, wider and quicker market access, and favorable
investment incentives. Ceteris paribus, an IJV is more profitable than a WOS (Oman,
1988; Yan and Gray, 1994). By comparison, in developed countries MNEs enjoy similar
institutional advantages to local players, and they can arrange their ownership structures
based on firm factors such as intangible assets. Early studies thus suggested that overall
WOSs tend to have a better performance than IJVs (Nitsch et al., 1996; Woodcock et al.,
1994). This research stream implies that an MNE’s ownership strategy interacts with the
institutional openness to influence subsidiary performance. In addition, it implicitly or
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explicitly assumes that MNEs have clear knowledge of the host country’s institutions and
their cause-effects on firm performance.
Another stream of literature examines the influence of institutional knowledge
about the host country that an MNE possesses (Narula, 2010). This type of literature
examines how an MNE arranges its subsidiaries’ ownership structures based on the extent
to which it can understand and cope with local institutions that involve a broad array of
host-country characteristics such as political and legal rules and the social norms (Delios
and Beamish, 1999; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; North, 1990). Explicitly or implicitly
drawing on TCE logic, such as the resource (knowledge) complementarity of potential
partners (Hennart, 2009), this stream assumes that MNEs choose appropriate ownership
structures that benefit their local performance. It also assumes that it takes time for an
MNE to learn about the local institutions and corresponding practices (Cho and
Padmanabhan, 2005; Delios and Beamish, 1999). Based on these two assumptions, this
stream suggests that the deficiency in the knowledge of how to cope with local
institutions, produces significant institutional uncertainty or disadvantage that threatens
an MNE’s local performance (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999;
North, 1990). One can therefore infer that an MNE with adequate local institutional
knowledge may consider using a higher ownership level to secure its specific assets
unless it is prevented by local regulation. In contrast, if an MNE lacks institutional
knowledge that is critical to its local performance, it can access such knowledge and
reduce the corresponding uncertainty by sharing ownership with indigenous partners
(Beamish and Banks, 1987; Hennart, 2009). This stream thus implies that an MNE’s
ownership strategy interacts with its institutional knowledge to influence subsidiary
performance. In addition, experience in the host country can improve an MNE’s
institutional knowledge and reduce relevant uncertainty in local operation. Therefore,
experience may result in better subsidiary profitability and/or positive ownership
adjustment (Makino and Delios, 1996; Yiu and Makino, 2002).
The two literature streams contribute to the scholarly understanding of an MNE’s
cross-border ownership strategy and the consequent performance within a relatively static
institutional environment. However, they have yet to examine a more dynamic context
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that changes the institutional openness and simultaneously incurs institutional dynamics
that invalidate an MNE’s existing institutional knowledge. Studying such a dynamic and
complex context is necessary and important for comprehensively understanding the O-P
relationship in emerging economies that provide the main growth opportunities for MNEs.
Emerging Economies
Emerging economies are often characterized by existing institutional voids and
economic liberalization (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Khanna and
Palepu, 1997). Institutional voids represent underdeveloped capital markets, infrastructure,
intermediary markets, regulatory systems, contract-enforcing mechanisms or other
market-supporting institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Economic liberalization as the
primary engine of rapid development of emerging economies may fill institutional voids
by establishing formal market-oriented mechanisms and structures that facilitate market
exchange (Hoskisson et al., 2000).
The coexistence of these two characteristics complicates the institutional
environments that an MNE needs to cope with in an emerging economy. Through
regulatory liberalization and the establishment of market-oriented mechanisms, an
emerging market becomes increasingly open to FDI. Without prior ownership restriction,
an MNE may promote its equity control to secure its competitive advantages (Chang et
al., 2013; Hennart, 1991). However, an MNE may also increase its ownership control
when high equity control becomes the dominant strategy of successful peers (Child and
Tsai, 2005; Xia et al., 2008). In this case, high ownership level enhances the legitimacy
within the reference group but does not necessarily benefit the subsidiary’s performance
(Chang et al., 2013; Xia et al., 2008).
Economic liberalization also incurs institutional uncertainty that can be defined as
the degree of instability within an institutional environment (Luo, 2007). In order to
support the effective (though inefficient) functioning of the market, informal institutions
are usually used to bridge existing institutional voids in an emerging economy (North,
1990; Peng, 2003; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011). The informal institutions endure because
of their cognitive-cultural nature and thus it takes time for market-oriented mechanisms

66

established by economic liberalization to be fully institutionalized (Peng, 2003). The
knowledge of cultural-based informal institutions is usually too intangible, sophisticated,
and sticky for MNEs to understand and utilize independently in a short period of time
(North, 1990; Peng, 2003). Therefore, a market orientation is usually coupled with
existing but changing institutional voids and robust informal institutions. This
complicates the state of institutions and their cause-effects on firm performance (Milliken,
1987). By contrast, local firms may have advantages in understanding and predicting
local institutional changes, leading to better performance (Chen, Ding, and Kim, 2010;
Henisz, 2000). Therefore, MNEs may still need to cooperate with indigenous firms to
access the complementary institutional knowledge (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Hennart,
2009).
In brief, existing institutional voids and ongoing economic liberalization in an
emerging economy not only change the institutional openness of the host country, but
also cause an MNE to confront institutional uncertainty because of an absence of local
institutional knowledge. This influences the MNE’s ownership strategy and the O-P
relationship in a complicated way.
Research Setting
This study compares Japanese FDIs in China and the United States during the
period from 1990 to 2009. It does so for multiple reasons. First, the country of origin may
influence an MNE’s overseas ownership choice (Erramilli, 1996; Makino and Neupert,
2000; Zhao, Luo, and Suh, 2004) and/or profitability (Jung, Beamish, and Goerzen, 2008;
McGahan and Victer, 2010). Focusing on MNEs from one country can reduce the
endogeneity issue caused by organizational choices (Reeb et al., 2012; Shaver, 1998). As
a number of prior studies have empirically examined Japanese FDIs (Makino and
Beamish, 1998a; Woodcock et al., 1994), they have provided a basis for comparison with
the present work. Moreover, using panel data helps to further reduce any endogeneity
concerns (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003).
Second, such a research setting allows for a comparison of Japanese O-P
relationships in China and the United States. China is the largest emerging economy that
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has been undergoing an institutional transition while the United States is the largest
advanced economy that sustains a relatively mature free-market institutional environment
(Chan, Makino, and Isobe, 2010). This provides a large sample size for empirical tests.
Moreover, this research setting controls for the confounding effects of multiple host
countries (Makino, Isobe, and Chan, 2004b; Pattnaik, Choe, and Singh, 2015). Although
advanced economies advocate free market institutions, they still differ in other
dimensions of their institutional environments (e.g., country culture) that influence a
foreign MNE’s ownership choice (Xu, Pan, and Beamish, 2004). In addition, emerging
economies employ heterogeneous approaches to economic liberalization (Lau, Qian, and
Roland, 2000; Roland, 2002). Different approaches may facilitate distinct institutional
changes in scope, intensity, and duration (Brouthers and Lamb Jr, 1995; Roland, 2002),
influencing a foreign MNE’s ownership choice diversely. Therefore, involving multiple
advanced or emerging economies will complicate theoretical analysis and empirical
testing.
Third, since there are still no exact measurements of the host country’s
institutional openness and uncertainty, this study needs an emerging economy within
which one can estimate the general trends of institutional openness and uncertainty.
While some countries adopted a “big bang” approach for a fast and comprehensive
implementation of all major reforms (Newman, 2000; Roland, 2002), China advocates a
gradualist, dual-track strategy for economic liberalization. This is a process by which a
market track is introduced and gradually strengthened, and the central planning track is
maintained and progressively diminished (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lau et al., 2000; Park,
Li, and Tse, 2006). This dual-track nature results in incremental economic liberalization
lasting for a lengthy period of time, allowing for the identification of the overall trends of
China’s institutional openness and uncertainty by accessing well-documented
governmental policies and relevant academic studies. In particular, prior studies have
suggested that China’s incremental economic liberalization can be operationalized as a
function of time (Zhang, 2015). Along with this process, Japanese MNEs have
significantly increased their ownership levels in their investments in China. This is in
comparison to the behaviour of Japanese MNEs in the United States where they increased
ownership levels only slightly. Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 delineates this phenomenon.
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Hypotheses
As mentioned, prior studies have shown that in developed countries WOSs tend to
have a higher financial performance than IJVs (Nitsch et al., 1996), and in developing
countries IJVs have a better financial performance than WOSs (Beamish and Banks, 1987;
Pan and Chi, 1999). Previous studies investigated Japanese subsidiaries operating at the
beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, higher Japanese ownership levels may relate to higher
profitability for subsidiaries in the United States and lower profitability for those in China.
The following restates these hypotheses with a time condition.
Hypothesis 1a: Japanese ownership level was negatively associated with a
subsidiary’s profitability in China in the early 1990s.
Hypothesis 1b: Japanese ownership level was positively associated with a
subsidiary’s profitability in the United States in the early 1990s.
Evolution of the O-P Relationship
Regulatory liberalization improved China’s institutional openness gradually and
allowed MNEs to choose their operation modes more freely than before. Therefore, with
increasing institutional openness, higher ownership levels in China may improve
Japanese MNEs’ profitability (Woodcock et al., 1994).
However, this inference does not consider the evolution of the O-P relationship
based on a complete picture of China’s institutional environment. Prior studies have
identified complexity, dynamism, and hostility as important environmental attributes.
These attributes can be understood as heterogeneity, instability, and inequality of
environmental elements towards FDIs (Dess and Beard, 1984; Tan and Litschert, 1994).
China’s economic liberalization process gradually relaxed country-level restriction on
FDIs, decentralized decision-making power to local governments and firms, privatized
property rights, established relevant legal systems, and formulated industrial policies that
influenced resource allocation (Child and Tse, 2001; Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000;
Park et al., 2006). This process facilitated institutional changes both within the political
hierarchy and across the breadth of geographic scope (Boisot and Child, 1996; Park et al.,
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2006). Moreover, China’s dual-track approach purports to liberalize markets without
eliminating the pre-existing rents of economic agents, but not fully imitate free-market
institutions (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lau et al., 2000). These characteristics interactively
and significantly change important attributes of the institutional environment in China
(Lau et al., 2000; Park et al., 2006; Shi et al., 2014a).
Along with the gradual economic liberalization, MNEs increasingly confront
subnational regional environments (Chan et al., 2010; Ma, Tong, and Fitza, 2013; Shi et
al., 2014a). In the early stages of the economic liberalization, MNEs usually chose their
investment locations and local partners from a very limited scope dictated by the central
government. Their subsidiaries were also subject to the central government’s monitoring
(Beamish, 1993). The influence of subnational regional environments was thus mitigated
by centralized decision-making mechanisms. With decreasing central government control,
MNEs can access a broader scope of locations and domestic players. Consequently, they
can interact with local stakeholders more directly and spread their investments across a
broader geography. Therefore, MNEs investing in China are increasingly influenced by (i)
political, (ii) social, and (iii) economic institutions of subnational regions (Chan et al.,
2010; Ma et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2014a). The present study argues that coexisting
institutional transition and subnational disparity intensify the complexity, dynamism, and
hostility of China’s institutional environment.
(i) Political institutions. China has significant within-country variation in political
decentralization at the province and even city level where the central government exerts
time-varying degrees of control (Huang and Sheng, 2009; Shi, Sun, and Peng, 2012).
Therefore, despite the nationwide implementation of corporate law and other marketrelated policies, subnational differences remain pronounced and change over time (Shi et
al., 2012), resulting in fuzzy boundaries between the central and local controls across
geographical locations. Moreover, to decentralize the political power, the central
government delegates some regulatory functions to the local level (Luo, 2005; Meyer and
Nguyen, 2005). Such delegation is often ambiguously and equivocally stipulated, leaving
opportunities for subjective interpretations by local authorities (Gao, Murray, Kotabe, and
Lu, 2010; Shi et al., 2014a). Lacking sufficient institutions that support a free market,
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local authorities continue to be influenced by the legacy of a socialist system and
subnational culture when formulating subnational regulations and policies (Kriauciunas
and Kale, 2006; Peng, 2003). Moreover, the political decentralization usually gives rise to
local protectionism and regionalism, allowing local agents to maximize self-interest (Ma
et al., 2013). This agency problem not only engenders “ad hoc rule bending”, but also
opens the door for economic actors to rely on relationship-based exchanges more than on
rule-based ones (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lin, 2001; Shi et al., 2014a). In conclusion,
subnational disparity in political institutions heightens the complexity, dynamism, and
hostility of institutional environments that MNEs confront, constituting the main source
of environmental uncertainty in sensing the state of local rules, understanding their causeeffects on value-added activities, and formulating organizational choices (Luo, 2007;
Milliken, 1987; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011).
(ii) Social institutions. Along with political decentralization, MNEs increasingly
confront subnational disparity in social institutions. China has significant within-country
variation in culture at the province or regional level (Chan et al., 2010; Kwon, 2012; Shi
et al., 2014a). Subnational culture as informal institution is usually used by local agents to
bridge institutional voids when relevant formal institutions are underdeveloped (Peng,
2003; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011). This makes it impossible for MNEs to bypass
subnational culture’s influence in their local operation. However, the knowledge of
subnational culture is usually too intangible and sophisticated for MNEs to learn in a
short period (North, 1990; Peng, 2003). Particularly, it is difficult for MNEs to
understand the fuzzy boundaries between formal institutions and cultural-cognitive
institutions. Therefore, the subnational disparity in social institutions intensifies the
complexity that MNEs need to cope with.
(iii) Economic institutions. The development of economic institutions varies
across the subnational regions within China (Chan et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2013).
Economic institutions involve intermediaries that provide support services to firms and
the common infrastructure that supports regional economic transaction (Chan et al., 2010;
Porter, 1990). Regions with underdeveloped economic institutions may pose challenges
for foreign subsidiaries, whereas those with well-established institutions may help to
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develop these subsidiaries’ competitive advantages (Ma et al., 2013; McEvily and Zaheer,
1999). Therefore, MNEs may choose advantageous subnational regions in which to invest
according to their strategic purposes. Regional economic institutions may influence
MNEs’ choices of subnational locations, ownership structure and subsidiary performance
(Goerzen, Asmussen, and Nielsen, 2013; Pan and Chi, 1999). With central government’s
macro-control and local governments’ political intervention, subnational economic
institutions change over time (Pan and Chi, 1999). Therefore, the variation of subnational
economic institutions may alter the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of institutional
environments, resulting in operating uncertainty in value-added activities.
To summarize, China’s economic liberalization not only results in a gradual
institutional transition from a central planning track to a market track, but also causes
subnational disparity in political, social, and economic institutions. The coexisting
institutional transition and subnational disparity give rise to the complexity, dynamism,
and hostility of China’s institutional environments, resulting in institutional pressure and
institutional uncertainty that an MNE has to cope with. Figure 2.1 describes the
theoretical foundation for the present study. Simultaneously operating in multiple
subnational regions intensifies this challenge (Boisot and Child, 1996; Qian, Li, Li, and
Qian, 2008). Comparatively, local firms have advantages in learning government
intentions and utilizing managerial ties (Chen et al., 2010; Li, Poppo, and Zhou, 2008;
Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). This explains how those local firms that were advantaged
under strict central control still maintain their privilege in the liberalizing economy (Lin,
2001). It also has been suggested that MNEs respond to institutional uncertainty through
partnerships with local firms that have privileged political ties (Henisz and Zelner, 2005).
Therefore, because of the coexistence of institutional openness and institutional
uncertainty, it is difficult to evaluate whether higher ownership levels in China may
improve Japanese MNEs’ profitability.
Nevertheless, if institutional openness and institutional uncertainty evolve
following certain trends, it will create an opportunity to examine the evolution of the O-P
relationship. As mentioned, China’s economic liberalization has followed a dual-track
approach. A strengthening market track is embodied in institutionalizing formal market
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rules and decreasing institutional voids. During this process, on one hand institutional
openness is growing over time, reducing MNEs’ reliance on equity-based relationships to
enter the market. On the other hand, the complexity, dynamism, and hostility in China’s
institutional environment are declining over time (Tan and Tan, 2005), reducing MNEs’
reliance on local partners to understand the state of local institutions and their causeeffects on their investments. At some point, the benefits of rule-based exchange exceed
those of relationship-based exchange (Peng, 2003). Increasing institutional openness and
decreasing institutional uncertainty implies that Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in
China may positively adjust over time, but it may not turn out to be a positive one very
quickly.
Compared to China’s situation, the United States has consistently had a relatively
mature free-market economy. Therefore, the present study assumes that its institutional
openness and uncertainty have remained at similar levels for the past two decades, and
Japanese MNEs do not confront major challenges. The above analyses lead to hypotheses
about the evolution of Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship.
Hypothesis 2a: In China, Japanese MNEs’ negative O-P relationship will
weaken over time after 1990.
Hypothesis 2b: In the United States, Japanese MNEs’ positive O-P
relationship will not significantly change over time after 1990.

Methodology
The present study needs to address two issues in the empirical model. First,
performance patterns in the two countries may share a number of explanatory factors to
different extents, and these differences should be reflected in the model (Gomes-Casseres,
1990). Second, there may be systemic differences in inward FDIs in the two countries
(Gomes-Casseres, 1990). For example, Japanese firms with stronger technological
advantages were more likely to invest in developed countries than in developing countries
(Makino, Beamish, and Zhao, 2004a). This study addresses the second problem via
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sample selection. To resolve the first issue, this study follows the methodology in GomesCasseres (1990) and adds the country dummy as well as relevant interactions in the model:
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 =

𝑛

𝑛

= α0 + (𝛼1 − 𝛼0 ) ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎 + ∑ 𝛽0𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑖 + ∑(𝛽1𝑖 − 𝛽0𝑖 ) ∙ 𝑥𝑖 ∙ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝑖=1

(3.1)

𝑖=1

where
Country is a dummy variable (equal to 1 if the subsidiary operated in China),
xi is an independent variable,
n is the number of independent variables,
α0, β0i are the intercept and slopes for Japanese subsidiaries in the United States,
α1, β1i are the intercept and slopes for Japanese subsidiaries operated in China.
Moreover, this study constructs a multilevel model with longitudinal data (19902009) of Japanese subsidiaries and their parent MNEs. To fit the multilevel model to an
ordinal logit regression, GLLAMM (Generalized Linear Latent And Mixed Models) is
recommended with Stata software (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). This command
has been used in strategy research (Soule, Swaminathan, and Tihanyi, 2013).
Samples
The initial sample included observations of Japanese subsidiaries during the 19902009 period from the merged Toyo Keizai and Needs datasets (2012 Edition). Many of
the prior studies to which the present study refers used earlier editions of the Toyo Keizai
datasets (Makino and Beamish, 1998a; Nitsch et al., 1996; Woodcock et al., 1994). Using
the data from the same organization improves the reliability of this study.
To resolve the second question (i.e., the systemic difference in selecting host
countries) mentioned by Gomes-Casseres (1990), the present study discards the
observations from Japanese MNEs that only invested in one of the two countries from
1990 to 2009. This study discards subsidiaries invested in agriculture, forestry, and
mining industries, within which there were distinct industry-specific regulations that were
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given priority over the country level policies 7 . This study also removes Japanese
subsidiaries that function as local headquarters, since almost all of them are WOSs. To
focus on strategic investments, this study discards subsidiaries with less than 5 percent
Japanese ownership during their lifetimes, since they were considered portfolio
investments (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). In addition, this study drops subsidiaries with
fewer than 20 employees to ensure that the sample did not mix viable subsidiaries with
small representative offices (Beamish and Inkpen, 1998). Finally, this study excludes
subsidiaries with missing data. With this careful screening, the final dataset consists of
557 Japanese MNEs, 1,608 subsidiaries in China and the United States, and a total of
7,575 observations during the period from 1990 to 20098.
Variables
The dependent variable for this study is Japanese financial performance, a threelevel ordinal variable. Toyo Keizai conducted an annual survey and asked each
subsidiary’s general manager to provide a perceived assessment of the subsidiary’s
financial performance — loss, breakeven, or gain. Prior studies report that this measure
has adequate reliability (Delios and Beamish, 2001, 2004). Accordingly, empirical tests
are based on ordinal logistic regression.
The first independent variable (IV) in this study is the Japanese ownership level,
measured as the percentage of total Japanese ownership in the subsidiary (Ownership
level). The second IV is the interaction between Japanese ownership level and the country
dummy (Ownership X Country). The third IV is the interaction between Japanese
ownership level and the time period from 1990 (Ownership X Time). The fourth IV is the
interaction between Ownership X Time and the country dummy (Ownership X Time X
Country).

7

The differences in regulatory rules between natural resource related industries and other industries are
synthesized from the website of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
(www.mofcom.gov.cn).
8
Compared to the number of Japanese subsidiaries (1,608), the number of observations (7,575) between
1990-2009 is relatively small. This is because (i) subsidiaries were established at different time, (ii) they
may have exited before 2009, or (iii) there are missing data in the dependent, independent, or control
variables.
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Based on prior studies, this study controls for variables that may influence
subsidiary performance in order to reduce endogeneity (Brouthers et al., 2003; Shaver,
1998). First, prior studies point out that Japanese IJVs established in emerging economies
exhibit higher performance than those in advanced economies because of more
technological advantages to exploit (Beamish and Delios, 1997; Makino et al., 2004a).
Prior studies also suggest that Japanese IJVs formed in Asia exhibit higher performance
than those in North America because of cultural proximity (Delios and Beamish, 2004).
Therefore, this study controls for the country effect by adding the country dummy
(Country = 1 if the subsidiary operates in China).
Second, this study controls for the time effect on subsidiary performance. On one
hand, institutional transition in China may imply an improving business climate and
increasing spillover of best practices, benefiting local operating efficiency (Luo, 1998;
Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009). On the other hand, intensifying competition
makes it harder to make a profit in China (Beamish and Jiang, 2002; Isobe, Makino, and
Montgomery, 2000; Pan and Chi, 1999; Pan, Li, and Tse, 1999). Further, it is also
suggested that there are both advantages for early and late movers in transitional
economies (Luo and Peng, 1998), and relevant costs and benefits of transactions in an
transitional economy may change over time (Peng, 2003). Therefore, this study includes
the time period measured from 1990 (Time) and its square item (Time2) considering the
possible nonlinear effect. This study also controls for the country difference in the time
effect (Time X Country, and Time2 X Country).
Third, prior studies suggest that a subsidiary’s operating experience may improve
its profitability (Delios and Beamish, 2001). Therefore, this studies controls for the
subsidiary’s age. It also considers the nonlinear effect (Delios and Beamish, 2004), and
the interaction effects with Japanese ownership level and the country difference (Age,
Age2, Age X Country, Age2 X Country, Ownership X Age, and Ownership X Age X
Country).
Fourth, this study considers an MNE’s experience in a subnational region. Prior
studies considered the MNE’s host country experience, computed as the ln of the sum of
subsidiary-year units in the host country, since accumulated operation may provide a
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valuable local knowledge base to respond to environmental uncertainties and risks
(Henisz and Delios, 2001; Salomon and Wu, 2012). As mentioned, along with the
economic liberalization, Japanese MNEs are increasingly exposed to subnational
institutions, and thus the regional experience is more relevant than the country experience
to subsidiary performance. In addition, the present study is concerned with the evolution
of the O-P relationship, indicating that the analysis should be based on the subsidiary unit.
Therefore, the empirical tests of this study focus on the evolution of institutional
conditions within subnational region and control for the influence of between-region
variance.
This study deconstructs an MNE’s country presence into regional experience,
regional diversity, and regional concentration. Regional experience is measured by an
MNE’s accumulated experience within a subnational region, i.e., a province, municipality,
or state. Nevertheless, this study drops regional experience because it is highly correlated
with the subsidiary experience (correlation = 0.615). Moreover, simultaneously operating
in multiple subnational regions may not only intensify the uncertainty that an MNE
confronts (Boisot and Child, 1996; Qian et al., 2008), but also bring out more
opportunities for exploitation and exploration (Lu and Beamish, 2004; Luo and Peng,
1999; Qian et al., 2008). Therefore, the study includes regional diversity measured by the
number of subnational regions where the MNE operates in China or the United States.
Based on the sample screening process previously described, the present study involves
24 provinces or municipalities in China and 36 states in the United States. In addition, the
data includes regional concentration measured by the number of subsidiaries in the focal
region, as it influences the subsidiary’s strategic importance and embeddedness in the
local networks (Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2002; Roth and Morrison, 1992). The
study also considers the interaction items of regional diversity and regional concentration
with the country dummy.
Fifth, the study includes the industry and sector categories since they represent
heterogeneity in the level of marketization or concentration, influencing an MNE’s choice
of ownership level and/or subsidiary performance (Boisot and Child, 1996; McGahan and
Porter, 1997; Zhao et al., 2004). Following prior studies (e.g., Dhanaraj & Beamish,
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2004), the present study includes eight industry and two sector dummy variables for the
subsidiary level in order to remove the confounding industry and sector effects (the
reference is the manufacturing of electronics). This study does not use industry dummy
variables for the MNE level because of the collinearity between the industrial categories
of the subsidiary and its MNE parent. Nevertheless, an MNE from one sector may invest
in other sectors in the host country (e.g., a Japanese manufacturer may invest in wholesale
or retail sectors in China). As such, this study includes two sector dummy variables for
the MNE level (the reference is the manufacturing sector). However, based on a Pearson
correlation test, MNEs from the service sector usually still invest in the service sector in
foreign countries (correlation = 0.742). Therefore, the variable Subsidiary in service was
not included.
Sixth, this study controls for MNE-specific factors that influence an MNE’s
ownership choice and/or subsidiary performance. This study includes the MNE size
(measured by the ln function of the number of employees in the MNE) since large MNEs
may have more flexibility in reallocating their subsidiary portfolio (Delios and Beamish,
1999; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). This study also considers an MNE’s profitability
measured by its return on sales (ROS). It may represent the MNE’s overall capabilities of
making profit (Barney, 1991). Moreover, this study needs to control for subsidiary asset
specificity as it benefits subsidiary performance when the parent MNE has a higher
ownership level (Chang et al., 2013; Zhang, Li, Hitt, and Cui, 2007). Lacking subsidiary
level data, this study includes the MNE’s asset specificity, measured by the advertising
and R&D intensities (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004).
Seventh, the study involves subsidiary-specific factors. The size (measured by the
ln function of the number of employees) represents the subsidiary resource commitment
that may negatively relate to the MNE ownership level (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986;
Delios and Beamish, 1999). Moreover, a Japanese MNE may invest in a subsidiary with
other Japanese MNEs or multiple local partners. Since the number of partners in a joint
venture may not only alleviate the liability of foreignness but also increase the ex ante or
ex post costs stemming from the complexity of the transaction (Gong, Shenkar, Luo, and
Nyaw, 2007; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009; Makino and Beamish, 1998b), the Japanese
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subsidiary’s performance may be affected by these alliance characteristics in a
complicated way. Therefore, this study includes two dummy variables to indicate whether
the subsidiary had investment from more than one Japanese MNE or more than one local
firm. In addition, the data includes the percentage of Japanese expatriates in a subsidiary
since it also represents the level of an MNE’s control (Gaur, Delios, and Singh, 2007;
Gong, 2003; Makino et al., 2004a).
Finally, investment motives indicate a subsidiary’s strategic position in the parent
firm’s market expansion and global integration, influencing the subsidiary’s operating
mode and the priority of maximizing profitability (Kim and Hwang, 1992; Pan and Chi,
1999; Roth and Morrison, 1992). Following Goerzen et al.’s (2013) approach, this study
categorizes original investment purposes into nine types: Local market seeking, Global
production network, Global distribution network, Local information collection, Local
labor seeking, Follow global stakeholders, New product development, Local resource
seeking, and International risk hedging.
Descriptive Statistics and Multi-Collinearity
This study centers all continuous independent variables in order to reduce multicollinearity in the empirical model (Aiken and West, 1991). Table 3.1 provides all the
descriptive statistics of the variables and their Pearson correlation matrix. According to
Table 3.1, the greatest correlation value is 0.544 (between The number of regions and
MNE size). This study further evaluates the multi-collinearity of variables using VIF tests,
and the maximum VIF value is less than 10, indicating that there is no serious multicollinearity concern in the model (Neter and Michael, 1990).
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Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Variable
Performance level
Ownership level
Time
Subsidiary age
Number of regions
Number of subsidiaries within region
Country
Local market seeking
Global production network
Global distribution network
Local information collection
Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical
Manufacturing transport
Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
Manufacturing non metal
Manufacturing other
Subsidiary in wholesale or retail
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Subsidiary size
Subsidiary expatriate ratio
More than one Japanese partners
More than one local partners

Mean
2.385
84.019
9.244
11.644
0.590
0.235
0.346
0.766
0.355
0.311
0.316
0.140
0.098
0.081
0.081
0.074
0.026
0.023
0.076
0.119
0.054
0.043
0.042
0.018
0.322
0.122
0.119
0.384
0.948
8.184
0.034
3.989
0.165
0.230
0.048

S.D.
0.783
25.019
4.958
8.845
0.620
0.420
0.476
0.424
0.479
0.463
0.465
0.347
0.297
0.273
0.273
0.263
0.160
0.150
0.264
0.324
0.225
0.204
0.201
0.133
0.467
0.328
0.324
1.196
1.857
1.268
0.059
1.750
0.704
0.421
0.214

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1
-0.068
0.104
0.143
0.045
0.032
0.061
-0.049
0.004
-0.024
0.004
0.016
-0.044
-0.030
0.029
-0.075
0.025
-0.016
0.044
-0.094
-0.018
-0.028
-0.035
0.037
0.059
-0.004
0.006
-0.004
0.033
0.048
0.064
0.066
-0.034
-0.019
0.036

1
-0.064
0.189
-0.244
-0.110
-0.406
0.030
-0.233
0.038
0.194
-0.116
0.031
0.030
-0.066
0.038
-0.053
-0.071
-0.124
-0.130
-0.032
-0.112
-0.051
0.003
0.308
-0.022
0.048
0.068
0.016
-0.148
0.040
-0.250
0.076
-0.297
-0.340

1
0.013
0.093
0.116
0.401
-0.079
0.191
0.050
-0.192
0.131
0.007
-0.035
0.004
-0.129
0.030
0.007
0.057
0.023
-0.005
0.052
0.011
0.009
-0.126
0.007
0.032
0.112
0.266
-0.020
0.040
0.103
-0.040
0.006
0.048

1
-0.021
-0.012
-0.438
0.085
-0.239
-0.036
0.162
-0.183
-0.016
-0.006
-0.060
0.026
-0.009
-0.046
-0.084
-0.130
-0.070
-0.055
-0.041
-0.028
0.295
0.080
0.049
0.032
0.001
0.038
0.002
0.023
0.008
-0.141
-0.122

1
0.294
0.194
-0.063
0.087
-0.093
-0.165
0.047
-0.030
-0.032
0.046
-0.006
0.070
0.011
0.113
0.026
-0.026
0.095
0.057
-0.046
-0.176
0.003
-0.019
0.004
0.040
0.544
-0.066
0.232
-0.041
0.136
0.083

1
0.086
-0.089
0.028
-0.025
-0.107
0.059
-0.007
0.022
0.082
-0.035
-0.040
0.050
0.016
0.016
-0.011
-0.030
0.014
-0.020
-0.077
0.035
0.050
0.030
0.062
0.225
-0.032
0.063
-0.031
0.061
0.039

1
-0.128
0.336
0.082
-0.299
0.385
-0.049
-0.079
0.148
-0.180
0.051
0.093
0.130
-0.038
0.057
0.107
0.032
0.047
-0.318
0.021
0.028
0.035
0.088
0.101
0.008
0.279
-0.097
0.242
0.282

1
-0.089
-0.066
0.075
-0.060
-0.017
-0.083
-0.045
0.022
-0.005
-0.041
0.005
0.017
0.021
0.006
0.059
-0.014
0.172
-0.002
-0.109
-0.025
0.002
-0.064
0.014
0.006
0.001
-0.018
-0.037

1
0.065
-0.222
0.247
0.020
-0.042
0.054
-0.042
0.072
0.106
0.221
0.200
0.157
0.142
0.142
0.144
-0.444
-0.088
-0.226
0.009
0.071
0.035
0.008
0.412
-0.097
0.152
0.148

1
0.076
0.086
0.024
-0.015
0.032
-0.048
0.019
0.016
-0.016
-0.107
-0.004
-0.014
-0.020
0.020
0.082
0.065
0.003
0.025
0.010
-0.185
-0.028
-0.068
0.004
-0.034
0.022

1
-0.131
-0.013
0.152
-0.046
0.087
-0.003
-0.076
-0.065
-0.149
-0.074
-0.078
-0.055
-0.028
0.253
0.115
0.001
-0.061
-0.068
-0.149
-0.035
-0.324
0.104
-0.174
-0.079
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Variable
Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical
Manufacturing transport
Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
Manufacturing non metal
Manufacturing other
Subsidiary in wholesale or retail
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Subsidiary size
Subsidiary expatriate ratio
More than one Japanese partners
More than one local partners

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Variable
Subsidiary in wholesale or retail
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Subsidiary size
Subsidiary expatriate ratio
More than one Japanese partners
More than one local partners

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1
-0.043
-0.038
0.251
-0.036
0.036
0.108
0.002
0.010
0.089
0.026
0.006
0.068
-0.213
-0.043
-0.061
0.009
0.059
0.030
0.000
0.262
-0.068
0.019
0.046

1
0.019
-0.076
0.069
-0.054
-0.039
-0.025
0.136
-0.015
-0.035
0.024
-0.001
-0.048
-0.033
0.043
-0.067
-0.054
-0.033
-0.025
0.035
-0.003
0.032
-0.018

1
-0.042
-0.013
0.009
-0.046
0.014
-0.069
-0.030
-0.059
-0.017
0.018
-0.061
-0.009
0.064
0.007
0.020
-0.022
-0.010
-0.084
0.013
-0.070
-0.027

1
-0.060
0.170
0.054
0.020
-0.018
-0.021
0.013
0.075
0.029
-0.111
0.025
-0.034
0.020
-0.006
0.014
0.036
0.100
-0.024
0.012
0.048

1
-0.047
0.007
-0.028
0.120
0.008
0.001
0.043
-0.039
-0.040
-0.044
-0.067
-0.018
-0.041
0.021
-0.049
0.050
-0.016
-0.015
-0.057

1
-0.025
-0.047
-0.060
-0.039
-0.035
-0.034
-0.022
-0.113
-0.038
-0.060
0.111
-0.004
0.015
0.029
0.061
-0.023
0.076
0.017

1
-0.044
-0.057
-0.037
-0.033
-0.032
-0.021
-0.106
0.114
-0.027
0.053
-0.023
-0.026
-0.027
0.088
-0.020
0.083
0.076

1
-0.105
-0.068
-0.061
-0.060
-0.039
-0.197
-0.061
-0.105
0.037
0.164
-0.040
0.070
0.061
-0.040
0.113
-0.013

1
-0.088
-0.078
-0.077
-0.050
-0.253
-0.128
-0.135
-0.092
-0.073
0.104
-0.032
0.288
-0.064
0.063
0.035

1
-0.051
-0.050
-0.032
-0.164
-0.082
-0.088
-0.019
0.022
-0.070
0.015
0.072
-0.029
-0.001
-0.013

1
-0.045
-0.029
-0.147
0.011
-0.078
-0.049
-0.029
0.066
-0.058
0.124
0.020
0.165
0.076

1
-0.029
-0.145
-0.034
-0.077
-0.014
0.008
0.045
-0.025
0.139
-0.036
0.041
0.045

1
-0.094
0.001
-0.044
0.115
-0.005
0.004
-0.007
0.065
-0.022
-0.046
0.034

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

1
0.247
-0.222
0.017
-0.001
-0.166
-0.023
-0.418
0.113
-0.206
-0.133

1
-0.137
-0.037
-0.164
-0.238
-0.096
-0.147
0.024
0.011
0.036

1
0.059
-0.145
0.035
0.041
-0.099
-0.001
-0.030
0.011

1
0.147
0.033
0.057
0.044
-0.028
-0.026
-0.017

1
-0.009
0.015
0.040
-0.009
-0.058
-0.022

1
-0.098
0.357
-0.058
0.133
0.072

1
0.016
0.001
-0.064
-0.013

1
-0.244
0.190
0.119

1
-0.074
0.006

1
0.183

1
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Results
With unconditional modeling (i.e., the regression on subsidiary performance
using only information about analysis levels but without any independent or control
variable), the intra-class correlations (ICCs) for different levels can be calculated. The
ICC between subsidiaries is 0.647, and the value between MNEs is 0.164, indicating the
necessity of three-level modeling (Singer and Willett, 2003). In addition, the ICC
between subnational regions is less than 0.01, and thus this study does not use the
regional level in empirical model and only include relevant variables.
Table 3.2 provides a hierarchical regression process. Model 1 includes most
control variables. Model 2 includes Japanese ownership level and its interaction with the
country dummy. Model 3 involves the effects of the subsidiary age and its relevant
interaction items. Model 4 includes the time items and their country differences. Model 5
adds the interaction between the time and Japanese ownership level to identify the
evolution of Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship over time. Since two constants are
consistently significant, Japanese subsidiaries’ financial performance (loss, breakeven, or
gain) can be explained by empirical models.
Model 5 empirically examines the four hypotheses. It is worth noting that the
regressions use centered continuous variables, and when the centered variable Time
equals zero, the real time is 1999 but not 1990. Therefore in 1999, Japanese MNEs’ O-P
relationship was negative in both China and the United States (coefficient = -0.009). One
can calculate the coefficients for 1990 based on equation (3.1), and results are -0.027 in
China and 0.009 in the United States9, supporting Hypotheses 1a and 1b. Moreover, the
negative Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in China weakens over time (coefficient = 0.002 + 0.004 = 0.002), supporting Hypothesis 2a. In contrast, the positive O-P
relationship in the United States weakens over time too (coefficient = -0.002), not
supporting Hypothesis 2b.

9

In 1990, the coefficient for subsidiaries in the United States (Country = 0) can be calculated as -0.009 + (9) * (-0.002) = 0.009. The coefficient for subsidiaries in China (Country = 1) can be calculated as -0.009 +
(-9) * (0.004-0.002) = -0.027.
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Table 3.2 Three-Level Longitudinal Logistic Regression
Variables
Ownership Level
Ownership X Country
Ownership X Time
Ownership X Time X Country

Model 1

Model 2
-0.003(0.004)
-0.011(0.006)†

Model 3
-0.004(0.005)
0.003(0.008)

Model 4
-0.005(0.005)
0.000(0.008)

Model 5
-0.009(0.005)†
-0.011(0.011)
-0.002(0.001)**
0.004(0.001)***

0.015(0.015)
-0.010(0.002)***
-0.027(0.037)
0.020(0.004)***

0.019(0.016)
-0.010(0.002)***
-0.003(0.041)
0.017(0.004)***

0.120(0.011)***
-0.003(0.001)***
-0.136(0.035)***
-0.027(0.003)***
-0.001(0.000)***
0.003(0.001)***

0.091(0.015)***
-0.002(0.001)***
-0.135(0.041)**
-0.030(0.003)***
-0.001(0.000)**
0.003(0.001)**

0.086(0.015)***
-0.002(0.001)***
-0.135(0.041)**
-0.029(0.003)***
0.000(0.000)
0.001(0.001)

Time Effect
Time
Time2
Time X Country
Time2 X Country
Subsidiary Experience
Subsidiary age
Age2
Age X Country
Age2 X Country
Ownership X Age
Ownership X Age X Country
MNE Subnational Experience
Number of regions
Number of regions X Country
Number of subsidiaries within a region
Number of subsidiaries X Country

-0.004(0.158)
0.432(0.229)†
0.126(0.181)
0.550(0.290)†

0.008(0.158)
0.408(0.229)†
0.127(0.181)
0.563(0.290)†

0.024(0.159)
0.035(0.236)
0.144(0.180)
0.420(0.292)

-0.002(0.160)
0.064(0.238)
0.078(0.180)
0.427(0.293)

-0.033(0.160)
0.102(0.239)
0.070(0.180)
0.438(0.294)

Country Dummy
Country (China =1; United States = 0)

0.100(0.195)

0.002(0.197)

1.669(0.266)***

1.063(0.363)**

0.811(0.377)*

Industry and Sector Effect
(reference: manufacturing electronics)
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical
Manufacturing transport
Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
Manufacturing non metal
Manufacturing other

0.550(0.616)
-0.605(0.568)
-0.047(0.339)
-0.818(0.291)**
-0.487(0.362)
-0.402(0.382)
0.133(0.383)
0.825(0.686)

0.520(0.613)
-0.633(0.566)
-0.082(0.338)
-0.862(0.291)**
-0.512(0.361)
-0.406(0.381)
0.098(0.382)
0.792(0.684)

0.439(0.608)
-0.774(0.562)
-0.024(0.338)
-0.656(0.288)*
-0.338(0.365)
-0.466(0.381)
0.304(0.384)
0.992(0.681)

0.377(0.605)
-0.724(0.560)
-0.040(0.337)
-0.724(0.289)*
-0.359(0.362)
-0.509(0.378)
0.235(0.382)
0.934(0.676)

0.341(0.605)
-0.804(0.564)
-0.064(0.338)
-0.737(0.290)*
-0.338(0.363)
-0.520(0.379)
0.211(0.383)
0.974(0.680)
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Subsidiary in wholesale or retail

0.840(0.226)***

0.865(0.226)***

0.617(0.228)**

0.707(0.229)**

0.677(0.229)**

(reference: manufacturing)
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service

-0.025(0.297)
-0.201(0.347)

-0.053(0.296)
-0.200(0.345)

-0.290(0.298)
-0.436(0.343)

-0.306(0.297)
-0.416(0.341)

-0.310(0.298)
-0.425(0.341)

Other MNE Specific Factors
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS

-0.073(0.057)
0.096(0.031)**
0.222(0.084)**
2.021(0.690)**

-0.061(0.057)
0.098(0.031)**
0.204(0.084)*
2.079(0.691)**

-0.098(0.058)†
0.020(0.032)
0.088(0.083)
2.218(0.699)**

-0.120(0.058)*
0.003(0.032)
0.093(0.083)
2.561(0.703)***

-0.123(0.058)*
0.001(0.032)
0.086(0.083)
2.566(0.704)***

Other Subsidiary Specific Factors
Subsidiary size
Expatriate rate
More than one Japanese partners
More than one local partners

0.487(0.057)***
-0.358(0.311)
-0.419(0.168)*
0.285(0.293)

0.488(0.056)***
-0.303(0.311)
-0.456(0.168)**
0.007(0.306)

0.265(0.057)***
-0.243(0.312)
-0.457(0.169)**
0.029(0.311)

0.282(0.057)***
-0.184(0.273)
-0.399(0.169)*
0.040(0.310)

0.289(0.057)***
-0.173(0.275)
-0.427(0.170)*
0.015(0.312)

Subsidiary Investment Purpose
Local market seeking
Global production network
Global distribution network
Local information collection
Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging

-0.107(0.124)
0.107(0.149)
-0.213(0.122)†
0.428(0.137)**
-0.237(0.179)
-0.258(0.175)
-0.242(0.198)
0.016(0.221)
-0.653(0.226)**

-0.121(0.124)
0.103(0.149)
-0.190(0.122)
0.430(0.137)**
-0.247(0.178)
-0.234(0.175)
-0.234(0.197)
0.001(0.221)
-0.674(0.225)**

-0.126(0.126)
0.080(0.150)
-0.204(0.123)†
0.368(0.138)**
-0.187(0.181)
-0.122(0.177)
-0.245(0.199)
0.010(0.223)
-0.449(0.230)†

-0.164(0.126)
0.070(0.151)
-0.231(0.123)†
0.329(0.138)*
-0.194(0.181)
-0.143(0.177)
-0.281(0.199)
0.063(0.223)
-0.497(0.230)*

-0.171(0.127)
0.062(0.151)
-0.226(0.123)†
0.342(0.138)*
-0.186(0.181)
-0.145(0.177)
-0.288(0.200)
0.061(0.224)
-0.493(0.230)*

-2.841(0.252)***
-0.599(0.248)*

-2.873(0.253)***
-0.633(0.249)*

-2.993(0.256)***
-0.680(0.252)**

-3.303(0.260)***
-0.977(0.255)***

-3.352(0.261)***
-1.019(0.256)***

-5750.841
288.79***
9.92**

-5620.149
550.18***
261.38***

-5594.280
601.91***
51.74***

-5586.469
617.54***
15.62***

Cons. (cut11)
Cons. (cut12)
Log likelihood
LR Chi2
Δ LR Chi2
***
p-value < 0.001; ** p-value < 0.01; * p-value < 0.05;

-5755.800
278.87***
/
†
p-value < 0.1
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Robustness Checks
Several robustness checks have been conducted to further examine the empirical
results. First, since prior studies have often focused on the dichotomy between WOSs and
IJVs, a robustness check is conducted with the dichotomous choice of ownership level
instead of a continuous measure. A subsidiary is defined either a WOS (if Japanese
ownership level exceeds 95%) or an IJV (Stopford and Wells, 1972). This robustness
check confirms the empirical results of this study. Moreover, since the choices of
subnational locations is associated with foreign subsidiaries’ performance (Chan et al.,
2010), this study also includes a robustness check by using Japanese subsidiaries’ average
profitability and its deviation in subnational regions. The data from Chan et al. (2010) is
used to replace the country dummy in the empirical model. This robustness check also
confirms the empirical results.
Further, a robustness check is completed with instrumental variables.
Organizational choices may result in endogeneity issues in the research of firm
performance (Reeb et al., 2012; Semadeni et al., 2014; Shaver, 1998). The present study
addresses endogeneity concerns in several ways. First, a research setting is used to reduce
country effects by focusing on investments of Japanese MNEs in China and the United
States (Makino and Neupert, 2000; McGahan and Victer, 2010; Pattnaik et al., 2015).
Second, this study adopts a comparative methodology and panel data to solve
endogeneity caused by time-varying factors and country differences (Gomes-Casseres,
1990; Reeb et al., 2012). Third, this study involves necessary control variables that
influence ownership choices and/or performance at subnational, industry and firm levels.
However, since it is impossible to identify all factors that influence subsidiary
performance in the empirical model, this study uses instrumental variables to control for
unobservable effects.
The instrumental variable approach centers on finding one or more variables,
called instruments, which influence the independent variable (Japanese ownership level)
but appear unlikely to affect the dependent variable (subsidiary performance). The chosen
instrumental variables must fulfil two conditions: relevance, i.e., the degree to which the
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instrument corresponds with the focal independent variable, and exogeneity, i.e., the
degree of which an instrument is uncorrelated with the dependent variable (Reeb et al.,
2012; Semadeni et al., 2014).
Based on prior literature review on China’s economic liberalization, this study
chooses Time and Time X Country as two instruments. As mentioned, MNEs respond to
China’s incremental economic liberalization by increasing their ownership levels (Chang
et al., 2013; Xia et al., 2008), and these two time items are used as proxies for influences
facilitated by institutional changes. Nevertheless, they are not necessarily associated with
subsidiary performance significantly because of two competing conditions. On one hand,
subsidiary performance in China can be enhanced because of the overall improvement of
business climate (Meyer et al., 2009). However, available to all firms, this improvement
is volatile because it is not a firm-specific advantage. On the other hand, intensifying
competitions increase the difficulty for a foreign MNE to make a profit in China
(Beamish and Jiang, 2002; Isobe et al., 2000). Therefore, one can expect that variables
Time and Time X China influence Japanese ownership levels directly but do not
significantly affect subsidiary performance.
The present study uses Stata command ivreg2 to conduct such an examination
because it can cope with panel data (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Bascle, 2008). With Fstatistic of 22.932 (threshold = 8.68), the instruments are strongly relevant to the variable
Ownership level. With insignificant J-statistic (p-value = 0.308), the exogeneity of the
instruments is satisfied. The empirical tests with GLLAMM confirm their exogeneity too
(Table 3.2). Therefore, the regression result from ivreg2 has been corrected for the
endogeneity issue caused by MNEs’ ownership choices (Table 3.3). The coefficients for
the year 1990 are -0.012 in China and 0.004 in the United States, supporting Hypotheses
1a and 1b. Moreover, the negative Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in China weakens
over time (coefficient = 0.001), supporting Hypothesis 2a. Surprisingly, the positive O-P
relationship in the United States strengthens over time (coefficient = 0.001), neither
supporting Hypothesis H2b, nor in accord with the result from GLLAMM.
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Table 3.3 Robustness Check with Instrumental Variables
Variable
Ownership level
Ownership X Country
Ownership X Time
Ownership X Time X Country
Time Effect
Time2
Time2 X Country

Model
0.013(0.006)*
-0.016(0.006)**
0.001(0.000)**
-0.000(0.000)
-0.002(0.001)***
0.005(0.001)***

Subsidiary Experience
Subsidiary age
Age2
Age X Country
Age2 X Country
Ownership X Age
Ownership X Age X Country

0.022(0.003)***
-0.001(0.000)***
-0.022(0.007)**
-0.005(0.001)***
-0.000(0.000)**
0.000(0.000)**

MNE Subnational Experience
Number of regions
Number of regions X Country
Number of subsidiaries within a region
Number of subsidiaries X Country

0.060(0.045)
-0.034(0.054)
0.060(0.041)
-0.016(0.055)

Country Dummy
Country (China =1; United States = 0)

0.239(0.055)***

Industry and Sector Effect
(reference: manufacturing electronics)
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical
Manufacturing transport
Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
*** p-value < 0.001; ** p-value < 0.01; * p-value < 0.05;

0.140(0.086)
-0.141(0.079)†
0.104(0.053)*
-0.134(0.051)**
-0.043(0.059)
-0.129(0.066)†
† p-value < 0.1

Variable
Manufacturing non-metal
Manufacturing other
Subsidiary in wholesale or retail
(reference: manufacturing)
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service

Model
-0.138(0.063)*
0.207(0.076)**
0.121(0.044)**
-0.033(0.044)
0.031(0.049)

Other MNE Specific Factors
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS

-0.050(0.014)**
-0.010(0.008)
-0.003(0.013)
0.734(0.166)***

Other Subsidiary Specific Factors
Subsidiary size
Expatriate rate
More than one Japanese partners
More than one local partners

0.040(0.006)***
-0.020(0.005)**
-0.051(0.031)
0.037(0.050)

Subsidiary Investment Purpose
Local market seeking
Global production network
Global distribution network
Local information collection
Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging

-0.128(0.026)***
0.027(0.032)
-0.066(0.025)**
0.039(0.027)
-0.009(0.037)
-0.035(0.041)
-0.038(0.045)
0.012(0.044)
-0.119(0.050)*

Cons

2.439(0.055)***

Wald F statistic
Hansen J statistic

22.932 (threshold = 8.68)
1.040 (p-value = 0.308)
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Discussion
This study investigates whether Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship evolved during
the past two decades. The analysis confirms prior studies’ conclusions that in the early
years WOSs tended to have a higher financial performance than IJVs established in the
United States (Nitsch et al., 1996), while IJVs had better profitability than the WOSs in
China (Makino and Beamish, 1998a). Moreover, the results show that Japanese MNEs’
O-P relationship positively evolved in China because of incremental economic
liberalization. Nevertheless, empirical results show that the O-P relationship evolved in
the United States too, and regressions of GLLAMM and ivreg2 provide conflicting
directions of the evolution. While GLLAMM provides more accurate evaluation on
ordinal response with multilevel model, ivreg2 corrects for endogeneity caused by
ownership choices. This divergence confirms the importance of correcting endogeneity in
performance research. The following analysis uses the results of GLLAMM to continue
the discussion of Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in China. This study departs from the
case in the United States and leaves it for further study.
Evolution of the O-P Relationship in China
To visually observe the evolution trajectories of Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship
in China, this study adopts a prediction-based procedure to illustrate empirical results
through graphic presentation. Figure 3.1 plots the O-P relationship for the years 1992,
2000, and 2009 by controlling for other factors. According to Figure 3.1 (a), the higher
the Japanese ownership level, the lower the probability that the subsidiary would be
profitable in China. According to Figure 3.1 (b), the negative O-P relationship weakened.
In 2009, Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship became slightly positive in China according to
Figure 3.1 (c), indicating that the ownership level is not substantively important to the
subsidiary performance.
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Figure 3.1 Performance Projections for Subsidiaries in China (1992, 2000, and 2009)

(a) Subsidiaries in China in 1992

(b) Subsidiaries in China in 2000

(c) Subsidiaries in China in 2009
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The present study also conducts predictions of the O-P relationship with three
dimensions — Japanese ownership level, time, and the probability of gain (for easier
observability this projection only focuses on the level of gain). Figure 3.2 shows that the
Japanese MNEs’ negative O-P relationship in China positively adjusts over time, but in
most years it remains negative. However, according to prior analysis, the reason for this
negative relationship has changed; while initially due to regulatory restrictions, it is more
recently a mixed function of institutional openness and uncertainty.
Model projections indicate that the O-P relationships delineated in early studies
have evolved significantly. It emphasizes the need for scholars and managers to examine
how the accepted wisdom may evolve over time.
Figure 3.2 Performance Projections for Subsidiaries in China (1990 – 2009)

Control Variables
The empirical tests also generate interesting results for some control variables.
First, although the time dimension does not influence subsidiary performance in a linear
way, there are up and downs since squared items of Time are significant. Moreover, the
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trend of subsidiary performance in China presents a U shape in China (Figure 3.2),
partially consistent with the model of institutional transitions theorized by Peng (2003).
Second, the operating experience of a subsidiary in the United States improves its
profitability. In contrast, for a subsidiary in China, the operating experience does not
benefit its performance. It implies that a subsidiary’s competitive advantages are shortterm in a volatile environment (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), and thus its operating
experience may not improve its ability to make a profit.
Third, an MNE’s advertising intensity and R&D intensity do not benefit the
subsidiary performance. A possible reason is that an MNE’s asset specificity is not
necessarily equivalent to that of subsidiaries, and the transfer of intangible assets can be
difficult and costly, impacting subsidiary performance (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000;
Zhang, Li, Li, and Zhou, 2010).
Contributions and Next Steps
The present study provides rich implications for IB research. First, this study is
one of the first papers to point out that MNEs’ O-P relationship in the host country may
evolve along with institutional changes. Thus, the causal relationship between MNEs’
ownership choices and their subsidiaries’ profitability is contingent on the state and
cause-effects of institutions that vary over time and across geographies. Second, this
study suggests that when analyzing a firm’s overseas ownership strategies, scholars and
practitioners should consider the host country’s overall openness toward FDIs as well as
institutional uncertainty arising from the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of
institutional environments. Third, this study enriches the TCE literature regarding the
influence of complementary local resources on subsidiary performance. The TCE
perspective usually only identifies specific assets as complementary resources that an
MNE needs to access in order to secure the subsidiary performance, and suggests that the
efficiency by which markets can transfer complementary local assets varies with the type
of asset and the host country’s institutional environment (Hennart, 2009). The present
study posits that institutional advantages stemming from relation-based strategies of local
partners are a type of critical complementary resource for MNEs when relationship-based
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institutions still outweigh rule-based ones in the focal subnational region. These
institutional advantages are difficult to transfer/acquire because of their volatility caused
by institutional uncertainty. Long-term equity-based relationship with local actors can be
an effective way to access volatile institutional advantages.
The present study provides rich implications to IB practice as well. As some
textbooks point out, many MNEs are more interested in the amount of equity control they
have over the subsidiary than in their share of the profits (Hodgetts, Luthans, and Doh,
2006). The interest in equity control is consistent with the growing use of the WOS
operation mode by Japanese MNEs during the period of economic liberalization in China.
However, the results presented herein affirm that for Japanese MNEs operating in China,
ownership is negatively related to subsidiary profitability for most years, implying that
full ownership does not lead to superior financial performance in China. Moreover, as
mentioned, the empirical results indicate that subsidiary experience exerts different
influences on the subsidiary profitability in the United States and China (Table 3.2). This
distinction implies that when a foreign subsidiary operates in a volatile environment,
managers in it should track the evolving institutional conditions rather than solely relying
on existing experience.
This study draws academic attention to the value in re-examining MNEs’ O-P
relationship. However, several issues are beyond the scope of this paper. First, as
mentioned, Hypothesis 2b is not supported: Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship evolved
significantly in the United States too. There are at least three possible reasons. First,
although the present study assumes that the institutional environment of the United States
is relatively stable, there may be frequent institutional changes at the state level (Shi et al.,
2014a), resulting in changes of institutional openness or uncertainty in subnational region.
Second, the institutional environment of the United States may not be as stable as the
present study assumes. For example, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) have
developed Worldwide Governance Indicators10 (WGI) to evaluate the governance for 200
10

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a long-standing research project to develop crosscountry indicators of governance. In its current status, the WGI consist of six composite indicators of broad
dimensions of governance covering over 200 countries since 1996: Voice and Accountability, Political
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law,
and Control of Corruption. These indicators are based on several hundred variables obtained from 31
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countries. Among six indicators of WGI, government effectiveness captures perceptions
of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2011). According to its longitudinal measure, the
government effectiveness in the United States decreased gradually from 1996 to 2013,
while it increased gradually in China over the same period 11. The degrading government
effectiveness may result in decreasing institutional openness or increasing institutional
uncertainty, consequently moderating the O-P relationship in the United States. Third,
increasing interconnectedness of the global markets may interlink institutions of different
countries and accelerate the pace of institutional changes at the supranational level,
continuously heightening overall economic uncertainty in all countries (Cantwell et al.,
2010; North, 2005). This requires MNEs to have more decentralized governance
structures, involving more locally responsive and internationally connected relationships
(Cantwell et al., 2010). These two potential reasons call for further study.
Second, existing literature has suggested that MNEs are diverse in local partner
selection (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza, 2000; Shi et al., 2012). Literature also
suggests that domestic firms in China are heterogeneous in terms of their embeddedness
in central planning or market tracks, positions in domestic network alliance, strategic
orientation, and operational capabilities (Boisot and Child, 1996; Kriauciunas and Kale,
2006; Park et al., 2006; Shi, Sun, Pinkham, and Peng, 2014b). The heterogeneity of local
partners results in variability in coordinating and aligning operations (Brouthers,
Brouthers, and Wilkinson, 1995; Park and Ungson, 2001). Lacking relevant data, the
present study is unable to address the variance of subsidiary performance caused by local
partners, calling for further research.
Third, this study argues that ownership sharing can be an effective way to access
critical complementary capabilities necessary to an MNE’s local operation in an uncertain
institutional environment. Nevertheless, other control mechanisms in addition to equity
different data sources, capturing governance perceptions as reported by survey respondents, nongovernmental organizations, commercial business information providers, and public sector organizations
worldwide (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2011).
11
The data are from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators.
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ownership may contribute to subsidiary efficiency (Luo, 2003; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997),
and managerial ties may complement an MNE’s institutional advantages in a foreign
country too (Acquaah, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Peng and Luo, 2000). Therefore, more than a
firm’s ownership structure, the tightness and continuity of its capability to coordinate the
various assets it creates, or to which it has access, is becoming more critical to its
performance (Cantwell et al., 2010). Future research may consider these mechanisms in
addition to ownership structure.
Fourth, this study uses a subsidiary’s investment purpose and the number of its
sibling subsidiaries in the same subnational region to roughly address the influence of the
parent MNE’s strategic orientation on its performance. Nevertheless, these proxies may
not fully explain the extent to which a subsidiary is integrated within global networks,
which in turn influences a subsidiary’s financial performance (Andersson et al., 2002;
Kim and Hwang, 1992; Lee and Song, 2012). Future research may incorporate the
strategic position of a foreign subsidiary within subsidiary networks into analysis.
Fifth, the Keiretsu membership of a Japanese MNE may influence its overseas
operation mode and the profitability of its overseas subsidiaries (Banerji and Sambharya,
1996; Brouthers, Gao, and Napshin, 2014; Makino and Beamish, 1998b). Keiretsu
membership is defined in terms of the origin of the owner of the firm, the affiliated mainbanks, and the conventional buyer-supplier links (Makino and Beamish, 1998b). Lacking
relevant data, the present study does not address the influence of affiliated Japanese
partners on subsidiary profitability. Future research may control for the influence of
Keiretsu membership of Japanese MNEs.
Sixth, the present study has neither separated formal institutions from informal
institutions, nor considered their differences in complexity, dynamism, and hostility
towards FDIs over the focal period. The literature has usually categorized regulatory rules
as formal institutions, and normative and cognitive rules as informal institutions (Peng
and Khoury, 2010; Scott, 1995). Uncertainties from formal and informal institutions
differ in that the former relates to local government while the latter relates to local market
(Li et al., 2008). Without measuring institutions in different categories, the present study
has only utilized the general trends of China’s institutional environment between 1990-
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2009 in theoretical and empirical analyses. Future study could divide the institutional
uncertainty further based on the differences between formal and informal institutions, and
refine the analysis of their influences on MNEs’ O-P relationship.
Seventh, the present study attributes subnational disparity in institutions to
institutional uncertainty at the country level. Nevertheless, some studies have investigated
subnational legitimacy such as relative openness at the subnational level (Meyer and
Nguyen, 2005; Schotter and Beamish, 2011; Wilkinson, Peng, Brouthers, and Beamish,
2008). Subnational level analysis can transfer partial country-level uncertainty into
subnational certainty, leading to finer-grained conclusions about the influences of
institutions on MNEs’ ownership choices. Future research could anchor the analysis at the
subnational level but simultaneously consider the homogeneity of subnational institutions
at the country level. The present study has utilized the average subnational performance
data of foreign subsidiaries from Chan et al. (2010) to reduce the endogeneity caused by
subnational disparity. However, it has not identified the heterogeneity of MNEs’ O-P
relationship within China caused by subnational disparity. Since some subnational
regions in China such as Shanghai and Shenzhen have emerged, it is feasible for future
research to categorize China’s subnational regions into emerging areas and emerged areas,
so that the heterogeneity of the O-P relationship can be explicitly identified.
Last, it would be useful to examine Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in other
emerging and advanced economies, or the O-P relationship of MNEs from other countries.

Conclusion
This study shows that Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship has evolved significantly
in the past two decades. Although China’s incremental economic liberalization has
improved the country’s institutional openness towards inward FDIs, for a long period the
IJV is still an appropriate choice in terms of subsidiary profitability because MNEs
confront institutional uncertainty during incremental economic liberalization. The study
also shows that Japanese MNEs’ O-P relationship in the United States has gradually
changed over time, implying emerging institutional conditions in the United States or
global economy may be absent from academic and managerial attention.
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Chapter 4. MNE Ownership (O), Subsidiary Survival (S),
and Economic Liberalization
Introduction
A large body of academic research has focused on the survival of a foreign
affiliate. Survival is an important objective measure of subsidiary performance (Geringer
and Hebert, 1991; Stopford and Wells, 1972). Prior studies have suggested that a higher
MNE ownership level in an overseas investment leads to lower mortality risk of the
subsidiary (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Li, 1995; Lu and Hébert,
2005). Moreover, some prior studies suggest that foreign subsidiaries in a developing
country are more likely to survive than those in a developed country (Makino, Beamish,
and Zhao, 2004a; Tsang and Yip, 2007).
For a variety of reasons, the literature affords us an incomplete and ambiguous
understanding of subsidiary survival, often undermining its usefulness in practice. First,
some studies investigate the profitability and survival of a foreign subsidiary
simultaneously without distinguishing between these two measures of performance
(Delios and Beamish, 2004; Makino et al., 2004a; Pan and Chi, 1999). However,
subsidiary survival is not only correlated with subsidiary profitability, but also associated
with other organizational goals. Prior studies have suggested that the value of an overseas
subsidiary can be the sum of two value components: the value of current competitive
advantages and the value of growth options that it brings to its parent MNE (Brouthers,
Brouthers, and Werner, 2008a; Cui and Kumar, 2012; Geringer and Hebert, 1991).
Therefore, despite the overlap, profitability and survival may reflect different value
components of an overseas subsidiary, on which MNEs may have different priorities at a
given time. Failing to address their association and differentiation may result in critical
research gaps (Delios and Beamish, 2004).
Second, since both equity ownership levels and subsidiary termination could be
subjective organizational choices, the relationship between the MNE ownership level and
subsidiary survival (the O-S relationship) may be more complicated than the literature
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presents. Organizational choices regarding the ownership level may result in endogeneity
issues in the O-S relationship (Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood, 2012; Semadeni,
Withers, and Trevis Certo, 2014). Therefore, some studies argue that after addressing
endogeneity issues the O-S relationship is insignificant (Shaver, 1998). Alternatively, as
previously discussed, the propensity for an MNE to terminate a foreign subsidiary may be
influenced by the priority placed on different value components.
These research gaps are especially prominent when focusing on foreign
subsidiaries in an emerging economy. First, prior studies suggest that the subsidiaries of
MNEs from developed countries are more likely to survive in developing countries than
in developed countries because of more opportunities for exploitation (Makino et al.,
2004a; Tsang and Yip, 2007). What these studies fail to consider is that some developing
countries (i.e., emerging economies) are growing rapidly by employing economic
liberalization as a primary engine. This factor possibly invalidates the extant conclusions.
Moreover, institutional transition, subnational variation and emerging uncertainty during
economic liberalization have been well documented (Boisot and Child, 1996; Peng, 2003;
Shi, Markóczy, and Stan, 2014a). These important changes in environments may alter the
priority of different value components of a foreign subsidiary for its parent MNE,
potentially changing its survival prospect (Cui and Kumar, 2012).
Second, when regulatory liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) is an
important aspect of economic liberalization in an emerging economy, MNEs increasingly
adopt wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) entries and even convert existing international
joint ventures (IJVs) to WOSs (Chang, Chung, and Moon, 2013; Gomes-Casseres, 1990;
Puck, Holtbrügge, Mohr, Lee, and Makhija, 2009). Based on data developed in this
dissertation, Japanese MNEs have dramatically increased their ownership levels in FDIs
in China during the period of China’s economic liberalization. In contrast, over the same
period, they have only slightly increased their ownership levels in FDIs in the United
States. This emerging phenomenon delineated by Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1, may increase
the endogeneity concerns in research on subsidiary survival (Shaver, 1998). Moreover,
several studies have investigated how the equity ownership of an MNE influences the
profitability of its subsidiaries along with the economic liberalization in an emerging
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economy (Chang et al., 2013; Douma, George, and Kabir, 2006; Zhang, 2015a).
Nevertheless, there is still no study that has examined whether economic liberalization
has changed MNEs’ O-S relationship. The present study purports to shed light on these
underexplored and important research gaps by examining the evolution of subsidiary
survival and the O-S relationship under the conditions of economic liberalization.
To address such a challenge, the present study adopts an institution-based view in
conjunction with transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective and the real options view
(Brouthers et al., 2008a; Delios and Henisz, 2000; Meyer, 2001; Wright, Filatotchev,
Hoskisson, and Peng, 2005). The survival of a subsidiary is determined by the
combination of its different values (Cui and Kumar, 2012), and the realization of these
values depend on the subsidiary’s ability to manage the institutional contexts in which it
is embedded (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008b; Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang, and
Jiang, 2008). Moreover, combined with TCE, the real options perspective has been used
to examine how institutional conditions influence an MNE’s decision-making on overseas
investments (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Kogut, 1991; Reuer and Tong, 2005). Based on
these chosen theoretical lenses, the present study investigates whether and how changes
in the institutional environments of emerging economies influence the survival prospect
of foreign subsidiaries and the O-S relationship.
The present study proceeds with a literature review and an explanation of the
research setting used. It then formulates a set of hypotheses that delineate the survival
prospects of foreign subsidiaries. Afterwards, it tests hypotheses using event history
analysis and data spanning a wider period of time. Finally, it discusses the empirical
results, and presents implications to IB research and practitioners.

Literature Review
Subsidiary Survival and Institutional Environment
Based on the real options perspective, the survival of a foreign subsidiary can be
determined by the sum of two value components: the value of current competitive
advantages and the value of growth options that it brings to its parent MNE (Barney, 1991;
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Brouthers et al., 2008a; Cui and Kumar, 2012; Kogut, 1991; Tong, Reuer, and Peng,
2008). The former pertains to the rents derived by exploiting existing assets and capacity
in current environmental conditions. The latter pertains to the rents derived from future
opportunities (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Cui and Kumar, 2012). Thus, the survival of a
foreign subsidiary is determined by the sum of its profitability and future opportunities.
Therefore, subsidiary survival is consequently correlated with, but not equal to, subsidiary
profitability.
To achieve these two value components, a foreign subsidiary should be able to
manage the institutional contexts in which it is embedded (Cantwell, Dunning, and
Lundan, 2010; Oliver, 1997; Peng et al., 2008). A successful firm would not only have
advantages in specific assets and organizing mechanism, but also have institutional
advantages in the host country (Barney, 1991; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Institutional
advantages can be defined as the formal and informal institutions that govern the valueadded processes within the firm and between the firm and its stakeholders (Cantwell et al.,
2010; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). To acquire or access institutional advantages in a
foreign country, an MNE needs to understand the state of institutions and their causeeffects on firm performance (Milliken, 1987).
Moreover, institutional conditions may have competing effects on the two value
components, influencing subsidiary survival in a complicated way. For example, with
greater institutional uncertainty in the host country, the efficiency of exploiting firmspecific advantages may be lower, resulting in unfavorable subsidiary profitability and
termination risk as well. Nevertheless, when uncertainty creates a situation where the
value of future opportunities cannot be accurately predicted, an MNE may choose to
retain the subsidiary in order to keep options available (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Cuypers
and Martin, 2007; Vassolo, Anand, and Folta, 2004). The existing literature has yet to
examine these two competing influences of the institutional environment on the survival
of a foreign subsidiary.
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Subsidiary Survival and MNE Equity Ownership
Prior studies provide competing conclusions on the O-S relationship as well.
Some studies suggest that higher equity ownership is associated with greater commitment,
higher level of managerial attention, and less opportunistic behaviors of the partner(s),
enhancing subsidiary survival (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Li,
1995). Another stream argues that this conclusion does not take into account the potential
endogeneity issue caused by organizational choices or subsidiary financial performance
(Reeb et al., 2012; Semadeni et al., 2014). For example, an MNE may purposely choose
its ownership level in foreign investments, resulting in non-random samples of ownership
choices in research. Moreover, an MNE may choose to terminate its foreign subsidiary
because of poor profitability regardless of its equity ownership. After addressing
endogeneity issues, an MNE’s equity ownership may not influence subsidiary survival
(Delios and Beamish, 2004; Hennart, Kim, and Zeng, 1998; Shaver, 1998). No study has
addressed endogeneity issues in MNE ownership choice and subsidiary profitability
simultaneously.
These research gaps in subsidiary survival and the O-S relationship will be
arguably more prominent in an emerging economy because of the changing institutional
environment.
Emerging Economies
Emerging economies are often characterized by existing institutional voids and
economic liberalization (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright,
2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Institutional voids represent underdeveloped capital
markets, infrastructure, intermediary markets, regulatory systems, contract-enforcing
mechanisms or other market-supporting institutions (Khanna and Palepu, 1997).
Economic liberalization as the primary engine of rapid development of emerging
economies, may fill institutional voids by establishing formal market-oriented
mechanisms and structures that facilitate market exchange (Hoskisson et al., 2000).
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For a variety of reasons, the coexistence of these two characteristics complicates
the institutional environments that MNEs must cope with in an emerging economy. First,
economic liberalization may influence the evolution of organizational choices in equity
ownership. At the initial stage of economic liberalization, a restriction on foreign
ownership may bring about ‘forced’ local ownership, even where TCE does not predict
the existence of the IJV (Contractor, 1990; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). With economic
liberalization, MNEs confront declining ownership restriction, which allows higher equity
control to secure their competitive advantages (Chang et al., 2013; Hennart, 1991). In
addition, MNEs may also increase their ownership control when high equity control
becomes the dominant strategy of successful peers (Child and Tsai, 2005; Xia, Tan, and
Tan, 2008). Thus, the changing patterns of foreign equity ownership should be taken into
account when examining the O-S relationship.
Second, influenced by the economic liberalization, an MNE may alter the weight
of different organizational goals of its subsidiary. Economic liberalization may result in
institutional uncertainty defined as the degree of instability within an institutional
environment (Luo, 2007). In order to support the effective (though not efficient)
functioning of the market, informal institutions are usually used to bridge existing
institutional voids in an emerging economy (North, 1990; Peng, 2003; Puffer and
McCarthy, 2011). The informal institutions endure because of their cognitive-cultural
nature, and thus it takes time for market-oriented mechanisms established by economic
liberalization to be fully institutionalized (Peng, 2003). Therefore, a market orientation is
usually coupled with existing but changing institutional voids and robust informal
institutions. This complicates the state of institutions and their cause-effects on firm
performance (Milliken, 1987). The resulting institutional uncertainty may not only
influence MNEs’ choices of ownership levels in the host country (Kostova and Zaheer,
1999; North, 1990), but also strengthen the importance of foreign subsidiaries as real
options for future opportunities (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Cuypers and Martin, 2007;
Vassolo et al., 2004), changing the survival prospect of foreign subsidiaries.
Third, institutional transition in an emerging economy may influence the survival
of a foreign subsidiary by changing its profitability. Developing market-based institutions
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may bring an improving business climate and operating efficiency (Luo, 1998b; Meyer,
Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng, 2009). However, intensifying competition makes it harder to
make a profit (Beamish and Jiang, 2002; Isobe, Makino, and Montgomery, 2000; Pan and
Chi, 1999). Therefore, it is important to incorporate profitability into analysis when
studying the survival of foreign subsidiaries.
Due to the reasons outlined above, the present study mainly examines the survival
of foreign subsidiaries in an emerging economy with significant institutional changes.
Research Setting
This study compares Japanese FDIs in China and the United States from 1990 to
2009. It does so for multiple reasons. First, the country of origin may influence an MNE’s
overseas ownership choice (Erramilli, 1996; Makino and Neupert, 2000; Zhao, Luo, and
Suh, 2004). Focusing on MNEs from one country can reduce the related endogeneity
issue caused by organizational choices (Reeb et al., 2012; Shaver, 1998). Moreover, a
number of prior studies have empirically examined the survival of Japanese subsidiaries
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Makino et al., 2004a), providing
theoretical and empirical bases for the present work. Moreover, using panel data helps to
reduce the endogeneity concerns (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003).
Second, such a research setting allows us to compare the Japanese subsidiaries in
China with those in the United States. China is the largest emerging economy that has
been undergoing an institutional transition. The United States is the largest advanced
economy that sustains a relatively mature free-market institutional environment (Chan,
Makino, and Isobe, 2010). This research setting provides a large sample size. Moreover,
this setting controls for the confounding effects of multiple host countries on subsidiary
survival. Although advanced economies advocate free market institutions, they still differ
in other dimensions of their institutional environments (e.g., country culture) that
influence a foreign MNE’s ownership choice (Meschi and Riccio, 2008). In addition,
emerging economies employ heterogeneous approaches to economic liberalization (Lau,
Qian, and Roland, 2000; Roland, 2002). Different approaches may facilitate distinct
institutional changes in scope, intensity, and duration (Brouthers and Lamb Jr, 1995;
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Roland, 2002), influencing a foreign MNE’s ownership choice, and the survival prospect
of its subsidiary. Therefore, involving multiple advanced or emerging economies will
complicate theoretical analysis and empirical testing.
Third, there are still no exact measurements of the host country’s institutional
transition. This study accordingly requires an emerging economy within which the
general trend of institutional transition can be estimated. While some countries adopted a
“big bang” approach for a fast and comprehensive implementation of all major reforms
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Newman, 2000), China has advocated a dual-track
strategy for economic liberalization since 1979. This is a process by which a market track
is introduced and gradually strengthened, and the central planning track is maintained and
progressively diminished (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lau et al., 2000; Park, Li, and Tse,
2006; Roland, 2002). This dual-track nature results in incremental economic liberalization
lasting for a lengthy period of time, allowing for the identification of the overall trends of
China’s institutional changes by accessing well-documented government policies and
relevant academic studies. In particular, prior studies have suggested that China’s
incremental economic liberalization can be operationalized as a function of time (Zhang,
2015b). Along with this process, Japanese MNEs have significantly increased their
ownership levels in their investments in China. In contrast, Japanese MNEs have
increased their ownership levels only slightly in the United States. Figure 1.1 delineates
this phenomenon.

Theory and Hypotheses
Subsidiary Survival and Profitability
As mentioned, the survival of a subsidiary is partially determined by the value of
its competitive advantages in current environmental conditions, i.e., its profitability (Cui
and Kumar, 2012; Geringer and Hebert, 1991). Prior studies have not addressed the
association and differentiation between survival and profitability of a foreign subsidiary
(Delios and Beamish, 2004). Therefore, the first hypothesis states their association.
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Hypothesis 1: The profitability of a Japanese subsidiary increases the
probability of its survival.
Subsidiary Survival and Its Evolution
Prior studies have suggested that foreign subsidiaries in China are more likely to
survive than those in the United States because there are more firm-specific advantages
for MNEs to exploit in China (Makino et al., 2004a; Tsang and Yip, 2007). Since
exploitation is mainly relevant to value generation in current conditions, this causality can
be addressed by subsidiary profitability (Hypothesis 1). The present study therefore
analyzes subsidiary survival based on the options for future opportunities that are shaped
by institutional environments.
In addition, prior studies have identified complexity, dynamism, and hostility as
important environmental attributes. They can be understood as heterogeneity, instability,
and inequality of environmental elements towards foreign investments (Dess and Beard,
1984; Tan and Litschert, 1994). The present study argues that coexisting institutional
transition and subnational disparity intensify the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of
China’s institutional environment, constituting the main sources of institutional
uncertainty for FDIs. Based on a comparison with Japanese subsidiaries in the United
States, this study argues that those in China need to cope with time-varying institutional
uncertainty incurred by economic liberalization.
Economic liberalization causes MNEs to increasingly confront subnational
institutions in China. In the early stage of economic liberalization, MNEs usually chose
their investment locations and local partners from a limited scope dictated by the central
government. Their IJV subsidiaries were also under the central government’s monitoring
(Beamish, 1993). The influence of subnational regional environments was thus mitigated
by centralized decision-making mechanisms. With economic liberalization deepening,
China’s central government gradually relaxed country-level restrictions on FDI and
decentralized decision-making power to local governments and firms (Child and Tse,
2001; Davis, Desai, and Francis, 2000; Park et al., 2006). This enabled MNEs to access
different locations and partners with decreasing central government control. Consequently,

112

they can interact with local stakeholders more directly, and spread their investments
across a broader geography. Therefore, MNEs are increasingly influenced by institutions
of subnational regions (Chan et al., 2010; Ma, Tong, and Fitza, 2013; Shi et al., 2014a).
The disparity in subnational institutions causes institutional uncertainty that a
foreign MNE must cope with. China has significant subnational variation in political
institutions (Chan et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2013; Shi et al., 2014a). First, the central
government exerts time-varying degrees of control (Huang and Sheng, 2009; Shi, Sun,
and Peng, 2012), resulting in fuzzy boundaries between central and local controls across
geographical locations. Second, China’s central government delegated some regulatory
functions to the local level (Luo, 2005; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). This delegation is
often ambiguously and equivocally stipulated, leaving opportunities for subjective
interpretation by local authorities (Gao, Murray, Kotabe, and Lu, 2010; Shi et al., 2014a).
Lacking sufficient institutions that support a free market, local authorities continue to be
influenced by the legacy of the socialist system and subnational culture when formulating
regional regulations and policies (Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006; Peng, 2003). Third,
China’s dual-track approach purports to liberalize markets without eliminating the preexisting rents of economic agents (Boisot and Child, 1996; Lau et al., 2000; Roland,
2002). As a result the political decentralization usually gives rise to local protectionism
and regionalism, allowing local agents to maximize self-interest (Ma et al., 2013). This
agency problem not only results in “ad hoc rule bending” by local authorities, but also
pushes economic actors to rely on relationship-based exchanges more than on rule-based
ones (Lin, 2001; Peng, 2003; Shi et al., 2014a). In conclusions, subnational variation in
political institutions heightens the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of institutional
environments that MNEs confront, constituting the main source of environmental
uncertainty in sensing the state of local rules, understanding their cause-effects on local
operation, and formulating organizational choices (Luo, 2003; Luo, 2007; Milliken, 1987;
Santangelo and Meyer, 2011).
In addition, China has significant subnational variation in culture and economic
development at the provincial or regional level (Chan et al., 2010; Ma et al., 2013; Shi et
al., 2012). Subnational culture as informal institution is usually used by local agents to
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bridge institutional voids when relevant formal institutions are underdeveloped (Peng,
2003; Puffer and McCarthy, 2011). This engenders fuzzy boundaries between formal
institutions and cultural-cognitive institutions, further complicating the state of local
institutions and their cause-effects on firm operation. In addition, Economic institutions
involve intermediaries that provide support services to firms and the common
infrastructure that supports regional economic transaction (Chan et al., 2010; Porter,
1990). With the central government’s macro-control and local governments’ political
intervention, subnational economic institutions change over time (Pan and Chi, 1999).
Subnational disparity in social and economic institutions heightens the complexity,
dynamism, and hostility of institutional environments, resulting in the institutional
uncertainty that an MNE confronts.
In brief, China’s economic liberalization not only results in a gradual institutional
transition from a central planning track to a market track, but also causes subnational
disparity in political, social, and economic institutions. The coexisting institutional
transition and subnational disparity give rise to the complexity, dynamism, and hostility
of China’s institutional environments, resulting in institutional pressure and institutional
uncertainty that an MNE has to cope with. Figure 2.1 describes the theoretical foundation
for the present study.
The present study argues that institutional uncertainty positively relates to the
survival of a foreign subsidiary. Literature suggests that institutional uncertainty increases
the importance of keeping an option available to participate in potential upside benefits in
the future (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Cuypers and Martin, 2007; Vassolo et al., 2004). As
previously discussed, institutional uncertainty incurred by political decentralization
induces MNEs to rely to a large extent on relationship-based exchanges (Lin, 2001; Peng,
2003; Shi et al., 2014a). These exchanges are difficult to discontinue because it requires
mutual agreement. Without a mutual agreement, the termination of such a relationship
may damage trust in the relationship or the MNE’s reputation in the local business
community, resulting in high exit and re-entry costs (Santangelo and Meyer, 2011).
Institutional uncertainty in China evolves following a certain trend, and its
trajectory may influence the survival of a foreign subsidiary. Strengthening market
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institutions are embodied in institutionalizing formal market rules and decreasing
institutional voids. It has been suggested that the complexity, dynamism, and hostility in
China’s institutional environment are declining over time (Tan and Tan, 2005). This not
only increases the weight of subsidiary profitability and decreases that of real options
(Cui and Kumar, 2012), but also reduces MNEs’ reliance on relationship-based
exchanges in subnational regions (Peng, 2003; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Ceteris
paribus, with decreasing institutional uncertainty, the survival of Japanese subsidiaries in
China may decline over time.
Compared to China’s situation, the United States has consistently had a relatively
mature free-market economy. The present study thus assumes that its institutional
environment remained stable for the past two decades and Japanese MNEs did not
confront unprecedented challenges. Accordingly, this study argues that Japanese
subsidiaries in China are more likely to survive than those in the United States because of
higher institutional uncertainty in China, at least for the early period of China’s economic
liberalization. Moreover, the survival of Japanese subsidiaries may decrease in China
with declining institutional uncertainty, and will be stable in the United States.
Hypothesis 2: In the beginning period of China’s economic liberalization,
Japanese subsidiaries in China will be more likely to survive than those in
the United States during the same period.
Hypothesis 3a: As economic liberalization increases, the survival of
Japanese subsidiaries in China will decrease over time after 1990.
Hypothesis 3b: As the institutional environment remains stable, the
survival of Japanese subsidiaries in the United States will not change over
time after 1990.
The O-S Relationship and Its Evolution
As mentioned, some prior studies suggested that the MNE ownership level is
positively associated with the survival of a foreign subsidiary (Dhanaraj and Beamish,
2004; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Li, 1995). Another stream of studies asserts that, with high

115

institutional uncertainty and the importance of relationship-based exchanges in an
emerging economy, an IJV has more advantages in learning local government intentions
and utilizing managerial ties than a WOS (Chen, Ding, and Kim, 2010; Li, Poppo, and
Zhou, 2008; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Therefore, an IJV provides better value in
terms of future opportunity than a WOS. Discontinuing an equity-based relationship may
result in high exit and re-entry costs. Under this situation, the level of MNE ownership
negatively relates to subsidiary survival. Nevertheless, a few studies argue that after
correcting the endogeneity issues, the ownership choice does not affect subsidiary
survival (Delios and Beamish, 2004; Shaver, 1998). The following restates these
competing conclusions with a time condition since the O-S relationship may evolve along
with economic liberalization.
Hypothesis 4a: The greater the Japanese ownership in China or the
United States, the higher the probability of the survival of subsidiaries in
the period of the 1990s.
Hypothesis 4b: Japanese ownership in China or the United States will
have no significant effect on the survival of subsidiaries in the period of
the 1990s.
Similarly, the existing literature implies that MNEs’ O-S relationship may evolve
along with economic liberalization. With the declining complexity, dynamism, and
hostility of institutions towards foreign investments, the pressure on MNEs to share
equity with locals is lowering and the cost to discontinue the current cooperation is
reducing (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2009; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). In this vein,
MNEs’ O-S relationship may positively shift over time. Nevertheless, this study argues
that an MNE may discontinue an IJV contract without terminating the subsidiary. On the
contrary, it may convert the current IJV into a WOS (Chang et al., 2013; Gomes-Casseres,
1990; Puck et al., 2009). This study therefore suggests that the O-S relationship will not
change in China or in the United States.
Hypothesis 5a: The Japanese O-S relationship in China will not change
over time from 1990.
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Hypothesis 5b: The Japanese O-S relationship in the United States will not
change over time from 1990.

Methodology
The present study examines Japanese subsidiaries’ survival in the United States
and China with discrete event history analysis (Delios and Beamish, 2001, 2004). To do
this, the present study needs to address two issues in the empirical model. First, the
survival patterns in the two countries may share a number of explanatory factors to
different extents. The empirical model should reflect these differences (Gomes-Casseres,
1990). Second, there may be systemic differences in inward FDI in the two countries
(Gomes-Casseres, 1990). For example, Japanese firms with stronger technological
advantages were more likely to invest in developed countries than in developing countries
(Makino et al., 2004a). This study addresses the second problem via sample selection. To
resolve the first issue, the study employs the methodology used in Gomes-Casseres (1990)
and adds a country dummy as well as its relevant interactions in the model:
Mortality risk =

n

n

α0 + (α1 -α0 ) ∙ China + ∑ β0i ∙ xi + ∑(β1i -β0i ) ∙ xi ∙ Country
i=1

(4.1)

i=1

where
Country is a dummy variable (equal to 1 if the subsidiary is operated in China),
xi is an independent variable,
n is the number of independent variables,
α0, β0i are the intercept and slopes for subsidiaries operated in the United States,
α1, β1i are the intercept and slopes for subsidiaries operated in China.
Samples
The event history model is constructed with longitudinal data of Japanese
subsidiaries and their parent MNEs. The initial sample included observations during
1990-2009 from the merged Toyo Keizai and Needs datasets (2012 Edition). Many of the
prior studies which this research refers to used earlier editions of the Toyo Keizai datasets
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(Delios and Beamish, 2001, 2004; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). Using the data from the
same organization improves the reliability of this study.
To resolve the second question (i.e., the systemic difference in selecting host
countries), the model does not use Japanese MNEs that only invested in one of the two
countries from 1990 to 2009. The model also discards subsidiaries invested in agriculture,
forestry, and mining industries, within which there were distinct industry-specific
regulations that were given priority over the general rules at country level 12. The model
also drops Japanese subsidiaries that function as local headquarters, since almost all of
them are WOSs. To focus on strategic investments, the model discards subsidiaries with
less than 5 percent Japanese ownership during their lifetimes, since they were considered
portfolio investments (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). In addition, subsidiaries with less
than 20 employees are not included to ensure that the sample did not mix viable
subsidiary organizations with small representative offices (Beamish and Inkpen, 1998).
Finally, subsidiaries with missing data are excluded. This careful screening results in a
final dataset consisting of 553 Japanese MNEs, 1,553 subsidiaries in China and the
United States, and a total of 7,368 observations during the period from 1990 to 200813.
Observations in 2009 are discarded because there was no subsidiary terminated.
Variables
The dependent variable for this study is Japanese subsidiary termination risk.
Consistent with previous research, a subsidiary that ceases to be listed in a particular
year’s directory, after appearing consistently for one or more years, was deemed as
terminated (Delios and Beamish, 2001; Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004). This process
considers terminations as exits by either divestiture or dissolution. From the Japanese
MNE’s point of view, both of them suggest a cessation of operations in that subsidiary
(Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004).
12

The differences in regulatory rules between natural resource related industries and other industries are
synthesized from the website of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
(www.mofcom.gov.cn).
13
Compared to the number of Japanese subsidiaries (1,553), the number of observations (7,368) between
1990-2008 is relatively small. This is because (i) subsidiaries were established at different time, (ii) they
may have exited before 2008, or (iii) there are missing data in the dependent, independent, or control
variables.
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To examine the proposed hypotheses, this study involves several groups of
independent variables. First, the study includes the subsidiary’s financial performance,
measured by a perceived assessment of the subsidiary profitability level – Subsidiary
profit gain, Subsidiary profit breakeven (reference level), or subsidiary profit loss. Prior
studies report that this measure has adequate reliability (Delios and Beamish, 2001, 2004).
Second, the study adds a country dummy (Country = 1 if the subsidiary operates in
China). Third, this study involves the level of Japanese ownership, measured as the ln
function of the percentage of total Japanese ownership in the subsidiary (Ownership level).
Its interaction with the country dummy is also included (Ownership X Country). Fourth,
this study adds the time period measured from 1990 (Time) and its interaction items.
Based on the discrete event history analysis method, the model itself has included the
year index to calculate the hazard function for subsidiaries in the United States (RabeHesketh and Skrondal, 2012). There is a collinearity issue between the variable Time and
the year index. Therefore, this study only involves its interactions with the country
dummy: Time X Country, Time2 X Country. Fifth, the model incorporates interaction
items to examine whether the Japanese O-S relationship changes over time in the two
countries: Ownership X Time, and Ownership X Time X Country.
The present study controls for variables that may influence subsidiary survival in
order to reduce endogeneity issues (Shaver, 1998). First, since a subsidiary’s operating
experience may improve its profitability (Delios and Beamish, 2001, 2004), the model
controls for the subsidiary’s age. The model also considers the nonlinear effect (Delios
and Beamish, 2004), and the interaction effect with the country dummy (Age, Age2, Age X
Country, Age2 X Country).
Second, the model considers an MNE’s experience in a subnational region. Prior
studies consider the MNE’s host country presence, computed as the ln of the sum of
subsidiary-year units in the host country, as the accumulated operation may provide a
valuable local knowledge base to respond to environmental uncertainties and risks
(Henisz and Delios, 2001; Luo, 1999; Salomon and Wu, 2012). As previously discussed,
along with the economic liberalization, Japanese MNEs are increasingly exposed to
subnational disparity in political, social, and economic institutions (Chabowski, Hult,
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Kiyak, and Mena, 2010; Chan et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2014a; Shi et al., 2012). Therefore,
the study deconstructs an MNE’s country presence into subnational regional experience,
regional diversity, and regional concentration (Zhang, 2015b). Regional experience is
measured by an MNE’s accumulated experience within a subnational region, i.e., a
province, municipality, or state. Nevertheless, the model drops this variable because it is
highly correlated with the subsidiary experience. Simultaneously operating in multiple
subnational regions may intensify the institutional uncertainty that an MNE confronts
(Boisot and Child, 1996; Qian, Li, Li, and Qian, 2008). It may also bring out more
opportunities for exploitation and exploration (Lu and Beamish, 2004; Luo and Peng,
1999; Qian et al., 2008). The model thus includes regional diversity measured by the
number of subnational regions where the MNE operates in China or the United States.
Based on the sample screening process previously described, the present study involves
24 provinces or municipalities in China and 36 states in the United States. The model also
includes regional concentration measured by the number of subsidiaries in the focal
region, as it influences the focal subsidiary’s strategic importance and embeddedness in
the local networks (Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2002; Roth and Morrison, 1992).
The model considers the interaction items of regional diversity and regional concentration
with the country dummy.
Third, the model adds industry and sector categories since they present
heterogeneity in the level of marketization or concentration, influencing the subsidiary
life cycle of a foreign subsidiary (Boisot and Child, 1996; McGahan and Porter, 1997;
Zhao et al., 2004). Following prior studies (e.g., Dhanaraj & Beamish, 2004), the present
study includes eight industry and two sector dummy variables for the subsidiary level in
order to remove confounding industry and sector effects (the reference is the
manufacturing of electronics). The model does not use industry dummy variables for the
MNE level because of the collinearity between the industrial categories of the subsidiary
and its MNE parent. However, an MNE from one sector may invest in other sectors in the
host country (e.g., a Japanese manufacturer may invest in wholesale or retail sectors in
China). As such, the model includes two sector dummy variables for the MNE level (the
reference is the manufacturing sector). However, based on a Pearson correlation test,
MNEs from the service sector usually still invest in the service sector in foreign countries
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(correlation = 0.742), and as a result, the model does not include the variable Subsidiary
in service to reduce multi-collinearity.
Fourth, the model controls for MNE-specific factors that influence a foreign
subsidiary’s survival rate. The model includes the size of an MNE (measured by the ln
function of the number of employees in the MNE), since large MNEs may have more
flexibility in reallocating their subsidiary portfolio (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Dhanaraj
and Beamish, 2004). The model also considers the MNE’s profitability (measured by the
return on sales (ROS)), as it may represent the MNE’s overall competitive advantages
(Barney, 1991, 1997). In addition, the model controls for the asset specificity of an MNE,
measured by advertising intensity and R&D intensity, as it sustains subsidiary survival
(Delios and Beamish, 2001).
Fifth, following prior studies, the model includes subsidiary-specific factors.
Subsidiary size (measured by the ln function of the number of employees) represents the
resource commitment that influences subsidiary survival (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986;
Delios and Beamish, 1999, 2004). Moreover, a Japanese MNE may invest in a subsidiary
with other Japanese MNEs or multiple local partners. The number of partners in a joint
venture may not only alleviate the liability of foreignness, but also increase the ex ante or
ex post costs stemming from the complex contract and its implementation (Gong, Shenkar,
Luo, and Nyaw, 2007; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009; Makino and Beamish, 1998). The
Japanese subsidiary’s survival may be affected by these alliance characteristics (Park and
Russo, 1996). Therefore, the model includes two dummy variables to indicate whether the
subsidiary had investments from more than one Japanese MNE or more than one local
firm. In addition, the model includes the percentage of Japanese expatriates in a
subsidiary since it also represents the level of the MNE’s control or managerial attention
towards the focal subsidiary (Gaur, Delios, and Singh, 2007; Gong, 2003; Plourde, Parker,
and Schaan, 2014).
Finally, investment motives indicate a subsidiary’s strategic position in the parent
firm’s market expansion and global integration, influencing the subsidiary’s operating
mode and life cycle (Li, 1995; Pan and Chi, 1999; Park and Ungson, 2001). Following
prior studies (Goerzen, Asmussen, and Nielsen, 2013; Zhang, 2015b), the model
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categorizes original investment purposes into nine types: Local market seeking, Global
production network, Global distribution network, Local information collection, Local
labor seeking, Follow global stakeholders, New product development, Local resource
seeking, and International risk hedging.
Descriptive Statistics and Multi-Collinearity
The model centers all continuous independent variables in order to reduce multicollinearity in the empirical model (Aiken and West, 1991). Table 4.1 provides all the
descriptive statistics of the variables and their Pearson correlation matrix. According to
Table 4.1, the greatest correlation value is 0.550 (between The number of subnational
regions and MNE size). The study further evaluates the multi-collinearity of variables
based on variance inflation factor (VIF). The maximum VIF value is less than 10,
indicating that there is no serious multi-collinearity concern in the model (Neter and
Michael, 1990).
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Variables
Subsidiary termination
Subsidiary profit gain
Subsidiary profit loss
Ownership level (ln)
Time
Subsidiary age
Number of subnational regions
Number of subsidiaries within the region
Country
Local market seeking
Global production network
Global distribution network
Local information collection
Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical
Manufacturing transport
Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
Manufacturing non metal
Manufacturing other
Subsidiary in wholesale or retail
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Subsidiary size
Subsidiary expatriate ratio
More than one Japanese partners
More than one local partners

Mean
0.025
0.574
0.189
4.355
8.970
11.619
0.590
0.232
0.337
0.767
0.352
0.309
0.320
0.140
0.098
0.082
0.082
0.076
0.025
0.024
0.075
0.118
0.055
0.043
0.043
0.018
0.324
0.123
0.118
0.386
0.927
8.188
0.034
3.982
0.167
0.231
0.048

S.D.
0.156
0.495
0.391
0.462
4.746
8.817
0.621
0.417
0.473
0.423
0.478
0.462
0.467
0.347
0.298
0.274
0.274
0.265
0.157
0.152
0.263
0.323
0.227
0.202
0.202
0.133
0.468
0.328
0.323
1.189
1.827
1.268
0.059
1.752
0.714
0.422
0.214

1
0.000
-0.049
0.038
-0.032
0.001
-0.023
0.018
0.076
-0.006
-0.030
-0.024
-0.023
0.018
0.000
-0.015
0.050
0.000
0.010
-0.015
0.009
-0.019
-0.027
-0.001
-0.017
0.005
-0.002
-0.005
0.033
0.014
0.009
-0.013
0.014
-0.033
-0.066
0.005
-0.014
0.004

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

0.000
-0.560
-0.071
0.121
0.120
0.049
0.035
0.084
-0.015
0.029
-0.013
-0.027
0.041
-0.029
-0.038
0.042
-0.077
0.037
-0.010
0.060
-0.084
-0.003
-0.016
-0.028
0.041
0.026
0.000
0.014
-0.009
0.033
0.053
0.082
0.115
-0.047
-0.001
0.035

0.000
0.030
-0.069
-0.143
-0.027
-0.019
-0.014
0.077
0.033
0.034
-0.042
0.019
0.051
0.006
-0.009
0.055
-0.014
0.020
-0.012
0.086
0.035
0.039
0.035
-0.024
-0.095
0.003
0.014
0.003
-0.027
-0.031
-0.041
0.016
0.009
0.041
-0.020

0.000
-0.062
0.137
-0.226
-0.108
-0.325
0.025
-0.200
0.038
0.156
-0.095
0.034
0.006
-0.051
0.024
-0.059
-0.073
-0.105
-0.114
-0.013
-0.110
-0.041
0.006
0.266
-0.058
0.055
0.064
0.020
-0.128
0.038
-0.223
0.064
-0.260
-0.302

0.000
0.008
0.098
0.107
0.394
-0.079
0.191
0.046
-0.186
0.138
0.010
-0.033
0.011
-0.124
0.020
0.017
0.052
0.020
0.004
0.050
0.017
0.009
-0.127
0.010
0.031
0.124
0.267
-0.014
0.057
0.102
-0.036
0.013
0.051

0.000
-0.019
-0.012
-0.437
0.089
-0.246
-0.038
0.166
-0.184
-0.019
-0.006
-0.058
0.024
-0.007
-0.046
-0.085
-0.131
-0.071
-0.054
-0.043
-0.028
0.303
0.083
0.045
0.032
-0.002
0.035
0.005
0.022
0.008
-0.142
-0.124

0.000
0.301
0.192
-0.063
0.086
-0.094
-0.164
0.044
-0.029
-0.030
0.044
-0.006
0.053
0.011
0.115
0.026
-0.026
0.099
0.061
-0.043
-0.175
0.000
-0.019
0.008
0.044
0.550
-0.068
0.232
-0.040
0.134
0.082

0.000
0.080
-0.084
0.028
-0.032
-0.103
0.058
-0.005
0.025
0.080
-0.034
-0.038
0.052
0.014
0.018
-0.009
-0.033
0.014
-0.021
-0.076
0.040
0.053
0.030
0.055
0.224
-0.030
0.056
-0.029
0.061
0.039

0.000
-0.129
0.339
0.081
-0.300
0.390
-0.046
-0.079
0.151
-0.179
0.045
0.098
0.130
-0.040
0.062
0.106
0.035
0.048
-0.321
0.023
0.031
0.039
0.087
0.107
0.012
0.278
-0.095
0.250
0.286

0.000
-0.084
-0.071
0.073
-0.063
-0.021
-0.084
-0.043
0.023
-0.012
-0.043
0.010
0.025
0.023
0.002
0.058
-0.017
0.170
-0.007
-0.112
-0.029
0.003
-0.062
0.006
0.013
0.000
-0.019
-0.035

0.000
0.067
-0.221
0.252
0.025
-0.042
0.057
-0.042
0.066
0.109
0.216
0.196
0.160
0.146
0.142
0.146
-0.442
-0.086
-0.224
0.008
0.072
0.037
0.009
0.414
-0.096
0.151
0.152

0.000
0.082
0.085
0.024
-0.015
0.034
-0.048
0.022
0.017
-0.016
-0.107
-0.002
-0.011
-0.022
0.022
0.081
0.059
0.008
0.024
0.009
-0.188
-0.032
-0.070
0.004
-0.032
0.024
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Variables
Local information collection
Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical
Manufacturing transport
Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
Manufacturing non metal
Manufacturing other
Subsidiary in wholesale or retail
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Subsidiary size
Subsidiary expatriate ratio
More than one Japanese partners
More than one local partners

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Variables
Subsidiary in wholesale or retail
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Subsidiary size
Subsidiary expatriate ratio
More than one Japanese partners
More than one local partners

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1
-0.133
-0.011
0.149
-0.046
0.086
-0.003
-0.078
-0.065
-0.149
-0.076
-0.076
-0.056
-0.028
0.256
0.119
-0.004
-0.065
-0.071
-0.150
-0.042
-0.323
0.103
-0.177
-0.080

1
-0.042
-0.043
0.249
-0.038
0.040
0.109
0.000
0.011
0.091
0.031
0.008
0.066
-0.215
-0.043
-0.064
0.010
0.059
0.031
-0.002
0.266
-0.069
0.020
0.050

1
0.020
-0.077
0.070
-0.053
-0.040
-0.022
0.136
-0.015
-0.040
0.025
0.000
-0.048
-0.037
0.040
-0.069
-0.050
-0.032
-0.028
0.036
-0.004
0.033
-0.017

1
-0.042
-0.013
0.012
-0.047
0.011
-0.070
-0.031
-0.058
-0.017
0.019
-0.061
-0.009
0.059
0.008
0.015
-0.021
-0.019
-0.083
0.012
-0.070
-0.026

1
-0.061
0.176
0.054
0.021
-0.016
-0.022
0.015
0.076
0.027
-0.112
0.027
-0.033
0.021
-0.007
0.011
0.034
0.099
-0.024
0.013
0.051

1
-0.046
0.006
-0.027
0.122
0.008
0.003
0.043
-0.039
-0.041
-0.045
-0.069
-0.019
-0.041
0.021
-0.051
0.052
-0.017
-0.015
-0.057

1
-0.025
-0.046
-0.059
-0.039
-0.034
-0.034
-0.022
-0.111
-0.039
-0.059
0.119
-0.009
0.016
0.024
0.061
-0.023
0.072
0.016

1
-0.044
-0.057
-0.038
-0.033
-0.033
-0.021
-0.108
0.116
-0.027
0.054
-0.022
-0.027
-0.028
0.090
-0.021
0.084
0.077

1
-0.104
-0.068
-0.060
-0.060
-0.039
-0.196
-0.060
-0.104
0.042
0.162
-0.034
0.068
0.064
-0.040
0.117
-0.013

1
-0.088
-0.077
-0.077
-0.050
-0.253
-0.129
-0.134
-0.092
-0.071
0.102
-0.032
0.289
-0.064
0.060
0.033

1
-0.051
-0.051
-0.033
-0.166
-0.083
-0.088
-0.019
0.024
-0.072
0.023
0.074
-0.030
0.000
-0.012

1
-0.045
-0.029
-0.146
0.013
-0.077
-0.049
-0.026
0.069
-0.053
0.124
0.021
0.163
0.072

1
-0.029
-0.146
-0.034
-0.077
-0.014
0.012
0.046
-0.026
0.143
-0.036
0.042
0.046

1
-0.094
0.002
-0.043
0.106
-0.001
0.004
-0.013
0.063
-0.022
-0.045
0.036

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

1
0.244
-0.222
0.018
-0.003
-0.166
-0.023
-0.417
0.112
-0.207
-0.134

1
-0.137
-0.041
-0.162
-0.238
-0.099
-0.143
0.024
0.011
0.038

1
0.063
-0.143
0.037
0.043
-0.099
-0.001
-0.030
0.014

1
0.158
0.032
0.059
0.042
-0.028
-0.025
-0.017

1
-0.007
0.007
0.041
-0.008
-0.054
-0.021

1
-0.101
0.354
-0.058
0.134
0.071

1
0.019
0.001
-0.065
-0.014

1
-0.243
0.192
0.117

1
-0.075
0.006

1
0.182

37

1
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Empirical Tests
The present study conducts an event history analysis in two ways - with and
without instrumental variables. There are two reasons. First, Japanese ownership patterns
in China apparently differed from those in the United States between 1990-2009 (Zhang,
2015b), indicating that Japanese MNEs purposely choose their ownership strategies. The
resulting non-random samples may cause endogeneity issues in survival research, unless
the model is able to include all factors that influence a subsidiary’s survival into the
empirical model (Reeb et al., 2012; Semadeni et al., 2014; Shaver, 1998). Although the
present study has tried to address endogeneity issues by simplifying the research setting,
adopting comparative methodology, and including control variables (Gomes-Casseres,
1990; Makino, Isobe, and Chan, 2004b; Reeb et al., 2012), it is impossible to include all
factors that influence subsidiary survival. Second, although regression with instrumental
variables can control for unobservable non-random effects (Reeb et al., 2012; Semadeni
et al., 2014), prior survival studies seldom adopt this approach in empirical tests. The
model conducts event history analyses both with and without instrumental variables to
provide a direct comparison of results and examine the necessity of addressing
endogeneity in subsidiary survival research.
Some prior studies use a Cox proportional hazards model to perform survival
analysis (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Lu and Hébert, 2005; Lu and Xu, 2006). However,
the Cox model provided by STATA has not supported the regression with instrument
variables. Moreover, for a binary dependent variable, an Instrumented Variables Probit
(ivprobit) estimator is recommended to address endogeneity issues (Woodldridge, 2002).
Accordingly, the model uses a probit estimator instead of Cox model to conduct the event
history analysis without instrumental variables.
Event History Analysis without Instrumental Variables
Table 4.2 provides a hierarchical regression process of event history analysis
without instrumental variables. Model 1 includes all control variables. Model 2 includes
the profitability levels of subsidiaries, examining whether subsidiary financial
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performance relates to its mortality risk. Model 3 involves the time influences, examining
whether the Japanese subsidiaries’ mortality risk changes over time in the United States
and China. Model 4 includes the interactions between time and Japanese ownership level,
examining whether the O-S relationship changes over time in the two countries. It is
worth noting that the regressions use centered continuous variables. When the centered
variable Time equals zero, the real time is 1999, not 1990, according to Table 4.1.
Model 4 empirically examines the five groups of hypotheses. First, the
profitability level of a subsidiary significantly decreases its mortality risk (coefficients for
profit gain and loss are -0.193 and 0.224 respectively), supporting Hypothesis 1. Second,
according to the coefficients of the year index and their significance, the subsidiary
mortality risk in the United States does not change over time, except for an increase in
1998, possibly due to the influence of the economic crisis. However, subsidiary mortality
risk in China increases over time (coefficient = 0.122). These results also suggest that
before 1999 the mortality risk of subsidiaries in China was lower than in the United States.
Therefore, Hypothesis 2, 3a, and 3b are supported. Third, the Japanese ownership level
negatively relates to subsidiary mortality risk in 1999 (coefficient = -0.278), supporting
Hypothesis 4a but not 4b. In addition, the Japanese O-S relationship does not vary over
time in the two chosen countries, supporting Hypothesis 5a and 5b.
Event History Analysis with Instrumental Variables
The instrumental variable approach centers on finding one or more variables,
called instruments, which influence the independent variable (Japanese ownership level in
a foreign subsidiary in this study), but appears unlikely to affect the dependent variable
(subsidiary survival) (Reeb et al., 2012; Semadeni et al., 2014; Wintoki, Linck, and
Netter, 2012). Chosen instrumental variables must fulfil two conditions: relevance and
exogeneity. Relevance here means the degree to which the instruments correspond with
the focal independent variable. Exogeneity is

the degree to which instruments are

uncorrelated with the dependent variable (Kennedy, 2008; Semadeni et al., 2014).
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Table 4.2 Event History Analysis without Correcting for Endogeneity
Variable
Ownership Level (ln)
Ownership X Country
Time Effect
Time X Country
Time2 X Country
Ownership X Time
Ownership X Time X Country
Subsidiary profitability
Subsidiary profit gain
Subsidiary profit loss
Subsidiary Experience
Subsidiary age
Age2
Age X Country
Age2 X Country
MNE Subnational Experience
Number of subnational regions
Number of subnational regions X Country
Number of subsidiaries within a region
Number of subsidiaries within a region X Country
Country Dummy
Country (China =1; United States = 0)
Investment Purpose
Local market seeking
Global production network
Global distribution network
Local information collection
Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging
Industry and Sector Effect
(reference: manufacturing electronics)
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical
Manufacturing transport

Model 1
-0.248(0.089)**
0.099(0.145)

Model 2
-0.264(0.091)**
0.087(0.146)

Model 3
-0.258(0.091)**
0.042(0.145)

Model 4
-0.278(0.091)**
-0.035(0.199)

0.114(0.043)**
-0.009(0.006)

0.122(0.045)**
-0.010(0.006)
-0.022(0.019)
0.044(0.037)

-0.199(0.083)*
0.225(0.096)*

-0.190(0.084)*
0.228(0.096)*

-0.193(0.084)*
0.224(0.097)*

-0.001(0.007)
-0.001(0.000)†
0.030(0.022)
0.001(0.003)

0.004(0.007)
-0.001(0.000)*
0.028(0.022)
0.000(0.003)

0.005(0.007)
-0.001(0.000)*
0.018(0.023)
0.000(0.003)

0.005(0.007)
-0.001(0.000)*
0.018(0.023)
0.000(0.003)

-0.041(0.081)
-0.017(0.124)
0.388(0.095)***
-0.107(0.149)

-0.041(0.082)
-0.019(0.126)
0.394(0.096)***
-0.073(0.151)

-0.060(0.082)
-0.035(0.127)
0.397(0.097)***
-0.116(0.151)

-0.071(0.083)
-0.019(0.127)
0.399(0.097)***
-0.124(0.151)

0.128(0.145)

0.189(0.148)

0.066(0.168)

0.037(0.175)

-0.064(0.078)
0.019(0.099)
-0.140(0.079)†
0.051(0.079)
0.109(0.114)
-0.099(0.127)
0.222(0.103)*
-0.013(0.129)
0.097(0.126)

-0.099(0.080)
0.025(0.100)
-0.160(0.080)*
0.062(0.080)
0.112(0.114)
-0.105(0.127)
0.214(0.104)*
-0.025(0.132)
0.076(0.127)

-0.113(0.080)
0.006(0.101)
-0.156(0.081)†
0.053(0.081)
0.152(0.116)
-0.105(0.128)
0.207(0.104)*
-0.040(0.133)
0.066(0.127)

-0.118(0.081)
0.001(0.101)
-0.158(0.081)†
0.051(0.081)
0.154(0.116)
-0.103(0.128)
0.210(0.104)*
-0.038(0.133)
0.066(0.127)

-0.427(0.304)
0.079(0.214)
-0.271(0.173)
-0.216(0.154)

-0.458(0.319)
0.034(0.219)
-0.252(0.175)
-0.258(0.155)†

-0.430(0.318)
0.047(0.220)
-0.213(0.175)
-0.250(0.156)

-0.481(0.330)
0.035(0.220)
-0.218(0.175)
-0.253(0.156)
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Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
Manufacturing non metal
Manufacturing other
Subsidiary in wholesale or retail
(reference: manufacturing)
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service
Other MNE Specific Factors
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Other Subsidiary Specific Factors
Subsidiary size
Expatriate rate
More than one Japanese partners
More than one local partners
Year Index
Y1991
Y1992
Y1993
Y1994
Y1995
Y1996
Y1997
Y1998
Y1999
Y2000
Y2001
Y2002
Y2003
Y2004
Y2005
Y2006
Y2007
Y2008
Cons.
Log likelihood
Wald Chi2
***
p-value < 0.001; ** p-value < 0.01; * p-value < 0.05;

†

p-value < 0.1

0.007(0.168)
-0.249(0.220)
0.125(0.178)
-0.096(0.273)
-0.121(0.104)

0.001(0.169)
-0.298(0.226)
0.092(0.179)
-0.087(0.282)
-0.092(0.105)

0.013(0.171)
-0.288(0.228)
0.090(0.180)
-0.072(0.284)
-0.108(0.105)

0.010(0.171)
-0.296(0.229)
0.086(0.180)
-0.080(0.285)
-0.117(0.106)

0.160(0.106)
-0.084(0.119)

0.136(0.108)
-0.095(0.120)

0.138(0.108)
-0.095(0.121)

0.132(0.109)
-0.103(0.121)

0.035(0.029)
-0.027(0.023)
0.058(0.036)
-0.885(0.577)

0.027(0.030)
-0.028(0.023)
0.059(0.036)
-0.722(0.586)

0.025(0.030)
-0.028(0.024)
0.068(0.037)†
-0.751(0.591)

0.025(0.030)
-0.027(0.024)
0.067(0.037)†
-0.745(0.591)

-0.167(0.030)***
-0.386(0.178)*
-0.128(0.092)
0.000(0.169)

-0.168(0.031)***
-0.394(0.180)*
-0.156(0.094)†
-0.004(0.172)

-0.177(0.031)***
-0.439(0.182)*
-0.134(0.094)
0.018(0.174)

-0.175(0.031)***
-0.440(0.183)*
-0.142(0.094)
0.010(0.176)

-0.239(0.334)
0.300(0.265)
0.339(0.260)
0.254(0.257)
-0.065(0.283)
0.269(0.254)
0.212(0.256)
0.348(0.250)
0.290(0.246)
0.215(0.247)
0.080(0.251)
0.172(0.283)
-0.027(0.303)
0.084(0.297)
-0.148(0.319)
0.374(0.275)
0.403(0.269)
0.267(0.295)
-2.070(0.245)***
-781.451
212.08***

-0.232(0.341)
0.341(0.268)
0.381(0.263)
0.309(0.259)
-0.040(0.288)
0.320(0.257)
0.300(0.259)
0.420(0.253)†
0.358(0.249)
0.270(0.250)
0.130(0.254)
0.216(0.286)
-0.002(0.307)
0.113(0.304)
-0.051(0.321)
0.458(0.278)
0.505(0.272)
0.349(0.298)
-2.040(0.251)***
-769.957
235.70***

-0.231(0.344)
0.379(0.269)
0.390(0.265)
0.320(0.262)
-0.022(0.291)
0.345(0.259)
0.324(0.262)
0.434(0.256)†
0.350(0.252)
0.224(0.254)
0.051(0.260)
0.095(0.293)
-0.163(0.316)
-0.087(0.315)
-0.271(0.336)
0.244(0.297)
0.314(0.302)
0.198(0.339)
-2.015(0.254)***
-764.663
241.41***

-0.237(0.342)
0.372(0.268)
0.387(0.264)
0.323(0.260)
-0.018(0.289)
0.348(0.258)
0.328(0.260)
0.440(0.254)†
0.359(0.251)
0.232(0.253)
0.056(0.259)
0.107(0.292)
-0.156(0.315)
-0.073(0.315)
-0.258(0.335)
0.253(0.297)
0.330(0.301)
0.219(0.338)
-2.004(0.252)***
-763.806
237.76***
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Table 4.3 Event History Analysis after Correcting for Endogeneity
Variables
Ownership Level (ln)
Ownership X Country
Time Effect
Time X Country
Time2 X Country
Ownership X Time
Ownership X Time X Country
Subsidiary profitability
Subsidiary profit gain
Subsidiary profit loss
Subsidiary Experience
Subsidiary age
Age2
Age X Country
Age2 X Country
MNE Subnational Experience
Number of subsidiaries within a region
Number of subsidiaries within a region X Country
Investment Purpose
Local market seeking
Global production network
Global distribution network
Local information collection
Local labor seeking
Follow global stakeholders
New product development
Local resource seeking
International risk hedging
Industry and Sector Effect
(reference: manufacturing electronics)
Manufacturing food
Manufacturing apparel
Manufacturing chemical and medical
Manufacturing transport
Manufacturing machinery
Manufacturing metal
Manufacturing non metal
Manufacturing other

Model 1
-0.055(0.637)
-0.112(0.626)

Model 2
-0.095(0.641)
-0.113(0.628)

Model 3
0.109(0.651)
-0.313(0.636)

Model 4
0.158(0.618)
-0.463(0.617)

0.115(0.043)**
-0.009(0.006)

0.125(0.044)**
-0.009(0.006)
-0.002(0.032)
0.027(0.044)

-0.190(0.084)*
0.219(0.096)*

-0.180(0.085)*
0.222(0.096)*

-0.183(0.085)*
0.218(0.096)*

-0.001(0.007)
-0.001(0.000)†
0.026(0.022)
0.002(0.003)

0.004(0.007)
-0.001(0.000)*
0.022(0.022)
0.001(0.003)

0.005(0.007)
-0.001(0.000)*
0.017(0.022)
0.000(0.003)

0.005(0.007)
-0.001(0.000)*
0.018(0.022)
0.000(0.003)

0.388(0.106)***
-0.119(0.147)

0.388(0.108)***
-0.074(0.149)

0.414(0.106)***
-0.162(0.151)

0.419(0.103)***
-0.174(0.150)

-0.066(0.078)
0.021(0.101)
-0.134(0.080)†
0.045(0.079)
0.130(0.111)
-0.107(0.127)
0.228(0.110)*
-0.017(0.133)
0.088(0.125)

-0.101(0.080)
0.028(0.102)
-0.151(0.080)†
0.053(0.080)
0.142(0.112)
-0.114(0.128)
0.217(0.111)†
-0.024(0.136)
0.063(0.126)

-0.114(0.080)
0.001(0.103)
-0.149(0.081)†
0.047(0.080)
0.161(0.112)
-0.119(0.127)
0.226(0.110)*
-0.056(0.137)
0.062(0.126)

-0.118(0.080)
-0.002(0.101)
-0.152(0.081)†
0.047(0.080)
0.158(0.112)
-0.119(0.127)
0.231(0.108)*
-0.057(0.136)
0.063(0.125)

-0.424(0.316)
0.060(0.215)
-0.284(0.172)†
-0.223(0.157)
-0.010(0.168)
-0.251(0.226)
0.094(0.177)
-0.108(0.274)

-0.463(0.330)
0.013(0.220)
-0.265(0.173)
-0.276(0.159)†
-0.018(0.169)
-0.304(0.233)
0.056(0.179)
-0.104(0.283)

-0.413(0.331)
0.026(0.220)
-0.231(0.173)
-0.231(0.161)
-0.009(0.170)
-0.274(0.234)
0.060(0.178)
-0.079(0.284)

-0.447(0.343)
0.015(0.219)
-0.234(0.172)
-0.232(0.158)
-0.010(0.170)
-0.278(0.233)
0.057(0.178)
-0.085(0.283)
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Subsidiary in wholesale or retail
(reference: manufacturing)
MNE in wholesale or retail
MNE in service
Other MNE Specific Factors
MNE advertising intensity
MNE R&D intensity
MNE size
MNE ROS
Other Subsidiary Specific Factors
Subsidiary size
Expatriate rate
More than one Japanese partners
More than one local partners
Year Index
Y1991
Y1992
Y1993
Y1994
Y1995
Y1996
Y1997
Y1998
Y1999
Y2000
Y2001
Y2002
Y2003
Y2004
Y2005
Y2006
Y2007
Y2008
Cons.
Log likelihood
Wald Chi2
F Statistics
Exogeneity test (Chi2)
*** p-value < 0.001; ** p-value < 0.01; * p-value < 0.05; † p-value < 0.1

-0.153(0.132)

-0.126(0.135)

-0.156(0.135)

-0.165(0.127)

0.176(0.123)
-0.092(0.132)

0.154(0.126)
-0.098(0.133)

0.159(0.125)
-0.117(0.133)

0.163(0.126)
-0.127(0.129)

0.035(0.029)
-0.029(0.023)
0.047(0.031)
-0.882(0.577)

0.027(0.030)
-0.030(0.024)
0.049(0.031)
-0.725(0.585)

0.023(0.030)
-0.031(0.024)
0.050(0.031)
-0.736(0.588)

0.022(0.030)
-0.031(0.024)
0.049(0.031)
-0.727(0.587)

-0.159(0.032)**
-0.392(0.178)*
-0.105(0.104)
0.020(0.168)

-0.159(0.032)**
-0.404(0.180)*
-0.131(0.105)
0.023(0.172)

-0.168(0.033)**
-0.436(0.180)*
-0.102(0.106)
0.031(0.172)

-0.165(0.033)***
-0.433(0.180)*
-0.104(0.106)
0.016(0.174)

-0.242(0.333)
0.293(0.264)
0.332(0.260)
0.251(0.256)
-0.062(0.282)
0.264(0.253)
0.211(0.255)
0.354(0.249)
0.299(0.245)
0.227(0.246)
0.098(0.249)
0.195(0.281)
0.001(0.300)
0.099(0.294)
-0.123(0.316)
0.400(0.271)
0.424(0.265)
0.301(0.291)
-2.055(0.244)***
-2608.934
143.38***
43.93
0.09 (p = 0.770)

-0.235(0.340)
0.333(0.267)
0.373(0.263)
0.304(0.259)
-0.038(0.288)
0.315(0.256)
0.298(0.258)
0.428(0.252)†
0.371(0.248)
0.288(0.249)
0.156(0.253)
0.248(0.284)
0.038(0.304)
0.141(0.301)
-0.014(0.318)
0.497(0.275)
0.537(0.268)
0.396(0.294)
-2.021(0.251)***
-2593.190
156.89***
40.60
0.06 (p = 0.804)

-0.239(0.341)
0.364(0.268)
0.376(0.265)
0.313(0.260)
-0.018(0.289)
0.335(0.258)
0.320(0.260)
0.436(0.254)†
0.354(0.250)
0.232(0.251)
0.060(0.256)
0.107(0.289)
-0.152(0.312)
-0.103(0.313)
-0.274(0.333)
0.233(0.297)
0.287(0.301)
0.187(0.337)
-2.010(0.252)***
-2586.216
163.42***
35.83
0.31(p = 0.580)

-0.247(0.339)
0.353(0.266)
0.366(0.263)
0.308(0.259)
-0.024(0.287)
0.324(0.258)
0.309(0.259)
0.424(0.254)†
0.339(0.250)
0.215(0.252)
0.038(0.257)
0.089(0.290)
-0.176(0.314)
-0.125(0.318)
-0.294(0.335)
0.203(0.305)
0.265(0.310)
0.169(0.345)
-1.988(0.251)***
-2416.234
165.13***
37.62
0.48 (p = 0.490)
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Based on the event history analysis without addressing endogeneity issues, the
study finds that neither the regional diversity of an MNE nor the country dummy
influences a subsidiary’s mortality risk (Table 4.2). Moreover, prior studies have
suggested that both regional diversity and country dummy affect a Japanese MNE’s
ownership level (Zhang, 2015b). The study therefore includes The number of subnational
regions, The number of subnational regions X Country, and Country as three instruments
for instrumented event history analysis.
The study employs the same procedure to conduct hierarchical regression with the
ivprobit estimator, and present results in Table 4.3. The results confirm that the chosen
variables are valid for instrumented regression. Since all F statistics are greater than the
threshold value 13.91 (p-value < 0.001), chosen variables are strongly relevant to the
variable Ownership level (Stock and Yogo, 2005). Since Wald statistics are insignificant,
chosen variables satisfy exogeneity requirements. Therefore, three variables jointly fulfil
conditions as instruments and the regression results from ivprobit have been corrected for
endogeneity.
According to Model 4 in Table 4.3, the ivprobit regression confirms most of the
results with the probit estimator, except for Hypothesis 4a and 4b. After correcting for
endogeneity issue incurred by non-random samples of ownership choices, Japanese
ownership level does not significantly influence subsidiary mortality risk, supporting
Hypothesis 4b but not 4a.
Robustness Checks
Additional robustness checks were conducted to examine whether our empirical
results were sensitive to different methods. First, a Cox proportional hazards model was
used to conduct the survival analysis. The same results were obtained as those of the
estimator probit in terms of hypothesis tests. Second, estimators probit and ivprobit do
not explicitly support multilevel analysis. Even so, the estimators provide an option to
adjust the standard error for subsidiaries clustered by the same parent MNE or the same
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subnational region. These robustness checks generate the same results in terms of
hypothesis tests.

Discussion
This study investigates whether Japanese subsidiaries’ survival evolved during the
past two decades, and whether Japanese equity ownership levels influenced subsidiary
survival after controlling for subsidiary profitability. The empirical results with and
without instrumental variables afford conflicting results regarding whether a Japanese
MNE’s ownership level influenced its subsidiary’s survival, confirming the necessity of
addressing endogeneity issues in firm survival research. After correcting for endogeneity
issues, this study shows that a Japanese MNE’s ownership level does not influence its
subsidiary’s survival directly. In addition, the higher a Japanese subsidiary’s financial
performance is, the lower the probability that it would be terminated, confirming the
strong correlation between subsidiary profitability and survival (Cui and Kumar, 2012;
Geringer and Hebert, 1991). The empirical results also show that before 1999, the
survival probability of Japanese subsidiaries in China was higher than that in the United
States because of the importance of keeping options available. While the survival of
Japanese subsidiaries did not change in the United States, it declined in China over time
because of decreasing institutional uncertainty. Figure 4.1 delineates this evolutionary
difference.
Control Variables
The empirical tests also generate interesting results for some control variables.
First, the number of sibling subsidiaries in the same subnational region increases the
probability of the focal subsidiary’s termination. This indicates that the strategic
importance of a subsidiary declines when the number of sibling subsidiaries increases.
Second, the squared subsidiary age is negatively associated with mortality risk. This
indicates that overall, the operating experience of a subsidiary improves the probability of
its survival. Third, the embeddedness in global distribution networks enhances a Japanese
subsidiary’s survival rate because of its strategic position in its parent MNE’s global
integration. Moreover, if a Japanese subsidiary is established for new product
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development purpose, its relatively weak relatedness to the parent MNE results in a lower
survival rate (Cui and Kumar, 2012; Li, 1995; Lu and Xu, 2006; Xu and Lu, 2007).
Finally, subsidiary size and expatriate rate are negatively associated with
subsidiary mortality risk, confirming that these two factors help a subsidiary to capture
more managerial attention, resulting in a greater survival rate (Dhanaraj and Beamish,
2004; Plourde et al., 2014).
Figure 4.1 Subsidiary Survival between 1990-2008

Contributions and Next Steps
The present study provides rich implications for IB research. First, this study is
one of the first papers to examine how the survival prospects of foreign subsidiaries
evolves with changing institutional environment. A subsidiary’s mortality risk may
increase with decreasing institutional uncertainty. To be specific to Japanese MNEs
operating in China, when the advantages of relationship-based strategies decrease, they
will become less dependent on local environments and partners for future opportunities.
In this vein, it becomes easier for them to discontinue an operation than before
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(Santangelo and Meyer, 2011; Xia, 2011). Second, the study shows that existing
conclusions in the literature such as that foreign subsidiaries in developing countries are
more likely to survive than those in developed countries, are bounded when institutional
development varies over time and across geographies. Figure 4.1 indicates that after 1999,
Japanese subsidiaries are more likely to survive in the United States than in China. Third,
conclusions drawn in the present study constitute a finer-grained understanding of foreign
subsidiary survival in emerging markets. In particular, this study contributes to
institution-based review and it identifies that when deciding whether to terminate an
overseas subsidiary or not, the weights of subsidiary profitability and real options of
future opportunities change along with institutional transition. In the same vein, this study
also contributes to the literature that combines TCE and real options perspectives. While
this combination has been used to explain the international entry mode choice (Brouthers
et al., 2008a; Kogut, 1991), this study suggests that its explanatory power can improve
subsidiary survival research as well. Fourth, by controlling for financial performance and
the endogeneity issue caused by ownership choices, the study highlights that the foreign
subsidiary’s survival is not associated with the parent MNE’s equity control. In addition,
although the relationship between MNE ownership level and subsidiary profitability may
evolve along with institutional changes (Zhang, 2015a), the present study suggests that its
O-S relationship does not change over time. This confirms the importance of addressing
endogeneity issues in firm performance research (Reeb et al., 2012; Shaver, 1998).
This study provides rich implications for IB practices as well. First, it suggests
that managers should pay attention to both profits and future opportunities when
considering whether to terminate an overseas investment. In particular, given the evolving
nature of institutional development, managers should carefully estimate the potential reentry cost when deciding to terminate a foreign subsidiary in a volatile environment.
Second, since MNEs’ O-S relationship is longitudinally insignificant, an IJV is as useful
as a WOS in terms of accessing future opportunities. Therefore, an MNE may achieve
optimal utility of the resource commitment for a foreign subsidiary by leveraging its
equity ownership.
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This study draws academic attention to the value in re-examining MNEs’ O-S
relationship. However, it leaves several issues for future study. First, although an MNE’s
ownership level does not influence subsidiary survival, prior studies suggest that it affects
subsidiary profitability (e.g., Zhang, 2015a). It implies that the O-S relationship might be
mediated by the subsidiary profitability. Future research may examine the possible
mediating role of subsidiary profitability by following a four step procedure defined in
the literature (Baron and Kenny, 1986).
Second, the empirical results suggest that Japanese subsidiaries in China were
more likely to be terminated than those in the United States after 1999 (Figure 4.1).
Nevertheless, with ongoing economic liberalization, China still has higher institutional
uncertainty than the United States. Therefore, Japanese subsidiaries in China should be
more likely to survive than those in the United States for a long time because of the
importance of future opportunities. A possible reason for this discrepancy is that the
present study only compares subsidiaries in two countries, and other emerging economies
might provide better future opportunities. The choice of host countries constitutes another
endogeneity issue in research on subsidiary performance, requiring further investigation.
Third, existing literature has suggested that foreign MNEs are diverse in local
partner selection (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza, 2000; Shi et al., 2012).
Literature also suggests that domestic firms in China are heterogeneous in terms of their
embeddedness in central planning or market tracks, positions in domestic network
alliance, strategic orientation, and operational capabilities (Boisot and Child, 1996;
Kriauciunas and Kale, 2006; Luo, 1998a; Peng and Heath, 1996; Shi, Sun, Pinkham, and
Peng, 2014b). The heterogeneity of local partners results in variability in coordinating and
aligning operations (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Wilkinson, 1995; Park and Ungson, 2001).
Lacking relevant data, the present study is unable to address the variance of subsidiary
survival caused by local partners and mutual coordination, calling for further research.
Fourth, other mechanisms in addition to equity ownership and expatriate staffing
may relate to the level of managerial attention and control to a subsidiary (Luo, 2003;
Mjoen and Tallman, 1997). Managerial ties in addition to equity-based relationships may
help a foreign subsidiary in keeping future opportunities available (Acquaah, 2007; Li,
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Zhou, and Shao, 2009; Peng and Luo, 2000). Future research may consider whether these
factors influence a subsidiary’s survival prospect.
Fifth, this study uses a subsidiary’s investment purpose(s) and the number of its
sibling subsidiaries in the same subnational region to roughly address the influence of its
strategic position towards its parent MNE. Nevertheless, these factors cannot fully
explain its degree of integration within global subsidiary networks, which influences
subsidiary survival as well (Andersson et al., 2002; Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson, and
Vahlne, 2011; Kim and Hwang, 1992; Lee and Song, 2012).
Sixth, the Keiretsu membership of a Japanese MNE may influence its overseas
operation mode and the survival rate of its overseas subsidiaries (Banerji and Sambharya,
1996; Brouthers, Gao, and Napshin, 2014; Makino and Beamish, 1998). Keiretsu
membership is defined in terms of the origin of the owner of the firm, the affiliated mainbanks, and the conventional buyer-supplier links (Makino and Beamish, 1998). Lacking
relevant data, the present study does not address the influence of affiliated Japanese
partners on subsidiary survival. Future research may control for the influence of Keiretsu
membership of Japanese MNEs.
Seventh, the present study has neither separated formal institutions from informal
institutions, nor considered their differences in complexity, dynamism, and hostility
towards FDIs over the focal period. The literature usually categorizes regulatory rules as
formal institutions, and normative and cognitive rules as informal institutions (Peng and
Khoury, 2010; Scott, 1995). Uncertainties from formal and informal institutions differ in
that the former relates to local government while the latter relates to the local market (Li
et al., 2008). Without measuring institutions in different categories, the present study has
only utilized the general trends of China’s institutional environment between 1990-2009
in theoretical and empirical analyses. Future study could divide institutional uncertainty
further based on the differences between formal and informal institutions, and refine the
analysis of their influences on foreign subsidiaries’ survival rate and MNEs’ O-S
relationship.
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Eighth, the present study attributes subnational disparity in institutions to
institutional uncertainty at the country level. Nevertheless, some studies have investigated
subnational legitimacy such as relative openness at the subnational level (Meyer and
Nguyen, 2005; Schotter and Beamish, 2011; Wilkinson, Peng, Brouthers, and Beamish,
2008). Subnational level analysis can transfer partial country-level uncertainty into
subnational certainty, leading to finer-grained conclusions about the influences of
institutions on MNEs’ ownership choices. Future research could anchor the analysis at the
subnational level but simultaneously consider the homogeneity of subnational institutions
at the country level. For example, since some subnational regions in China such as
Shanghai and Shenzhen have ‘emerged’, it is feasible for future research to categorize
China’s subnational regions into emerging areas and emerged areas, so that the
heterogeneity of subsidiary survival and MNEs’ O-S relationship within in China can be
identified.
It would also be useful to examine the generalizability of the conclusions with
Japanese subsidiaries in other emerging and advanced economies, or subsidiaries of
MNEs from other countries.

Conclusion
This study investigates whether and how an MNE’s ownership choices and
priority of difference values influence its overseas subsidiaries’ survival. By comparing
Japanese subsidiaries in an emerging economy with those in an advanced economy, the
empirical results show that the ownership level of an MNE does not influence its
subsidiary’s survival directly. Moreover, this study finds that the survival of Japanese
subsidiaries is associated with their profitability. In addition, institutional uncertainty may
enhance subsidiary survival because of the options for future opportunities. As
institutional uncertainty declines during institutional transition, the survival of foreign
subsidiaries decreases.
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Chapter 5. General Conclusions
Introduction
A foreign subsidiary’s sustained competitive advantage depends on its ability to
manage the institutional context of its resource decisions (Brouthers, Brouthers, and
Werner, 2008b; Oliver, 1997; Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008). The institutional context in
an emerging economy is complicated by the coexistence of existing institutional voids
and economic liberalization. International business (IB) scholars have recognized the
importance of developing theories for international strategies in emerging economies
because of their distinct institutional environments (Arnold and Quelch, 1998; Hoskisson,
Eden, Lau, and Wright, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Nevertheless, existing literature
has not comprehensively addressed a prominent phenomenon: the increasingly higher
level of an MNE’s equity ownership in emerging economies resulting from regulatory
liberalization. It is critically important to understand the underlying mechanisms about
how managers in MNEs perceive relevant institutional conditions regarding their
ownership choices in emerging economies, and whether these changing ownership
choices will improve their subsidiary profitability and survival. The lack of this
understanding may undermine scholars and practitioners’ ability to formulate appropriate
ownership choices with respect to successful investments in emerging economies.
As such, drawing on multi-theoretic lenses based on the institution-based view,
this dissertation was conducted to address three broad research questions. First, how does
economic liberalization influence an MNE’s ownership choice in an emerging economy?
Second, how does economic liberalization change the relationship between an MNE’s
equity ownership and its subsidiary’s profitability? Third, how does economic
liberalization change the survival prospect of a foreign subsidiary and the relationship
between an MNE’s equity ownership and its subsidiary’s survival? Because of the
confounding effects stemming from multiple home and host countries, this dissertation
compared Japanese investments in China, the largest emerging economy that adopts an
incremental economic liberalization, and those in the United States, the largest advanced
economy, from 1990 to 2009.
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To investigate these questions, this dissertation synthesizes insights from literature
on institutional transition and subnational disparity (Chan, Makino, and Isobe, 2010; Peng,
2003; Shi, Markóczy, and Stan, 2014). First, the dissertation analyzes how institutional
transition and subnational disparity cause the complexity, dynamism, and hostility of
China’s institutional conditions, which vary across the geographic scope and over time
(Dess and Beard, 1984; Tan and Tan, 2005). These important characteristics of China’s
institutional environments complicate an MNE’s understanding of the states of
institutions and their cause-effect on subsidiary performance. This constitutes the main
sources of uncertainty that an MNE needs to cope with. Thereafter, this dissertation
theorizes how these important characteristics of institutional environments influence an
MNE’s cross-border ownership strategy. Further, the dissertation examines how an
MNE’s ownership choice and economic liberalization jointly affect the profitability and
survival of its subsidiaries. In addition, this dissertation addresses the endogeneity issue
of subsidiary performance research caused by ownership choices (Shaver, 1998).
Essay 1 (Chapter 2) investigates how economic liberalization and subsidiary
experience jointly influence an MNE’s ownership choice. Prior literature focused on an
emerging economy’s regulatory restriction and liberalization on foreign equity ownership
(Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Xia, Tan, and Tan, 2008). Essay 1 involves broader aspects of
economic liberalization such as political decentralization and corresponding subnational
disparity in institutions. Prior literature suggested that subsidiary experience reduces an
MNE’s reliance on local partner(s) and leads to higher MNE ownership level (Makino
and Delios, 1996). While this finding is true in an advanced economy, Essay 1 argues that
it should be re-examined within the institutional context of an emerging economy. The
institutional uncertainty stemming from the economic liberalization increases the
importance of relationship-based exchanges. In this vein, the operating experience of a
Japanese subsidiary is relevant to the ability to cooperate with local actors, rather than to
the ability to operate independently. As such, Essay 1 posits that a Japanese MNE
increases its ownership levels in China to adapt to the process of economic liberalization.
However, a Japanese MNE also tends to maintain equity-based relationship with local
actors with the increase in subsidiary experience. In contrast, a Japanese MNE only
increases its ownership levels in the United States with the accumulation of subsidiary
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experience. Empirical tests based on growth-curve models support the theory developed
in Essay 1.
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the relationship between MNE ownership level and
subsidiary profitability (O-P relationship). Prior studies suggested that a Japanese MNE’s
ownership level is positively associated with the subsidiary profitability in developed
countries and negatively associated with those in developing countries (Beamish and
Banks, 1987; Nitsch, Beamish, and Makino, 1996; Pan and Chi, 1999). Essay 2
investigates an underexplored topic, i.e., the evolution of the O-P relationship during
China’s economic liberalization. In accord with Essay 1, Essay 2 argues that China’s
economic liberalization has enhanced the institutional openness towards foreign
investments, positively altering an MNE’s O-P relationship. Meanwhile, economic
liberalization has engendered institutional uncertainty that an MNE must cope with,
negatively adjusting its O-P relationship. As economic liberalization in China deepens,
institutional openness increases, reducing an MNE’s reliance on local partner(s) to enter
the market. Meanwhile, institutional uncertainty declines (Tan and Tan, 2005), reducing
an MNE’s reliance on local partner(s) to understand the state of local institutions and their
cause-effect on subsidiary performance. Therefore, a Japanese MNE’s O-P relationship
positively evolves along with China’s economic liberalization. Empirical tests based on
multilevel longitudinal model support this proposition. Even so, for most years during
1990-2009, an MNE’s O-P relationship remains negative in China, indicating that high
equity control does not lead to superior subsidiary profitability in China. After addressing
the endogeneity issue caused by ownership choices, this conclusion remains true.
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) examines the relationship between MNE ownership level and
subsidiary survival (O-S relationship). While prior studies suggest that an MNE’s
ownership level is positively associated with subsidiary survival (Dhanaraj and Beamish,
2004; Li, 1995), they leave two research gaps. First, an MNE chooses its overseas
ownership level according to the institutional context within which it operates. This
indicates the necessity of addressing the endogeneity issue when investigating an MNE’s
O-S relationship (Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood, 2012; Shaver, 1998). Second, the
survival of a foreign subsidiary is associated with its short-term profitability and future
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opportunities. Although Essay 2 has addressed subsidiary profitability and the O-P
relationship, it is necessary to investigate whether and how the real options of future
opportunities influence subsidiary survival and alter the O-S relationship. In accordance
with the real options perspective, Essay 3 suggests that the institutional uncertainty
positively relates to the survival of a foreign subsidiary because of the importance of
keeping options available. Moreover, with declining institutional uncertainty in China,
there is decreasing need for an MNE to seize future opportunities by maintaining nonperforming subsidiaries. This has resulted in a declining survival rate of foreign
subsidiaries in China. The Event History tests show that (i) after addressing the
endogeneity issue caused by ownership choices, the ownership level of an MNE does not
influence its subsidiary’s survival in China and the United States; (ii) the survival of a
Japanese subsidiary is positively associated with its profitability in China and the United
States; and (iii) the survival rate of Japanese subsidiaries in China declines over time with
decreasing institutional uncertainty.
A summary of research findings in this dissertation is presented in Figure 5.1.

Contributions
The three essays included in this dissertation are the first studies to systematically
examine how an MNE adapts its ownership choice to accommodate the economic
liberalization of an emerging economy, and how this adaptation influences its
subsidiary’s performance. They jointly provide a finer-grained picture of an MNE’s
ownership choices and the performance of its subsidiary under the condition of economic
liberalization.
The three essays have made a number of theoretical contributions. They suggest
that both existing theories and best practices may in fact not be constant in time and space
because their inherent causalities may evolve over time or be bounded by geographies.
The theoretical and empirical findings in the dissertation enrich the OLI paradigm by
depicting an evolutionary relationship between institutional environment (L factor),
MNEs’ responses in terms of cross-border ownership strategies (I factor), and consequent
performance outcomes in overseas markets (Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan, 2010;
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Dunning, 1977; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Specific to the institution-based view, these
essays have suggested that the states and cause-effects of institutional conditions on
subsidiary performance may vary across geographic space and over time. Such variation
should be included in theoretical analyses and empirical testing when investigating MNEs’
cross-border strategies and their consequent outcomes. Otherwise, the relevant scholarly
understanding may be myopic in time and space (Augier and March, 2007).
More specifically, Essay 1 identifies that regulatory liberalization is not the only
institutional condition that influences an MNE’s ownership choice in an emerging
economy. It integrates three institutional influences stemming from different levels
(regulatory openness, institutional uncertainty, and peer pressure) into analysis. When
these institutional factors vary across geographies and over time, a foreign MNE’s
ownership choice will change accordingly. Moreover, Essay 1 has enriched the learning
perspective by distinguishing relationship-based experience from rule-based experience.
It suggests that the content and roles of subsidiary experience are contingent on
institutional conditions within which a foreign subsidiary operates.
However, Essay 1 cannot identify whether MNEs have sufficiently perceived all
relevant institutional influences and responded to them to an appropriate extent in terms
of enhancing subsidiary performance. It is addressed by Essay 2 and Essay 3. These two
essays jointly investigate the evolution of subsidiary performance under the conditions of
economic liberalization. In particular, Essay 2 has identified that institutional advantages
stemming from relationship-based practices of local partners are a type of critical
complementary resources for foreign MNEs during the host country’s institutional
transition. These institutional advantages are difficult to transfer/acquire because of their
relationship-orientation and volatility caused by institutional uncertainty. These findings
enrich the TCE perspective which usually only identifies specific firm assets as the
complementary resources that an MNE needs to access by using equity-based relationship.
In addition, Essay 3 contributes to the institution-based review by suggesting that when
deciding whether to terminate an overseas subsidiary, the weights of subsidiary
profitability and real options of future opportunities change along with institutional
transition. Essay 3 also contributes to the literature that combines TCE and real options
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perspectives. While this combination has been used to explain the international entry
mode choice (Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2008a; Kogut, 1991), this study suggests
that its explanatory power can improve subsidiary survival research as well.
These three essays have also made empirical contributions. First, they have
adopted advanced empirical methods using multilevel models and instrumented
regressions, in order to support theories with mathematical rigor. Second, they have
provided empirical support for the conceptual model of institutional transition proposed
by Peng (2003) and enriched the model with implications of subsidiary performance.
Third, the calculation of intra-class correlation in Essay 1 has identified the necessity of
considering subnational level analysis.
This dissertation provides rich implications to practitioners. First, to seize
opportunities in an emerging economy, an MNE needs to systematically and constantly
scan changing institutional conditions at different levels and formulate organizational
choices contingent on their strategic orientations. In particular, an MNE needs to foresee
institutional uncertainty emerging from the process of economic liberalization. Moreover,
when a foreign subsidiary operates in a volatile environment, managers in it should track
evolving institutional conditions rather than solely relying on existing experience. Third,
the empirical results show that the ownership level neither substantively influences
subsidiary profitability, nor significantly influences subsidiary survival. This indicates
that IJVs can perform as well as WOSs. Thus, an MNE may have overreacted to the
economic liberalization when increasingly adopting WOS entry or converting existing
IJVs to WOSs.

Limitations and Future Research
This dissertation leaves several issues for future study. First, this dissertation is
conducted using comparative approach. It assumes that the United States is a mature freemarket with little countrywide institutional change. With this assumption, a Japanese
MNE’s ownership choice and its association with subsidiary performance should not
significantly change over time. Nevertheless, empirical results of Essay 2 show that an
MNE’s O-P relationship does evolve somewhat over time in the United States too,
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implying that there may be neglected institutional changes at subnational or supranational
level (Cantwell et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2014). Future research can examine a broader
institutional setting.
Second, in addition to equity ownership, other mechanisms such as managerial
ties may help an MNE to assess institutional advantages in a foreign country (Acquaah,
2007). Moreover, an MNE may hedge the influence of institutional uncertainty by
leveraging its subsidiary portfolios around the world (Lee and Song, 2012). Further, local
actors are heterogeneous in terms of their complementary advantages (Boisot and Child,
1996). Therefore, more than a firm’s ownership structure, the tightness and continuity of
its capability to coordinate the various assets it creates, or to which it has access, is
becoming critical to its performance (Cantwell et al., 2010). Lacking relevant data, this
dissertation has not addressed these factors. Future research may identify an MNE’s
internal and external network portfolios and investigate how they jointly influence the
ownership choice and its consequences.
Third, the Keiretsu membership of a Japanese MNE may influence its overseas
operation mode and the performance of its overseas subsidiaries (Banerji and Sambharya,
1996; Brouthers, Gao, and Napshin, 2014; Makino and Beamish, 1998). Lacking relevant
data, the present study does not address the influence of affiliated Japanese partners on
subsidiary profitability. Future research may control for the influence of Keiretsu
membership of Japanese MNEs.
Fourth, this dissertation has neither separated formal institutions from informal
institutions, nor considered their differences in complexity, dynamism, and hostility
towards FDIs over the focal period. The literature usually categorizes regulatory rules as
formal institutions, and normative and cognitive rules as informal institutions (Peng and
Khoury, 2010; Scott, 1995). Uncertainties from formal and informal institutions differ in
that the former relates to local government while the latter relates to the local market (Li,
Poppo, and Zhou, 2008). Without measuring institutions in different categories, the
present study has only utilized the general trends of China’s institutional environment
during 1990-2009 in theoretical and empirical analyses. Future study could divide the
institutional uncertainty further based on the differences between formal and informal
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institutions, and refine the analysis of their influences on MNEs’ ownership choices and
their consequent performance in overseas markets.
Fifth, this dissertation attributes subnational disparity in institutions to institutional
uncertainty at the country level. Nevertheless, some studies have investigated subnational
legitimacy such as relative openness at the subnational level (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005;
Schotter and Beamish, 2011; Wilkinson, Peng, Brouthers, and Beamish, 2008).
Subnational level analysis can transfer partial country-level uncertainty into subnational
certainty, leading to finer-grained conclusions about the influences of institutions on
MNEs’ ownership choices. Future research could anchor the analysis at the subnational
level but simultaneously consider the homogeneity of subnational institutions at the
country level. Since some subnational regions in China such as Shanghai and Shenzhen
have arguably already emerged, it is feasible for future research to categorize China’s
subnational regions into emerging areas and emerged areas, so that the heterogeneity of
MNEs’ ownership choices, the O-P relationship, subsidiary survival, and the O-S
relationship within China can be explicitly identified.
Sixth, Essay 2 and Essay 3 imply that an MNE’s O-S relationship might be
mediated by subsidiary profitability. Future research may examine this possible mediating
role of subsidiary profitability.
Seventh, it would be useful to examine the generalizability of conclusions by
simultaneously using multiple institutional settings. It calls for theoretical effort to
establish comprehensive but still parsimonious constructs that can effectively measure all
institutional conditions.
Last but not least, based on secondary data, this dissertation leaves opportunities
to investigate organizational choices by using first-hand data. As such, more insights
about ownership choices from behavioral research can benefit scholars and managers.
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Figure 5.1 Summary of Dissertation Findings
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